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Abstract: Topics in Asymmetric Information: The role of firm disclosure 
policy 
In a world of asymmetric information, firms can use accounting policy as a means to signal 
information to outsiders and thereby, attempt to reduce the level of asymmetric information 
that outsiders face. I examine ‘commitment’ mechanisms that can be used by firms to signal 
information to outsiders. In particular, I examine the use of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) and the use of Fair Value Accounting (FVA). 
The first paper examine the influence of Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) as introduced by 
Hofstede (1980), on the cost of equity for IFRS adopters in the EU. The results suggest that 
though UAI has a detrimental impact on the cost of equity, UAI interacts with IFRS 
adoption, leading to a reduction in the cost of equity for firms based in higher UAI countries 
that use IFRS. The results are being driven by the mandatory adopters group, who were 
found to benefit from IFRS adoption and a higher UAI, while voluntary and 
Voluntary/Mandatory adopters appear to suffer from an increase in their cost of equity. The 
paper therefore suggests that differences in cultural norms towards uncertainty may be able 
to explain part of the heterogeneity in the cost of equity exhibited by firms that have adopted 
IFRS. 
The second paper examines the influence of FVA on the design and renegotiation of debt 
contracts. The paper is an extension of the Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009) model and 
incorporates the use of FVA as a disclosure mechanism and compares it to a setting where 
the firm uses Historical Cost Accounting (HCA). The model suggests that FVA firms would 
benefit from fewer covenants and a lower cost of debt. In subsequent extensions to the 
model, I incorporate the different FVA classifications and the model suggests that the Level 
1 classification is expected to be more information relevant to lenders compared to the Level 
3 classification. 
The third paper uses the predictions from the second paper and examines the influence of 
FVA on a sample of US private loans obtained from LPC/Dealscan. The results of the paper 
suggest that the Level 1 FVA classification results in a lower number of Balance sheet 
covenants, and a lower cost of debt. However, we do not find positive evidence to suggest 
that the Level 1 classification leads to a reduction in the Covenant intensity index or an 
increase in the number of loan amendments. The Level 2 and 3 classifications appear to 
exhibit results that suggest that they are considered less informationally relevant compared 
to the Level 1 classification. 
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I. Introduction 
In a world of symmetric information, firm insiders and outsiders would have the same 
information and the firm’s choice of accounting policy would not matter. However, once we 
move away from a symmetric information world to a world in which there is asymmetric 
information, as we see in practise, accounting policy can have an impact on how outsiders 
view the firm. 
In his seminal paper, Akerlof (1970) showed how markets for used goods may shrink or 
even disappear when sellers are better informed about the quality of the good than buyers. 
When we apply his findings to corporate finance, in particular to capital structure, the 
implications are that in situations where firm insiders (managers) are better informed than 
firm outsiders, namely being debt and equity financers, that outsiders may discount the value 
of the firm and its earnings and therefore, the firm may raise less funds or raise funds at a 
greater cost than it would otherwise have to in a symmetric information world. 
In an effort to reduce this potentially large additional cost, firms may pursue strategies that 
can signal their ‘quality’ to outsiders, and thereby mitigate any ‘adverse selection’ fears that 
the financier may have. Prior literature has shown that firms make use of mechanisms such 
as dividends (Bernheim and Wantz ,1995, Bhattacharya, 1979), debt issue (Leland and Pyle 
1977, Myers and Majluf 1984), and share repurchases (Ofer and Thakor 1987), in order to 
attempt to signal their quality to outsiders, and thereby obtain more favourable terms.  
Accounting policy choice has been viewed using three different perspectives: Opportunistic 
behaviour by managers (Mian and Smith, 1990), efficient contracting (Malmquist, 1990, and 
information related (Bartov and Bodnar, 1996) perspectives. This thesis examines the 
intersection of the three perspectives. The thesis examines certain opportunities that have 
arisen for firms in the past few years, it examines whether it leads to more efficient 
contracting and whether the financiers experience a reduction in the level of information 
asymmetry, via examining the capital market benefits that the firms observe. 
There is a growing literature on firm disclosure policy and how this policy can be shaped in 
order to signal the firm’s quality. Disclosure policy can be used to signal firm quality to 
market participants, by either increasing the disclosure level, disclosure quality, or both 
(Verrecchia 2001, Diamond 1985, Diamond and Verrecchia 1991), and the disclosure of 
information in order to reduce asymmetric information has been shown to reduce a firm’s 
cost of capital.  
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In this thesis, I explore certain situations where firms may use a change in accounting 
disclosure policy as a means to send a signal to outsiders. In particular, the first paper focuses 
on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and how a firm may use IFRS 
adoption as a mechanism to improve its information disclosure to equity holders and how 
this change in disclosure policy will be viewed by market participants based on the 
prevailing cultural norms towards Uncertainty Avoidance. Prior literature on IFRS adoption 
has shown that IFRS adoption leads to an increase in foreign analyst following and a 
reduction in forecast errors (Alves et al 2008), an increase in abnormal return volatility and 
trading volume for adopting firms (Landsman et al, 2012), more positive capital market 
reaction for firms from lower quality information environments (Armstrong et al, 2010), to 
improve contracting efficiency in the private debt market (Tsui et al, 2011), and an increase 
in foreign institutional ownership (Covrig et al, 2007).  
The first paper shows that the level of Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) in a country, can have 
an effect on the cost of equity for firms that adopt IFRS. In particular, I show that though a 
higher UAI score is expected to lead to a higher cost of equity, the higher UAI score is able 
to interact with IFRS adoption to lead to a lower cost of equity for firms, and this benefit 
appears to be prevalent even during the financial crises of 2007-8. 
However, I find that the effect of UAI is not uniform, but rather that mandatory adopters 
appear to benefit from a decrease in their cost of equity, while voluntary and 
voluntary/mandatory adopters appear to suffer from an increase in their cost of equity.  
The contribution I make to the growing literature on IFRS adoption is to examine the 
adoption decision within the context of the cultural attitude towards uncertainty. I use 
Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) Uncertainty Avoidance Index as the measure for a country’s attitude 
towards uncertainty and examine the effect of IFRS adoption on the firm’s cost of equity 
capital. The novel addition of this particular paper is the examination of whether the cultural 
attitude towards uncertainty is partly responsible for the heterogeneity in capital market 
benefits that have been observed in prior literature for adopting firms across countries.  
Another key contribution of the paper is to show results that suggest that firms may 
incorporate their country’s cultural norms and traditions when deciding on a change in 
disclosure policy. The results show that in certain situations, the prevailing cultural norms 
can have an effect on how market participants react to a change in a firm’s disclosure policy. 
The second paper extends the model introduced by Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009). The main 
contribution of the paper is to introduce a model which is able to incorporate how different 
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accounting disclosure regime may influence debt contracts, covenants, and the renegotiation 
process.  
The second paper theoretically examines the design and renegotiation of covenants in debt 
contracts under asymmetric information. In particular, I examine the influence of two 
distinct accounting regimes on the design and renegotiation of covenants. The model has a 
setting wherein future firm investments are efficient in some states but also result in a 
transfer from the Lender to the firm. The model has symmetric information concerning the 
efficiency of the investments, however, the firm is better informed about any potential 
transfers compared to the lender. Information acquisition differs under the two different 
accounting regimes. Under the Fair Value (FVA) regime, the Lender obtains the true 
realisation of the transfer value prior to the investment being made. However, under the 
Historical Cost (HCA) regime, the lender has to acquire this information at a cost.  
Given the above setting, I show that the presence of asymmetric information between the 
firm and the lender, and between the two different accounting regimes leads to the allocation 
of a greater number of decision rights (covenants) ex ante to the more uniformed party, which 
is the lender facing a HCA regime, then would be the case under symmetric information.  
The model also suggests that firms that use FVA should be rewarded ex ante by the lender 
via requiring a lower yield on the debt contracts. Finally, the model suggests that the trade-
off between the potential cost savings from delaying information and the potential benefits 
from acquiring information earlier, results in the lender requiring less strict debt covenants 
under the FVA regime.  
In subsequent extensions to the basic model, I introduce a scenario wherein the HCA firm is 
allowed to revalue and thereby disclosure more information to the lender. Under this 
scenario, I show that the deal structuring in terms of the number of covenants and the cost 
of debt improves for the firm compared to the HCA regime in the base model. However, the 
FVA firm still observes a better structure in terms of lower covenants and cost of debt.  
I also introduce a scenario in which we have two different versions of FVA, which are meant 
to proxy for the Level 1 and the Level 3 classifications, where the Level 1 classification is 
the FVA assumed in the base model and the Level 3 classification contains noise compared 
to the Level 1 classification. I am able to show that the Level 3 classification will be seen as 
less informationally relevant to the lender than the Level 1 classification, and as a 
consequence, will be offered a higher number of covenants and a higher cost of debt. 
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The contribution of the second paper is threefold. First, it is the first theoretical paper that 
explicitly links the introduction of FVA to covenant design and cost of debt. At present, 
there is no research that attempts to theoretically link FVA to covenant design, and as a 
result, this paper is able to extend existing literature by introducing a theoretical framework 
that produces a model that is able to incorporate the change in the information set, and 
therefore, the change in covenant design. 
The second contribution of the paper is that it theoretically shows why lenders may prefer a 
certain disclosure policy over another, and the channels through which differences in 
information sets may be incorporated into the design of loan contracts, including the 
inclusion of covenants, the level of covenant strictness, and the cost of debt. 
The third contribution of the paper is that it is able to theoretically show why lenders may 
discriminate between the different FVA classifications when structuring the loan.  
The third paper builds on the predictions made by the model in paper 2, and tests these 
predictions against a sample of US private loan contracts obtained from LPC / Dealscan. The 
paper’s main contribution is to show results that suggest that the FVA classifications have 
an influence on covenant design and the cost of debt. Again, this appears to be the first 
empirical paper that explicitly links FVA to covenant design and cost of debt. Existing 
literature has linked IFRS adoption to debt issuance and to cost of debt (Tsui et al, 2011) 
however, there is no existing research that links Fair Value accounting to covenant design 
and cost of debt.  I examine the influence of the FVA classifications on the occurrence and 
number of loan covenants, the cost of debt, the covenant intensity index (covenant 
strictness), and the number of ex-post loan amendments.  
The third paper suggests that the Level 1 classification tends to exhibit a decrease in the 
number of Balance sheet covenants, but observes no change in the number of Income 
statement or Non-financial covenants. The paper also finds that the level 1 classification also 
observes a lower cost of debt. For the Level 2 classification, I find that it observes an increase 
in the initial yield of debt and a decrease in the number of loan amendments, both of which 
suggest that lenders appear to find the Level 2 classification to be less informationally 
relevant. Finally, the level 3 classification is observed to exhibit a lower number of Income 
statement covenants and a lower covenant intensity index.  
The third paper contributes to the capital structure and accounting literature, by providing 
insights into the impact of FVA on debt contract design, its influence on covenant inclusion 
and strictness, on loan amendments and on the cost of debt. Prior studies have tried to link 
13 
 
‘conservative’ accounting to covenant design and to cost of debt, however, I show a link 
between the recently introduced FVA regime and its ability to effect debt contract design 
and the cost of debt.  
The results suggest that lenders may prefer certain accounting regimes over others and that 
in the context of private loan contracts, lenders appear to prefer accounting regimes that are 
meant to improve the information set available to them by disclosing asset and liability 
values, and the resulting gains and losses in a timely manner.  
The thesis therefore contributes to existing literature by examining situations and conditions 
under which a change in firm’s disclosure policy can be used to influence equity and debt 
financing.  
Section II describes some key prior literature that sets the basis of the theoretical framework 
that underpins the thesis. Section III introduces the first paper: ‘The influence of Uncertainty 
Avoidance on liquidity and Cost of equity’. Section IV introduces the second paper: 
‘Accounting choice and debt design’. Section V introduces the third paper: ‘Debt design and 
Fair Value Accounting: Covenant occurrence, covenant intensity, loan amendments, and 
cost of debt’.  Finally, Section VI provides the conclusion to the thesis.  
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II. Literature Review 
In this section, I examine some of the key prior literature that underpins my thesis. I also 
include separate literature reviews that contain the relevant literature in each of the three 
papers.  
The natural starting point for this thesis is Akerlof (1970), who showed how markets for 
used goods may suffer from adverse selection due to the presence of asymmetric 
information. Akerlof (1970) showed that markets for used goods may shrink or even 
disappear when the sellers are better informed about the quality of the good compared to the 
buyers. The implications of Akerlof (1970) are that firms/issuers may raise a lower amount 
of funds or reduce the number of times they try to raise funds, when financiers face 
asymmetric information concerning the quality of the firm.  
In an effort to reduce this potentially large additional cost, firms may pursue strategies that 
can signal their ‘quality’ to outsiders, and thereby mitigate any ‘adverse selection’ fears that 
the financier may have. Prior literature has shown that firms make use of mechanisms such 
as dividends (Bernheim and Wantz ,1995, Bhattacharya, 1979), debt issue (Leland and Pyle 
1977, Myers and Majluf 1984), share repurchases (Ofer and Thakor 1987), the use of 
information intermediaries (Franco et al , 2009) and monitoring and bonding (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976), in order to attempt to signal their quality to outsiders, and thereby obtain 
more favourable terms.  
Financial reporting can be used as a mechanism in reducing the information asymmetries 
that exist between managers and outsiders. This informational asymmetry largely exists due 
to managers having better information than outsiders but being reluctant to disclose 
information that may be detrimental to their own interests (Verrecchia 2001).  
However, Leftwich (1980), Watts and Zimmerman (1986), and Beaver (1998) suggest that 
accounting information can be construed as a ‘public’ good given that existing shareholders 
implicitly bear the full cost associated with producing the information but are unable to 
charge potential investors for the use of the information. As a result, potential investors are 
able to ‘free ride’ on the information paid for by existing shareholders, which may lead to 
the underproduction of accounting information. These authors argue that regulation may 
therefore be required to ensure that the underproduction of information is mitigated.  
Prior research has suggested that information asymmetry results into higher transaction costs 
for a firm’s shares, and therefore, increases the required return on the shares. The information 
asymmetry hypothesis suggests that in order to maximise firm value, managers have an 
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incentive to reduce information asymmetry by adopting accounting standards/policies that 
would make financial statements more informative to financers. Bartov and Bodnar (1996) 
find that firms with greater information asymmetry are more likely to adopt more 
informative accounting methods when they become available.   
Boot and Thakor (2001) examine three types of disclosures; the first is, information that 
complements the information available only to informed investors. The second is 
information that is orthogonal to that which any investor can acquire and which complements 
information available to all investors. The last type is information that reveals to all investors 
what was previously only known by the informed investors. They find that in equilibrium, 
all types of firms would voluntarily disclose all three types of information. They also find 
that complementary information disclosure by firms strengthen the investor’s private 
incentives to acquire information.  
Managers are able to reduce information asymmetry using financial reporting via two 
mechanisms. Managers can either ‘commit’ to fully disclose their private information 
concerning the firm, or they can engage in ‘voluntary’ disclose. A manager’s commitment 
to disclose information is an ex ante decision that is meant to provide information to 
outsiders irrespective of the contents. However, a voluntary disclosure policy is an ex post 
decision made by managers to provide information after observing the content. 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) examine German firms that have switched from Local 
accounting standards to an international reporting regime, which entails a greater level of 
commitment by the firm to increase the level of financial reporting disclosure. The authors 
find a reduction in the information asymmetry component of the cost of capital for the firms 
that have switched compared to firms that continue to follow German accounting standards.   
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) suggest that a credible commitment by managers to 
improve disclosures results in a higher share price due to the reduction in information 
asymmetry and an increase in trading liquidity.  Lafond and Watts (2008) find results that 
suggest that firms commit to timelier recognition of losses (‘Conservatism’) when investors 
suffer from low information transparency.  
Healy and Palepu (1993,1995) suggest that investor’s perceptions of a firm are important 
variables for managers that expect to issue debt or equity. As a result, managers who expect 
to undertake capital market transactions have incentives to provide voluntary disclosure to 
financiers in an attempt to mitigate the asymmetric information, and thereby reduce the 
firm’s cost of funding. 
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In this section, I have provided some existing literature that shows the impact of asymmetric 
information on debt and equity financing, some of the mechanisms that management may 
adopt to mitigate the effect of asymmetric information on financing decisions and costs, and 
some literature on how accounting information and choice may be used by the firm to reduce 
the effect of information asymmetry. Further in the thesis, I include more detailed literature 
reviews in each of the three papers that provide a more in-depth analysis of the existing 
literature relevant for that particular paper. 
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III. Paper 1: ‘The influence of Uncertainty Avoidance the Cost of 
equity’  
1. Introduction 
Over the past couple of decades, the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), and before that, International Accounting Standards (IAS), has gained considerable 
attention and momentum across the globe. At present, over 10011 countries require or allow firms 
to use IFRS as the basis of their financial reporting statements. Several more countries are 
considering either to require the use of IFRS, or to allow firms to voluntarily use IFRS. Firms have 
in the past, and continue to adopt IFRS voluntarily, before the mandate from their respective 
regulatory authorities. An important issue that has arisen in the literature surrounding capital market 
research concerning IFRS and IAS adoption is whether the capital market effects are heterogeneous 
or homogenous across firms, countries, and on the firm’s adoption decision. 
The aim of this paper is to attempt to explain the heterogeneity found in the economic benefits of 
IFRS adoption. The paper attempts to answer this question by examining whether the cross-country 
differences in economic benefits stemming from IFRS adoption can be explained partly by the pre-
existing cultural norms in the country. In particular, we examine whether the pre-existing cultural 
attitude towards uncertainty avoidance, has an influence on the economic benefits that accrue from 
the adoption of IFRS, and whether the cross-country difference in uncertainty avoidance can explain 
the heterogeneity found in the economic benefits. We use Hofstede’s (2001) Uncertainty Avoidance 
Index (UAI) as our measure for the level of uncertainty in a country. The measure relates to the level 
of anxiety in a country when it is confronted with an unknown future (Hofstede, 1980, 2001). 
Countries with higher scores for UAI indicate societies with a lower tolerance for unstructured 
situations and are more skeptical about the potential rewards from risky ventures and apply a higher 
discount rates to perceived risks. (Fidrmuc and Jacob, 2010).  
We hypothesis in this paper that the move from local accounting standards to IFRS adoption was a 
risky venture, with uncertain risks and rewards for shareholders, firms and other market participants. 
However, the move from local accounting standards to IFRS adoption, with its focus on improved 
financial reporting quality and quantity, coupled with increased comparability across countries, 
should lead to improvements in the cost of equity and liquidity of firms, especially firms located in 
higher UAI countries, where there is a pre-existing preference for a lower degree of information 
disclosure (Gray, 1988). Therefore, we expect that firms in higher UAI countries gain a greater benefit 
from adopting IFRS since these firms have the potential to obtain larger economic benefits from 
                                                             
1 Source: www.ifrs.org  
22 
 
adoption compared to firms in lower UAI countries, where the existing financial reporting standards 
are meant to more informative (Gray, 1988). 
However, part of the heterogeneity in the economic benefits may be due to cross firm differences in 
financial reporting quality. Daske et al (2013) suggest that the economic benefits that accrue to firms 
are related to the degree of financial reporting transparency of the firm, with firms that engage in a 
greater degree of financial reporting transparency benefiting more from IFRS adoption.  
Therefore, in this paper, we analyze whether IFRS adoption, controlling for increased financial 
reporting transparency, results in greater economic benefits for firms located in higher UAI countries, 
compared to adopters in lower UAI countries, and non-adopters.  
We posit that the channel by which the cost of equity will be affected, will be improved transparency 
caused by the move to IFRS and improved financial reporting, which will be magnified in higher 
UAI countries due to the move to IFRS from using a pre-existing set of accounting standards that are 
more conservative in nature and which prefer not to disclose information.  
To highlight the influence of Uncertainty Avoidance on the capital market effects, we examine cross-
sectional differences in capital market outcomes for IFRS adoption firms, alongside the role of firm-
level reporting incentives and the strength of regulatory enforcement. We show that Uncertainty 
Avoidance by itself leads to a higher cost of equity. However, uncertainty avoidance interacting with 
IFRS adoption, and controlling for increased financial reporting transparency and regulatory 
enforcement, has significant explanatory power for the direction and level of the observed cost of 
equity benefit. That is, we find that while UAI in itself causes a higher cost of equity, the use of IFRS 
and a higher UAI score leads firms to enjoy a reduction in their cost of equity, though we do not find 
for this benefit to fully compensate for the effect of UAI. We find that this interaction between IFRS 
adoption and UAI is robust even to the addition of additional explanatory factors, such as Daske et 
al’s (2013) three financial transparency variables and Hail et al’s (2013) regulatory enforcement 
variables.  
Further, we find that the effect of UAI and IFRS is not uniform, but rather that mandatory adopters 
appear to benefit from a decrease in their cost of equity, while voluntary and voluntary/mandatory 
adopters appear to suffer from an increase in their cost of equity. On closer examination, we find that 
mandatory adopters tend to be larger firms, that are more closely related to Daske’s (2013) three 
SERIOUS variables, compared to the voluntary and voluntary/mandatory groups. Our results suggest 
that the heterogeneity the cost of equity may be explained partly by the cultural norms of the country, 
and also based on whether the firm is an earlier or mandatory adopter.  
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Our sample is composed of firms from 22 EU member states and comprises the period 2000-2013. 
Our sample selection is based on our need to ensure that IFRS adoption occurs at around the same 
period of time for all firms, and that the IFRS accounting standards adopted by the firms are identical. 
The EU adoption in 2005, led to the requirement for listed entities in these member states to have to 
mandatorily adopt IFRS from the 1st of January, with the earlier adoption being voluntary. Therefore, 
listed entities in these countries adopted the same version of the IFRS2 standards on the same date, 
with identical subsequent updates of accounting standards taking place at the same time for all the 
affected firms in the countries. Focusing on EU adoption allows us to control for any potential cross-
country variations in the IFRS adopted by the sample countries.3   
We also choose the period in question in order to allow us to examine the potential economic benefits 
prior to EU wide adoption, prior to the global recession, and post the global recession. 
Our analysis centers on three groups of firms: voluntary, voluntary/mandatory, and mandatory adopters. 
We do this for two main reasons. First, the research design is based on uncertainty avoidance having a 
slightly different influence on the capital market effects for the three groups of firms. By decomposing 
IFRS adopters into mandatory, voluntary/mandatory and voluntary adopters, we are able to examine 
whether uncertainty avoidance causes a heterogeneous effects on the three groups. 
Second, the research aim is to examine whether capital market participants differentiate between these 
three groups, and whether uncertainty avoidance influences this decision. By decomposing the three 
groups, we are able to isolate this effect. 
We hypothesis that the economic benefits accruing from IFRS adoption should be different for the three 
types of adopters. Mandatory adopters are required by their regulatory body to use IFRS, while 
voluntary adopters are those that adopt IFRS prior to its regulatory mandate. We posit that for identical 
firms, the firm in a higher UAI country should benefit more from the earlier adoption of IFRS, given 
the cultural norms for predictability in the country and firm going counter to the cultural norms of its 
host nation, therefore, for such a firm, the incentives to go counter to its cultural norms must suggest that 
the benefits out-way the costs associated with the action.  However, post the mandatory requirement, 
both mandatory and voluntary/mandatory firms in higher UAI countries should benefit more than 
identical firms from lower UAI countries because the improvement in the financial statements 
disclosure is expected to be larger for such firms compared to firms in lower UAI countries which are 
expected to have a pre-existing greater disclosure of accounting information prior to IFRS adoption, 
and due to there being a lower level of uncertainty attached to the adoption once it becomes mandatory.   
                                                             
2 “IFRS as adopted by the EU”. 
3 IFRS adoption is a global convergence program with individual countries converging their local GAAP standards 
towards IFRS on regular basis. Only the EU on 01/01/2005 fully converged their local standards to one form and 
continue to make all changes on the same date. Source: Pwc, Deloitte IASPLUS.  
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We identify voluntary IFRS adopters based on accounting standards data in WorldScope and 
DataStream. We create an IFRS reporting panel, which allows us to provide descriptive evidence 
on the adoption trends around the world. 
We begin the tests by analyzing whether IFRS reporting in higher UAI countries, on average, is 
associated with a lower cost of equity relative to local GAAP firms, and relative to identical firms in 
lower UAI countries. We examine the realized annual return of equity. Using this variable, (and several 
others in the sensitivity analyses), we find evidence that suggests that UAI appears to cause an increase 
in the cost of equity as expected. However, once we introduce the interaction term for IFRS and UAI, 
we find that IFRS adopters in higher UAI countries appear to benefit from a decrease in their cost of 
equity. We control for firm level heterogeneity in the capital market effects due to differences in 
financial reporting quality using Daske et al’s (2013) three measures for improved financial reporting. 
The idea behind including these variables in the tests is to illustrate that markets respond positively to 
changes in firms reporting transparency. These variables incorporates the improvement in firm level 
transparency, in terms of a change in the reporting incentives (SERIOUS1), a change in the reporting 
behavior (SERIOUS2), and a change in the reporting environment (SERIOUS3).   
We find that improved financial reporting transparency, as measured by the three variables introduced 
by Daske et al (2013), leads a reduction in the cost of equity. This result for all three of the Daske et al 
(2013) SERIOUS variables is in line with our expectations and with prior research. We also control 
for cross-country variations in regulatory enforcement using variables introduced by Hail et al (2013).  
When we bifurcate the IFRS group into mandatory (M), voluntary/mandatory (VM) and voluntary 
adopters (V), we find that for the M group, their interaction terms with IFRS are significant and 
negative, suggesting that they benefit from a reduction in the cost of equity. While we find that for the 
VM group, they exhibit a significant and negative relationship, suggesting that they suffer from an 
increase in the cost of equity. 
In Section 6, we bifurcate our sample into different time periods to examine the effect of adoption and 
the behavior of the three different adopters. We find that during the 2000-04 period (Pre-EU adoption), 
and during the 2005-07 period, only the M group exhibits significant and negative interaction terms. 
We also find that during the 2008-13 time period, the M group exhibit significant and negative 
interaction terms, while the VM group exhibits a significant and positive term, suggesting that the 
influence of UAI on IFRS holds even during the period of the Global Recession of 2007-8. 
To benchmark these findings, we incorporate other cross-country variables used in prior research, 
namely Schwartz et al (2005,2007), Hofstede (1980, 2001), GLOBE, La Porta et al (2006) and 
Religious demographics, and use these variables to explain the cross sectional variation. The results 
from the robustness tests and from the main analysis, support our main analsysis and suggests that 
there is some evidence that the heterogeneity in the economic benefits from IFRS adoption may be 
caused by cross-country differences in uncertainty. We generally find that similar proxies introduced 
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by Schwartz et al (2005,2007),GLOBE, La Porta et al (2006), Religious demographics and Hofstede’s 
other cultural dimensions, all suggest that there is some evidence to suggest that mandatory adopters 
in countries with a higher pre-existing need for certainty or conservatism, tend to experience greater 
economic benefits compared to their peers from countries where there is a lower need for certainty or 
conservatism.  
The paper’s three main contributions to the literature are as follows. First, the study is among the first 
to highlight and test the effect of Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) on the capital market effects for IFRS 
adopting firms. Existing studies tend to focus on firm-level differences, such as transparency, 
incentives, and capital market idiosyncrasies. This study shows that country level uncertainty avoidance 
can play a significant role in determining the capital market effects of IFRS adoption. In doing so, we 
contribute to existing literature around the heterogeneity of capital market effects of IFRS adoption 
(Daske et al 2013, Ball et al 2003, Leuz et al 2003). Second, we find results that suggest that the 
influence of cultural norms can be long lasting in certain cases.  When we bifurcate the adoption 
sample into voluntary and mandatory adopters, we are able to show that only the mandatory adopters 
benefit from a decrease in their cost of equity, while voluntary and voluntary/mandatory appear to 
suffer from an increase in their cost of equity. The findings add to existing literature that has found 
evidence that firms are able to use dividends (Bhattacharya 1979), share repurchases (Ofer and 
Thakor 1987) or issue debt (Leland and Pyle 1977) as mechanisms to signal their quality to market 
participants. We find evidence to support existing literature on disclosure quality and quantity, and 
how disclosure quality can be used to signal firm quality to market participants, by either increasing 
the disclosure level, disclosure quality, or both (Verrecchia 2001, Diamond 1985, Diamond & 
Verrecchia 1991). Lastly, we use a dataset that includes the Global recession of 2008, existing studies 
on IFRS adoption are mostly based on and around the mandatory adoption of IFRS by the EU. 
However, this study attempts to examine whether the capital market outcomes are persistent across 
time or whether previously observed outcomes are time period specific. 
In section 2, we develop the main hypotheses. In section 3, we delineate the research design and describe 
the data. In section 4, we conduct some univariate analysis on the main variables of interest. In section 
5, we describe the full period analyses and results. In section 6, we examine the sub-periods and examine 
whether firms observed heterogeneous time affects. In section 7, we discuss the robustness checks. 
Section 8 concludes. 
2. Hypothesis Development 
We start the research with the notion that the underlying motivations for why managers may 
change standards, including the changing economics of the firm, play an important role in 
determining the economic consequences surrounding IFRS adoption. Some firms may 
adopt IFRS in name only, without making any material changes to the financial statements. 
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Others may be faced by economic changes, such as potential growth opportunities or entry 
into a new market, which may provide management with an incentive to improve the 
financial reporting policy of the firm and to signal its increased commitment to transparency 
to market participants. Akerlof (1970) noted that in certain situations, there may be markets 
in which buyers and sellers have different levels of information (known as ‘asymmetric 
information’) concerning the quality of the product, which leads to an ‘adverse selection’ 
problem. That is, a problem arises for the buyer because the buyer does not know ex ante if 
he is being deceived by the seller in terms of the quality of the product. IFRS adoption could 
be a part of a broader set of changes that firms make in order to become more transparent 
and to improve their corporate governance, in an attempt to reduce the ‘asymmetric 
information’ problem that investors face. 
Similarly, there can be numerous other incentives around IFRS adoption, and not all firms 
are equally likely to embrace the increased commitment to transparency envisioned in IFRS 
prepared financial statements. As a result of such differences in incentives, and provided 
that markets are able to differentiate between the incentives firms face, a level of 
heterogeneity in the economic effects of IFRS adoption should exist. 
Several prior literature, such as Ball et al (2000), Ball et al (2003), Leuz (2003), Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), Leuz et al (2006) and Bradshaw and Miller (2008), highlight the role 
of a firm’s reporting incentives in explaining observed accounting properties and actual 
practices. IFRS, similar to any other set of accounting standards, allow management 
discretion in terms of using their judgement and using measurements that are ultimately 
based on private, unobservable information. The manner in which firms use this allowed 
discretion depends on manager’s reporting incentives, which are influenced by numerous 
factors, including firm characteristics, market forces, and country level institutional factors. 
In this paper, we examine and test the role of uncertainty avoidance on the firm-level 
incentives, in the context of IFRS adoption. 
There is evidence that suggests a link exists between uncertainty avoidance (UAI), liquidity, 
and cost of equity. For example, Cardon and Marshall (2008) find that UAI was shown to 
significantly impact technology acceptance. Huang (2007) uses Hofstede’s UAI and 
hypothesizes that countries with a higher score for UAI will experience a disproportionately 
slower growth in industrial sectors where information is less available. Huang bases the 
hypothesis on Rigotti et al’s (2008) model, that shows that tolerance of uncertainty is 
necessary for the growth of ‘emerging sectors about which little is known’ between capital 
market participants. In Rigotti et al’s model, market participants that possess a personality 
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that lacks uncertainty tolerance, will be reluctant to enter into informationally opaque 
industries, which lack clear market information and signals. The lack of the uncertainty 
tolerance personality in a given society is shown to lead to a slower adoption rate of new 
technologies and a slower growth rate of such informationally opaque industrial sectors. 
Durnev et al (2004) find that stock prices in certain countries are less informative than in 
others due to information being scarce in certain countries and industries. Rigotti et al 
(2008) argue that firms engaged in the earlier stages of the industrial cycle, or those using 
more complex means of production, usually tend to release less information. 
Hofstede (2001) argues that a higher score for uncertainty avoidance implies that society 
has a lower tolerance for unstructured situations, uncertainty, and ambiguity. Individuals in 
higher uncertainty avoidance countries are more likely to be skeptical about the potential 
benefits from undertaking riskier ventures, and as a result, will desire a higher return for 
such projects. Whereas, individuals in lower uncertainty avoidance countries will tend to 
exhibit a lower tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity, and are more willing to accept 
change and undertake a greater level of risk. 
Fidrmuc and Jacobs (2010) argue that in high UAI countries, investors and management 
have a cultural need for predictability in the form of a greater level of financial stability 
within firms. Jaggi and Low (2000) argue that UAI is inversely related to the level of 
disclosure in societies, with a higher level of UAI implying a lower level of disclosure. 
Gray (1988) found that countries with a higher score for UAI are more secretive, therefore 
a negative relationship is predicted between UAI and disclosure. He also argues that for 
professionalism in accounting standard setting and judgment, a country requires a lower 
score for UAI. A lower score for UAI implies that there is a belief in having as few rules as 
possible and for personal judgment to be more easily tolerated. Uniformity, consistency and 
comparability are argued to be determined by the level of UAI, with a higher score implying 
a stronger preference for uniformity. A preference for uniformity implies a desire to control 
for law and order and a need for written rules and regulations, while conformity implies 
that absolute values and truths exist. 
In terms of conservatism in accounting standards, Gray (1988) argues that uncertainty 
avoidance directly influences conservatism, and that a higher score for UAI implies that 
society would want to implement more conservative accounting standards. The level of 
secrecy in a country can be related to the level of conservatism, in that it requires a cautious 
approach to corporate financial reporting. Gray (1988) argues that a preference for secrecy 
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is consistent with a higher score for uncertainty avoidance, due to a need to restrict the level 
of information disclosure. 
Therefore, we predict that UAI is expected to have a negative (harmful) effect on the cost 
of equity for firms given its preference for secrecy and need to restrict information 
disclosure (Gray, 1988), and a greater need for financial stability and predictability within 
firms, with individuals in higher UAI countries being more hesitant of the potential benefits 
from risky ventures and who tend to apply a higher discount rate to the perceived level of 
risk (Fidrmuc and Jacobs, 2010). 
H1: Companies in higher uncertainty avoidance countries tend to have a higher cost 
of equity.   
In order to address the above asymmetric information problem faced in certain countries 
and in certain industries, IFRS adoption has been proposed by the IASB (International 
Accounting Standards Board). IFRS have been introduced and mandated by various 
regulatory authorities and accounting boards across the world, in an effort to increase and 
improve firm level disclosures (Hope, 2003), to increase comparability across countries 
(Defond et al, 2011, De Franco,2011), in order to reduce the set of regulations for preparers 
(Dunn and Maydew, 2004), in order to potentially reduce information acquisition costs 
(Brown and Hillegeist, 2007, Bae et al, 2008 ), and in order to reduce the likelihood of 
technical errors. 
Hope (2003) finds that when compared to local accounting standards, IFRS adoption leads 
to a set of financial statements that are of a higher quality and that provide a greater quality 
of disclosure. In essence, IFRS adoption changes the information set available to market 
participants, by changing the quality and quantity of public information disclosed by firms. 
The association between high uncertainty avoidance and the benefits from IFRS adoption 
put forward in the literature reflects the notion that the move from local accounting 
standards towards a global set of accounting standards, i.e., IFRS adoption; was an 
undertaking that was deemed to be risky with unknown future economic benefits ex ante. 
Following from Cardon and Marshall (2008), Rigotti et al (2008) and Hofstede (2001), 
higher uncertainty avoidance societies should exhibit a higher intolerance towards 
acceptance of technological advancements, such as IFRS. As a result, we expect that 
adoption of IFRS should result in greater economic benefits for such societies compared to 
lower uncertainty avoidance societies, given the pre-existing regulations and systems in 
place in higher uncertainty avoidance countries will be of poorer quality compared to lower 
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uncertainty avoidance countries (Hope, 2003). As a result, the ‘distance’ between the pre-
existing quality of accounting standards, and the standards introduced by IFRS, is expected 
to be higher for higher uncertainty avoidance countries (e.g., Greece, etc), compared to 
lower uncertainty avoidance countries (e.g., UK, etc), where the pre-adoption accounting 
standards were deemed to be of a higher quality in terms of disclosure quality and quantity.  
Therefore, we posit that the significant channel by which the expected economic 
consequences (cost of equity) will be affected, will be improved transparency caused by 
the move to IFRS and improved financial reporting, which will be larger in higher UAI 
countries due to the pre-existing lower levels of transparency and comparability in financial 
statements. Companies in higher UAI countries tend to value secrecy and prefer to not 
disclose information (Gray, 1988), therefore, IFRS by its very nature will change the 
quality and quantity of the information that the firm will be required to release to market 
participants. For lower UAI companies, the difference between the disclosure requirements 
under IFRS and under their local GAAP are expected to be smaller than the difference 
between the disclosure requirements required under IFRS and local GAAP for companies 
in higher UAI countries. Therefore, market participants will benefit from the improved 
level of transparency and information disclosure that will be created, especially for higher 
UAI companies, and this expected to result in a lower cost of equity.  
IFRS adoption results in a greater level and quality of firm level information being released 
to the market. A greater quality and quantity of firm level information has been found to 
increase stock liquidity, reduce cost of capital and improve valuation (Verrecchia, 2001; 
Diamond and Verrrecchia, 1991). Hence, IFRS adoption should reduce the cost of capital. 
Countries with a higher score for uncertainty avoidance are expected to have poorer quality 
of existing accounting standards, compared to the quality and quantity of disclosure 
enshrined under IFRS. As a result, firms in higher uncertainty avoidance countries are 
expected to benefit more from IFRS adoption compared to firms from lower uncertainty 
avoidance countries, where the existing quality of financial reporting standards is of a 
higher quality. 
Firms that oppose the switch to IFRS or to the increased reporting requirements under IFRS 
and to becoming more transparent will be less likely to make material changes to their 
reporting policies (Daske et al, 2013). Thus, there may be ‘label’ and ‘serious’ adopters in 
a country; label adopters being those firms that do not materially change their reporting 
policies, while serious adopters being those firms that do change their reporting policies 
and make an increased effort to become more transparent. However, even with perfect 
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enforcement, due to the degree of discretion allowed to management and differing 
incentives, reporting behavior is expected to differ across firms (Frings et al, 2012; Leuz, 
2006). 
Controlling for all other factors, countries with a higher quality of enforcement regimes and 
with regulatory environments that lead to stronger reporting incentives are more likely to 
experience significant capital market benefits around the introduction of IFRS. In such 
countries, mandatory adopters are less likely to escape with adopting IFRS purely as a 
‘label’. (Daske et al, 2013) 
In terms of the interaction of uncertainty avoidance and IFRS, we expect a positive 
(beneficial) relationship to exist between the economic consequences from IFRS adoption 
and uncertainty avoidance. This is due to a higher level of uncertainty avoidance implying 
a greater intolerance to adopt innovation, such as a new set of financial reporting standards. 
As a result, we expect that the existing accounting standards in place in higher UAI 
countries would be of poorer quality compared to lower UAI countries, as evidenced by 
Hope (2003) and in line with the arguments put forward by Jaggi & Low (2000) and Gray 
(1988); the adoption of IFRS is expected to benefit market participants more in higher UAI 
countries because the adoption will result in a greater improvement in the quality and 
quantity of financial information disclosed to the market, compared to firms from lower 
UAI countries. Firms from higher UAI countries are expected to prepare financial 
statements with a lower quantity of disclosure and to be conservative in their financial 
reporting behavior, thereby reducing the information content of existing financial 
statements. Firms from lower UAI countries are expected to prepare financial statements 
that are less conservative in nature and contain a greater level of disclosures, thereby 
offering a more informative set of financial statements. As a result, the incremental benefit 
to market participants is expected to be greater for firms located in higher UAI countries 
than from lower UAI countries. 
H2: The cost of equity benefits that accrue from IFRS adoption, will be positively 
affected by the level of uncertainty avoidance. 
Next we decompose firms into mandatory and voluntary adopters. Daske et al (2008) argue 
that the capital market benefits should be different across voluntary and mandatory 
adopters. They argue that due to mandatory adopters being forced to adopt IFRS, this group 
should respond less to the adoption. Voluntary adopters are more likely to make significant 
changes to their reporting policies, and as a result should experience a greater benefit. 
However, voluntary IFRS adoption may be part of a broader strategy of increasing corporate 
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transparency and as a result; the benefits cannot be solely attributed to IFRS (Daske et al, 
2013). 
In the case of mandatory adoption, firms are mandated by their regulator to adopt IFRS and 
they have little choice in ignoring this directive. However, for a voluntary adopter, there is 
no regulatory mandate, hence, IFRS adoption is a choice available to such firms. They have 
the option to adopt IFRS early or to remain using local accounting standards. Siegel et al 
(2011), show that going counter to a nation’s cultural norms can result in extreme economic 
consequences. Thus, if a firm adopts IFRS in a country with a higher UAI score, it will be 
going counter to the norms of society. Hence, we would expect that prior to the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS, this type of firm should be able to be in a better position to signal its 
quality to market participants by its adoption behavior, that is, the earlier adoption of IFRS 
can be construed as a signalling mechanism by market participants, when analysed in 
conjunction with the prevailing social attitude towards uncertainty avoidance. Mandatory 
adoption by its very nature, can-not be used as a signalling mechanism by the firm, given 
that the decision to adopt is not present, but rather, the move is due to a regulatory mandate. 
Only in the case of a voluntary adoption, can a firm be in a position to signal its quality, 
based on its adoption decision and the prevailing level of uncertainty avoidance. 
An identical firm that adopts early in a country with a lower UAI score should not benefit 
to the same degree as a firm from a higher UAI country. Firms from lower UAI countries 
already prepare financial statements that are of a higher quality or disclosures that are of 
greater quantity, as a result, the adoption of IFRS is not seen by market participants as a 
greater commitment to financial reporting transparency, then would be the case for a firm 
from a higher UAI country. Firms from higher UAI countries prepare their financial 
statements using accounting standards that allow for the lower quality or quantity of 
financial statement disclosure. A move towards the adoption of IFRS would be seen as a 
bigger commitment for such firms, given the existing financial reporting requirements for 
the firm.  
H3: Voluntary adopters in countries with a higher UAI score are more likely to 
experience greater benefits compared to identical firms that are mandatory 
adopters, local standards users, or from lower UAI countries. 
Moving on to the expected economic benefits accruing to Mandatory adopters; such firms 
adopt IFRS due to the presence of a regulatory requirement to do so. However, IFRS 
adoption is expected to confer benefits to the adopting firm. We expect that the level of 
economic benefits will vary depending on the level of uncertainty avoidance present in the 
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country. Firms from higher UAI countries are expected to have existing accounting 
standards in place that are conservative in nature. IFRS adoption will force firms to move 
towards a set of standards that are less conservative and which compel the firm to increase 
the level of financial disclosure. The incremental benefit to market participants due from 
the move towards IFRS adoption is expected to be greater for higher UAI firms than lower 
UAI firms. Post adoption, the economic benefits should exist for both mandatory and 
voluntary/mandatory4 adopters if IFRS improves the information set made available to 
market participants. 
We also expect that post IFRS adoption, both mandatory and voluntary/mandatory adopters 
should exhibit similar economic benefits. Voluntary/mandatory adopters should exhibit the 
same level of economic benefits as mandatory adopters because market participants should 
treat both sets of firms in a similar manner post adoption, given that both types of firms will 
prepare financial statements under the same accounting regime. Post IFRS adoption, 
voluntary/mandatory adopters should not be treated differently from mandatory adopters 
by market participants. 
H4: Both Mandatory and Voluntary/Mandatory adopters in countries with a higher 
UAI score are more likely to experience greater economic benefits compared to 
identical firms that are IFRS adopters or local standards users from lower UAI 
countries, and the economic benefits from adoption are positively influenced by the 
financial reporting behavior of the firm. 
In principle there are several additional explanations for heterogeneous capital market 
effects around IFRS adoption, which we attempt to mitigate or address in the research 
design. First, it is possible that the heterogeneity in capital market returns is being driven 
by firm level differences in terms of transparency or the quality of corporate governance. 
We incorporate this variable in the research by using the three variables introduced by 
Daske et al (2013), which we term SERIOUS. These variables are constructed in a manner 
that allows us to control for changes in the quality of financial statements and thereby 
incorporate any improvement in financial statement transparency. 
Second, the heterogeneity in the capital market outcomes may be due to cross country 
differences in relation to regulatory enforcement and/or compliance. We attempt to control 
for this by using the enforcement variables introduced by Hail et al (2013) in our analysis. 
                                                             
4 Voluntary/Mandatory adopters are those firms that adopted IFRS early, and continue to do so once IFRS 
becomes mandatory in their respective countries.  
33 
 
Thirdly, the heterogeneity in the capital market outcomes may be due to cross country 
differences in relation to the version of IFRS adopted by the sample countries. We control 
for this by using the EU as our sample, thereby ensuring that the version of IFRS adopted 
is the same for each country during our sample period. 
Finally, the heterogeneity in the capital market outcomes may be due to other cross-country 
differences that can be better captured by variables introduced and used in prior research. 
In order to rule out this possibility, we incorporate other cultural variables in the robustness 
tests and find that UAI is the only robust cross-country variable that is able to provide 
statistically significant results in all of the tests. The other variables are found generally 
provide results that are very similar to UAI.  
3. Research Design and Data 
The research design relies on the variation in the capital market benefits of IFRS adoption 
due to uncertainty avoidance (UAI). We therefore focus on IFRS adopters in the main 
analyses, and decompose the group into mandatory, voluntary/mandatory, and voluntary 
adopters, in order to examine the expected differences. We first need variables that illustrate 
whether a firm year observation includes IFRS, Mandatory, Voluntary/Mandatory or 
voluntary adoption. This is done by coding each observation from data obtained from 
Worldscope and partitioning the mandatory, voluntary/mandatory, and voluntary adopters 
according to information provided by Deloitte LLP and PWC LLP. Next, we need a variable 
that incorporates the effect of UAI on adopting firms. We create this variable by 
incorporating the product of the IFRS/Mandatory/Voluntary indicator variable and the UAI 
score for the country. We also incorporate a variable that allows us to differentiate between 
‘Serious’ and ‘Label’ adopters (Similar to Daske et al, 2013), as well as proxies for the 
economic outcomes and a set of control variables. We then estimate the following model: 
𝐶𝑜𝐸 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 +  𝛽2𝑈𝐴𝐼 +  𝛽3𝑆𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑈𝑆 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗 +  𝜀    (1) 
Where CoE stands for cost of equity (i.e., the Realized return). IFRS is a binary variable 
that is coded ‘1’ for years in which a firm follows IFRS. We replace IFRS with Voluntary, 
Voluntary/Mandatory, and Mandatory variables in subsequent regressions. Voluntary is 
coded as ‘1’ for firms that adopted IFRS before it because mandatory5. Mandatory is coded 
as ‘1’ for years in which a firm follows IFRS for the first time due to a regulatory mandate. 
Voluntary/Mandatory is coded as ‘1’ for firms that adopted IFRS early and continue to use 
IFRS once it becomes mandatory. UAI denotes the UAI score each country has been 
assigned by Hofstede (2001). SERIOUS denotes the three financial reporting transparency 
                                                             
5 Voluntary observations relate to firm years that continue IFRS prior to the EU adoption in 2005. 
34 
 
classifications introduced by Daske et al (2013), and Controls denotes a set of control 
variables (mentioned below).  
With this model, we can compare the effect of UAI on IFRS adopters, and whether the 
influence of UAI is different for voluntary, voluntary/mandatory, and mandatory adopters. 
For the purpose of the research, we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions with 
robust Standard errors, OLS with Fixed Effects for Industry, OLS with Fixed Effects for 
Year, and cluster by Firm. We present our results using OLS regression with Fixed effects 
for Industry and Year, and clustered by Firm. 
3.1.1.  IFRS reporting Classification 
We begin by first coding the financial statements for each firm year observation. The IFRS 
coding involves two steps. First, we construct a firm year panel dataset with a binary 
indicator variable. Second, we determine the switch year, that is, the point in time when 
IFRS reporting is used by the firm.  
First, we use a narrower definition of IFRS compared to Daske et al (2013), when we code 
the binary IAS variable. This classification relies primarily on what firms claim they are 
doing in their financial statements. We begin from the ‘Accounting standards followed’ 
dataset in Worldscope/DataStream, as it offers the best coverage for this information set. We 
identify IFRS firm years if Worldscope/DataStream indicates that the financial statements 
are based on ‘International Standards’, ‘IFRS’ or  ‘International Standards and some EU 
guidelines’. This leads to a total of 20,398 firm year IFRS observations that serve as the basis 
of the analysis.  
We code a firm year as being US GAAP, if the ‘Accounting standards followed’ code 
indicates that the firm year is either ‘US standards’ or ‘US GAAP reclassified from local 
standards’. We code a firm as 0 (non IFRS adopter), if the ‘Accounting standards followed’ 
code in Worldscope/DataStream identifies the firm year as being ‘Local standards’, ‘EU 
standards’, ‘Not Disclosed’, ‘Local standards with EU guidelines’, ‘Other’; amongst other 
classifications shown in table 1. 
Table III-1 shows the classification criteria we have used in the coding analysis for this 
paper. 
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Table III-1: Accounting Standards classification based on Worldscope/Datastream. 
  WorldScope Description       Coding for analysis 
  We code firm-year observations as IFRS if one of the following cases applies: IFRS 
  International standards         
  International standards and some EU guidelines       
  IFRS         
            
  We code firm-year observations as US GAAP if one of the following cases applies:   
  US Standards (GAAP)       US GAAP 
  US GAAP reclassified from local standards       
            
  We code firm-year observations as Local if one of the following cases applies: Local 
  Local standards         
  EU standards         
  Specific standards set by the group       
  Not disclosed         
  Local standards with some EU guidelines       
  Local standards-inconsistency problems       
  EEC standards- inconsistency problems       
  Local standards with some OECD guidelines       
  Local standards with a certain reclassification for foreign companies      
  Other         
  Local standards with EU and IASC guidelines       
  International standards-inconsistency problems       
  International standards and some EU guidelines-inconsistency problems     
  Local standards with some IASC guidelines       
  Local standards with OECD and IASC guidelines       
The table describes the coding of firm year observations to the reporting categories of IFRS, US GAAP, or Local GAAP, 
using the different accounting standards classifications. The coding is based on how a firm year is classified in the 
'Accounting standards followed' dataset in Worldsope/Datasteam. 
The second step involves identifying the ‘switch year’. IFRS adoption may take one of two 
forms; a firm prepares financial statements in accordance with IFRS because it is mandated 
to do so by its regulatory authority (Mandatory adopters), or it may adopt IFRS before it 
becomes mandatory for it to prepare financial statements using these standards (Voluntary 
adopters). 
We identify the period in which IFRS becomes mandatory for a country via the PWC website 
and IASPlus (Deloitte LLP). We use this to determine the firms that have used IFRS for the 
first time because of it becoming mandatory. These firms are then labelled mandatory 
adopters in the analysis. Those firms, that adopt IFRS before it becomes mandatory, are 
coded as being voluntary adopters in the analysis.  
A firm year coded as being IFRS, can either be Mandatory, Voluntary/Mandatory, or 
voluntary, but not all three. Hence, the mandatory, Voluntary/Mandatory and voluntary sub-
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groups are mutually exclusive, and together comprise the entire IFRS group. Table III-2 
below shows the classification and composition of the dataset by country. 
Table III-2: Dataset composition by country. 
 
The Dataset comprises a maximum of 20,398 firm year observations from 22 countries with fiscal year ends between 
January 1,2000 and December 31,2013, for which we have sufficient Worldscope/Datastream data to classify the 
observation as being either IFRS, US GAAP, or Local GAAP. The table reports the number of firm year observations and 
percentages by country. The columns IFRS, US GAAP and Local GAAP represent the number of observations that fall in 
each category and the resulting percentage of each category to the total observations from that country.  The columns 
Voluntary and Mandatory report the number of firm years that fall within either Voluntary or Mandatory adopters and the 
percentage shows the fraction of each category as a function of the IFRS total for each country. 
3.1.2. UAI Classification 
The key variable in the research is the UAI variable and the effect of the interaction between 
UAI and IFRS adoption on the cost of equity. We also want to examine whether the influence 
of uncertainty avoidance is different for mandatory and voluntary adopters. 
The measure of country level uncertainty aversion used in the research, is obtained from a 
cross country psychological study conducted by Geert Hofstede (1980, 2001) between 1967 
and 1973 that involved a matched sample of respondents: 88,000 IBM local employees that 
held similar marketing and customer service position, that were recruited and employed in 
50 countries across the world. 
Hofstede constructed the index by averaging the answers to psychological survey questions 
based on three dimensions related to individual attitudes towards uncertainty: rule 
orientation, employment stability, and stress.  
Country Firm Years Firm Years %
Firm 
Years % Firm Years %
Firm 
Years %
Firm 
Years %
Firm 
Years %
AUSTRIA 270             250             93% 7                3% 13                5% 37             14% 137          51% 76            28%
BELGIUM 373             284             76% 16             4% 73                20% 20             5% 157          42% 107          29%
CZECH 45                38                84% 2                4% 5                  11% 8                18% 15            33% 15            33%
DENMARK 267             225             84% -            0% 42                16% 16             6% 66            25% 143          54%
FINLAND 699             541             77% -            0% 158             23% 11             2% 108          15% 422          60%
FRANCE 2,511          1,609          64% 26             1% 876             35% 48             2% 102          4% 1,459      58%
GERMANY 4,061          2,859          70% 272           7% 930             23% 337           8% 1,348      33% 1,174      29%
GREECE 563             457             81% 10             2% 96                17% 2                0% 24            4% 431          77%
HUNGARY 140             97                69% -            0% 43                31% 8                6% 47            34% 42            30%
ICELAND 20                19                95% -            0% 1                  5% 1                5% 3               15% 15            75%
IRELAND 228             169             74% 7                3% 52                23% -            0% 27            12% 142          62%
ITALY 1,527          1,216          80% 10             1% 301             20% 8                1% 52            3% 1,156      76%
LUXEMBOURG 78                72                92% -            0% 6                  8% 10             13% 40            51% 22            28%
NETHERLANDS 689             511             74% 46             7% 132             19% 13             2% 58            8% 440          64%
NORWAY 633             518             82% 59             9% 56                9% 2                0% 67            11% 449          71%
POLAND 359             267             74% -            0% 92                26% 8                2% 47            13% 212          59%
PORTUGAL 191             165             86% -            0% 26                14% 3                2% 51            27% 111          58%
SLOVAKIA 10                8                  80% -            0% 2                  20% 2                20% 6               60% -           0%
SLOVENIA 51                40                78% -            0% 11                22% -            0% 6               12% 34            67%
SPAIN 796             573             72% 1                0% 222             28% 3                0% 20            3% 550          69%
SWEDEN 997             777             78% -            0% 220             22% 6                1% 72            7% 699          70%
UK 5,890          4,276          73% 57             1% 1,557          26% 5                0% 367          6% 3,904      66%
Total 20,398       14,971       73% 513           3% 4,914          24% 548           3% 2,820      14% 11,603    57%
IFRS USGAAP Local GAAP Voluntary
Voluntary / 
Mandatory Mandatory
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Hofstede’s Uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) data is available for over 50 countries,6 
however, we only examine 22 countries from this dataset. The sample includes the 22 EU 
countries due to our interest in examining the relationship between IFRS adoption and UAI. 
As a result, we only include EU member states that adopted a similar version of IFRS on the 
same date across the sample countries, thereby allowing us to examine the effect of UAI on 
countries that adopt an identical set of accounting standards on the same date.  
The UAIs for the 22 countries are reported in Table III-3, where a higher UAI score implies 
a higher level of uncertainty avoidance and a relative lack of uncertainty tolerant 
entrepreneurs, employees, and investors.  
Table III-3: Hofstede's Cultural dimensions, Schwatz, and other national variables. 
COUNTRIES 
Hofstede Schwatz et al  
  PDI IDV MAS UAI EMB HIE MAST AA IA EGA HAR 
Austria 11 55 79 70 3.19 1.66 3.721 3.89 4.97 5.06 4.62 
Belgium 65 75 54 94 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Czech Republic 57 58 57 74 3.77 2.07 3.447 3.07 4.59 4.59 4.66 
Denmark 18 74 16 23 3.29 1.73 3.74 4.08 4.77 5.15 4.32 
Finland 33 63 26 59 3.53 1.7 3.393 3.61 4.84 5.03 4.59 
France 68 71 43 86 3.1 1.98 3.574 4.31 5.37 5.18 4.5 
Germany 35 67 66 65 3.18 1.91 3.752 3.75 4.92 5.14 4.71 
Greece 60 35 57 100 3.47 1.78 4.126 3.83 4.43 4.98 4.68 
Hungary 46 80 88 82 3.73 2.04 3.74 3.35 4.46 4.51 4.38 
Iceland 30 60 10 50 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Ireland 28 70 68 35 3.6 1.86 3.835 3.62 4.38 4.99 3.9 
Italy 50 76 70 75 3.61 1.47 3.6 2.84 4.86 5.38 4.91 
Luxembourg 40 60 50 70 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Netherlands 38 80 14 53 3.36 2 3.801 3.65 4.78 5.08 4.19 
Norway 31 69 8 50 3.55 1.41 3.619 3.29 4.67 5.29 4.64 
Poland 68 60 64 93 4.05 2.51 3.638 3.04 4.24 4.55 4.24 
Portugal 63 27 31 99 3.51 1.85 3.901 3.41 4.51 5.39 4.57 
Slovakia 100 52 100 51 4.05 2.11 3.706 2.61 4.15 4.58 4.53 
Slovenia 71 27 19 88 3.82 1.44 3.466 3.42 4.93 4.58 4.77 
Spain 57 51 42 86 3.36 1.84 3.681 3.59 4.98 5.2 4.64 
Sweden 31 71 5 29 3.23 1.73 3.61 3.97 5.07 4.96 4.54 
United Kingdom 35 89 66 35 3.55 2.34 3.876 3.86 4.42 5 3.81 
Table III-3 above shows the key national variables used in the paper. The first set of variables relate to Hofstede's (2001) 
cultural dimensions: PDI relates to Power Distance Index, IDV relates to Individualism, MAS relates to Masculinity, 
and UAI relates to Uncertainty Avoidance and is the primary variable used in the paper. The next set of variables relate 
to Schwartz et al (2005): EMB relates to the level of Embeddedness, HIE relates to the level of Hierarchy, MAST relates 
to the level of Mastery, AA relates to the level of Affective Autonomy, IA relates to the level of Intellectual Autonomy, 
EGA relates to the level of Egalitarianism, and HAR relates to the level of Harmony. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
6 Hofstede (2001) and geert-hofstede.com 
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Table III-4: World Religions, La Porta et al, Globe, CIFAR and Hail et al. 
COUNTRIES World Religions (CIA DATASET) La Porta et al Globe CIFAR Hail et al 
  CATH PROS ORTH Anti-SD Disclose G-UAI ACC_STDS ENF_EU 
Austria 65% 4% 0% 0.21 0.40 5.16 62 0 
Belgium 57% 2% 0% 0.54 0.80 NA 68 0 
Czech Republic 10% 1% 0% 0.33 0.40 4.44 NA 0 
Denmark 0% 80% 0% 0.46 0.80 5.22 75 0 
Finland 0% 77% 1% 0.46 1.00 5.02 83 0 
France 85% 2% 0% 0.38 0.80 4.43 78 0 
Germany 34% 34% 2% 0.28 0.40 5.22 67 0 
Greece 1% 0% 98% 0.22 0.40 3.39 61 0 
Hungary 37% 14% 2% 0.18 0.20 3.12 NA 1 
Iceland 4% 79% 0% 0.25 0.40 NA NA 0 
Ireland 87% 5% 1% 0.79 0.80 4.30 81 1 
Italy 88% 1% 1% 0.42 1.00 3.79 66 0 
Luxembourg 87% 2% 0% 0.28 0.60 NA NA 1 
Netherlands 30% 20% 0% 0.20 0.60 4.70 74 0 
Norway 1% 89% 0% 0.42 0.20 NA 75 0 
Poland 90% 0% 1% 0.29 0.20 3.62 NA 0 
Portugal 85% 1% 0% 0.44 1.00 3.91 56 0 
Slovakia 62% 8% 4% 0.29 0.60 NA NA 0 
Slovenia 58% 90% 2% NA NA 3.78 NA 0 
Spain 94% 3% 0% 0.37 0.60 3.97 72 0 
Sweden 1% 75% 1% 0.33 0.40 5.32 83 1 
United Kingdom 10% 32% 0% 0.95 1.00 4.65 85 0 
Table III-4 above shows the key national variables used in the paper. The first set of variables relate to the percentage of a 
nation's population following one of the major religions of the world: CATH relates to Catholics, PROS relates to 
Protestants, and ORTH relates to Orthodox. The next set of variables relate to the national level characteristics produced 
by La Porta et al (2006): Anti SD relates to the level of Anti Director rights index, and Disclose relates to the level of 
organisation level disclosure in the country. The next set of variable is obtained from the Globe cultural network: G-UAI 
relates to the globe constructed measure for UAI in a country. The next Variable is ACC_STDS, which is obtained from 
CIFAR (1995) and relates to the quality of accounting standards in a country. The last set of variables have been obtained 
from Hail et al (2013) and relate to the degree of Enforcement change in the EU around the time of IFRS adoption. 
We also include several other variables in Table III-3 and Table III-4 that are used in the 
robustness tests. These variables include Hofstede’s (2001) three other cultural dimensions, 
namely, Power distance Index (PDI), Individualism (IDV) and Masculinity (MAS). We also 
include cultural variables introduced by Schwartz et al (2005,2007), that have also been used 
to proxy national level variation in personality traits. Table 4 also includes the religious 
demographics of each sample country as another variable in the robustness tests. We also 
include the Disclose and Anti-self-Dealing (Anti-SD) variables from La Porta et al (2006), 
alongside the UAI variable constructed by the Globe cultural research initiative. We also 
include the quality of accounting standards pre-IFRS adoption from CIFAR (1995). Finally, 
we include the ENF_EU variable from Hail et al (2013), which is meant to control for the 
degree of change in regulatory enforcement around the time of IFRS adoption in the EU. 
The interaction term between UAI and IFRS is constructed in two steps. In the first step, we 
identify if a firm year observation includes IFRS. This allows us to build a panel data of 
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observations in which we are able to segregate observations as either being IFRS, US, Local 
GAAP, Mandatory, Voluntary/Mandatory, and Voluntary adopters. This yields into a panel 
that classifies a firm year observation in a binary variable. The panel is coded 1 if the firm 
uses IFRS, or 0 if it is US GAAP or Local GAAP.  The same methodology applies to US 
coding, and to the Mandatory, Voluntary/Mandatory, and Voluntary classification. 
The second step involves creating the variable that is able to examine the effect of UAI on 
IFRS adoption. This is done by multiplying the country’s UAI score against the panel created 
from step 1. This yields the interaction term of IFRS_UAI, M_UAI, VM,UAI, and V_UAI; 
that represent the interaction between IFRS, Mandatory, Voluntary/Mandatory, and 
Voluntary adopters respectively. 
3.1.3. ‘Serious’ Versus ‘Label’ Classification 
Daske et al (2013) introduce three variables that are constructed in order to categorize firms 
as either being ‘Label’ or ‘Serious’ adopters. These variables categorize firms using firm-
level changes in reporting incentives, actual reporting behaviour, and the external reporting 
environment around the switch to IFRS. These variables are meant to examine the financial 
reporting transparency of firms. 
When we examine IFRS adoption alongside the SERIOUS variables introduced by Daske 
et al (2013), we would expect that if firms attempt to improve their financial reporting 
transparency policy; that they should benefit more from the liquidity, and cost of equity 
benefits compared to firms that do not attempt to improve their financial reporting 
transparency. This expectation arises from market participants assigning a greater value to 
financial statements that contain a lower level of accruals, and thereby, contain a lower level 
of management based judgment and potential manipulation. The expectation is based on 
existing literature such as Francis et al (2005), who find that poorer accruals quality (AQ)7 
is associated with larger costs of debt and equity. 
Daske et al (2008) find that the liquidity, cost of capital and Tobin’s Q benefits only occur 
in countries where firms have incentives to be transparent and where legal enforcement is 
strong. 
Daske et al (2013) examine the liquidity and cost of capital effects around voluntary and 
mandatory IFRS adoption and introduce a classification of “Serious” and “Label” adopters 
using firm level changes in reporting incentives, actual reporting behaviour, and the external 
                                                             
7 AQ is measured as the standard deviation of residuals from regressions relating current accruals to cash 
flows. 
40 
 
reporting environment. Daske et al (2013) refer to “serious” adopters as those firms that are 
“serious” about the changes in their reporting strategy.  
They use three proxies to partition the firms into serious and label adopters. The idea is to 
attempt to identify firms that experience substantial increases in their reporting incentives. 
These firms are deemed more likely to make major improvements to their reporting strategy. 
Two of the proxies focus on the determinants of firm’s incentives, while the remainder relies 
on the firm’s actual reporting behaviour.  
The Reporting Incentives (“serious 1”) is calculated as the first and primary factor (out of 
the two that are retained) when applying factor analysis to the following six firm attributes: 
firm size (natural log of the US$ market value), financial leverage (total liabilities to total 
assets), profitability (return on assets), growth opportunities (book to market ratio), 
ownership concentration (percentage of closely held shares), and internationalisation 
(foreign sales over total sales). The factor increases in size, leverage, profitability, growth 
and foreign sales, and decreases in ownership concentration, similar to Daske et al(2013). 
The second proxy relies on the accrual based characteristics of financial reporting. The 
Reporting Behaviour (“serious 2”) variable is constructed as the ratio of the absolute value 
of accruals to the absolute value of cash flows (multiplied by -1, so that higher amounts 
signify more transparent reporting) The variable is then scaled by operating cash flows in 
order to serve as a performance adjustment. Accruals are calculated as the difference 
between net income before extraordinary items and the cash flow from operations.  
The third proxy relies on the ability to capture external changes affecting a firm’s reporting 
incentives. In line with Daske et al (2013), we compute the Reporting Environment (“serious 
3”) variable as the natural log of the number of analysts following the firm (plus one). For 
firms without any analyst coverage in I/B/E/S, we set the analyst following to zero.  
In order to reduce measurement errors and to allow for the incentives to change over time, 
we calculate 3 year rolling averages relative to the observed year for each reporting proxy. 
We then use the distribution of changes to classify firms with above median changes 
compared to their industry peers. Firms with rolling averages above the median industry 
moving averages are coded as “serious” adopters (coded as 1), and with below median 
changes as label adopters (coded as 0). This classification methodology is slightly different 
compared to that used in Daske et al(2013) in order for us to allow firms to be classified as 
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more or less transparent compared to their peers and to allow firms to move between being 
more or less transparent over the time period under question. 8 
3.1.4. Hail et al (2013) 
Next, we include the cross-country variation in regulatory enforcement introduced by Hail 
et al (2013). The ∆ENF_EU is a binary indicator variable that takes on the value of “1” if 
the country has observed substantive change in enforcement. Hail et al (2013) identify the 
change in substantive enforcement based on a survey of national regulators, audit firms, and 
on publicly available information. 9 
3.1.5. Cost of equity 
We use the cost of equity based on weekly realized returns. The cost of equity dependent 
variable is the ex-post realized returns of equity. Gebhardt et al (2001) and Fu et al (2012), 
argue that the ex-post realized returns should be an unbiased estimator of the unobservable 
cost of equity in an efficient financial market. Similar to Fu et al (2012), we construct this 
variable by compounding the 52 weekly returns in the calendar year. We then take the natural 
log of the variable as in Daske et al (2013). 
𝐿𝑁(𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡) = 𝐿𝑁((1 + 𝑟1) … (1 + 𝑟52) − 1).  
                                                             
8 Daske et al(2013) use their methodology in order to examine the influence of IFRS adoption in 2005, so 
their methodology is centred around this time period. We adjust their methodology to allow our 
classifications to be more dynamic, and to allow us to have ‘label and ‘serious’ adopters throughout our 
sample period. 
9 Hail et al (2013), page 170, Table 6. 
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Figure III-1: PNORM of LNRW 
 
The above figure shows the pnorm graph for LNRW, which is a standardized normal 
probability plot of the dependent variable. As can be seen from the above graph, the variable 
is approximately normally distributed. 
Table III-5 below shows the summary of the key variables used in the analysis including the 
three dependent variables mentioned above and the control variables. Cross country 
variables such as the UAI index and Hail’s et al (2013) is mentioned separately in Table III-3 
and Table III-4. The composition of the IFRS, US GAAP and local accounting data is 
reported separately in Table III-2.   
Table III-5: Summary statistics for key variables used in the analysis. 
    
Dependent 
Variables: Observations Mean Std Dev P1 P25 Median P75 P99 
Realised Returns 20,398 0.0194 0.0648 0.0001 0.0032 0.0077 0.0169 0.1783 
         
SERIOUS1 20,398 0.2299 0.4208 0 0 0 0 1 
SERIOUS2 20,398 0.4418 0.4966 0 0 0 1 1 
SERIOUS3 20,398 0.2456 0.4304 0 0 0 0 1 
WLNMCUSD 20,398 12.433 2.4220 7.6544 10.6104 12.1786 14.1844 18.2018 
WLNMR 20,398 4.6713 1.6369 0.6842 3.5914 4.6916 5.7474 8.3168 
WVOL 20,398 0.0334 0.0997 0.0009 0.0075 0.0124 0.0269 0.4099 
LOSS 20,398 0.2143 0.4104 0 0 0 0 1 
WLEV 20,398 0.1376 0.2014 0.0000 0.0010 0.0121 0.2389 0.875 
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Table III-5 above shows the summary statistics obtained for each of the dependent and control variables used in the 
analysis. The Bid-ask spread is the annualized estimate obtained from the daily data obtained from Datasteam. The 
Realized returns are calculated by compounding the weekly returns obtained from datastream. The construction and 
measurement of the control variables is mentioned in more detail later on in the paper. 
 
Table III-6 below shows the correlation matrix between the key variables used in the paper, 
including the dependent variables and the IFRS adoption variables.    
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Table III-6: Correlation Matrix. 
Table III-6 shows the correlation matrix for the variables used in the analysis, including the dependent variables. The construction and measurement used for each variable in the matrix is 
described in further detail in Section 4. 
                 
 LNRW IFRS V M VM UAI SERIOU
S1 
SERIOU
S2 
SERIOU
S3 
WLNMC
USD 
WLNMR USGAAP WVOL LOSS WLEV ENF_EU 
                 
LNRW 1                
IFRS 0.062*** 1               
V 0.077*** 0.098*** 1              
M -0.071*** 0.639*** -0.232*** 1             
VM 0.125*** 0.219*** -0.079*** -0.519*** 1            
UAI -0.055*** -0.032*** 0.054*** -0.089*** 0.058*** 1           
SERIOUS1 -0.087*** 0.053*** -0.037*** 0.063*** -0.007 -0.130*** 1          
SERIOUS2 -0.099*** 0.099*** -0.057*** 0.089*** 0.021*** -0.140*** 0.192*** 1         
SERIOUS3 -0.162*** -0.018** -0.036*** 0.021*** -0.031*** 0.006 0.168*** 0.263*** 1        
WLNMCU
SD 
-0.206*** 0.012** -0.034*** 0.018** 0.018* 0.044*** 0.215*** 0.339*** 0.577*** 1       
WLNMR -0.012 0.027*** -0.015** 0.027*** 0.002 0.041** 0.005 -0.004 -0.001 0.0025*** 1      
USGAAP 0.083*** -0.369*** -0.036*** -0.236*** -0.081*** 0.019*** -0.021*** -0.025*** 0.001 0.006 -0.015** 1     
WVOL 0.229*** -0.011* 0.043*** -0.052*** 0.036*** -0.031*** -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.039*** -0.091*** -0.003 0.059*** 1    
LOSS 0.031*** 0.004 0.006 -0.009 0.014** -0.016*** -0.011** -0.008 -0.012** -0.031*** -0.008 -0.002 -0.009 1   
WLEV -0.012 0.011* -0.003 0.018*** -0.011* 0.031*** 0.003 0.009 0.009* 0.036*** -0.013** -0.020*** -0.004 0.146*** 1  
ENF_EU -0.039*** -0.017** -0.021*** 0.031*** -0.018*** -0.293*** 0.049*** 0.057*** -0.016*** -0.045*** -0.008 -0.043*** -0.023*** 0.007 -0.013** 1 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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3.1.6. Other Control Variables 
We include industry, country, and year fixed effects in all the regression models, and hence 
control for differences in countries’ adoption rates as well as time trends. We also check that 
the results are robust when we include Firm year and Industry dummies in the regressions 
and we cluster by firm. For the adoption variable, we include binary indicator variables to 
control for firms following US GAAP (Daske et al, 2013). We control for country 
differences by including the ∆ENF_EU variable from Hail et al (2013). 
We control for the Firm Size, Return Variability, Market Return, Loss, US GAAP, Leverage, 
and ENF_EU (Similar variables are also used by Daske et al 2013). Firm size is defined as 
the natural log of Market Value in USD obtained from DataStream/Worldscope. Market 
return is the annualized return on the local market index, which is meant to control for 
momentum based strategies. Return variability is calculated as the annualized standard 
deviation from the daily stock market return from DataStream. LOSS is a binomial variable 
which is coded 1 if the firm has reported a loss in the previous period and zero otherwise. 
Leverage is the fraction of Total Debt to Total firm assets. US GAAP is a binary variable 
equal to one if the firm year observation uses US GAAP (similar to Daske et al 2013).Finally, 
the ENF_EU variable is the variable obtained from Hail et al (2013), which is meant to 
control for any variation in enforcement changes.  
A. Data 
We obtain financial data from Worldscope, weekly prices, daily prices, and financial data 
from DataStream / Worldscope. The data is available for the 22 countries in our sample and 
relates to the time period January 2000 to December 2013. We include all common stocks, 
which were listed on the stock exchange (s) in each country during the sample period. A 
cross listed stock is included only in its home country sample. We include all firms that were 
operational during the period, that is, we include both ‘dead’ and ‘alive’ firms. This allows 
us to reduce the survivorship bias in the dataset. 
 
 
Table III-7 below, shows the description for the variables used in the tests. The description 
for any additional variables used in the robustness tests are detailed in the respective 
robustness test section. 
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Table III-7: Control Variables used in the paper 
Variable Description/Source 
SERIOUS 
The three variables created by Daske et al(2013), which are meant to measure firm 
level financial reporting transparency. 
LEV Calculated as the ratio of total debt to the market value of equity. Source - Worldscope. 
  
LNMCUSD 
Natural log of the Market Value in USD (as used in Daske et al 2013). Used to control 
for the size of a company.Source- Datastream/Worldscope. 
MR 
Natural Log of the Return on the market.  Used to control for the effect of momentum 
trading strategies. Source- DataStream. 
US GAAP 
US GAAP.  Used to control for the effect of a company using US GAAP. Source- 
Datastream/Worldscope. 
VOL 
Return volatity. Calculated as the annualized variability of daily returns. Used to 
control for the effect of volatitity on trading behaviour. Source- 
Datastream/Worldscope. 
LOSS 
A variable to take into account a company making a loss in the prior period. Source- 
Datastream/Worldscope. 
ENF_EU 
Obtained from Hail et al (2013). Used to control for changes in enforcement around the 
time of IFRS adoption. 
 
4. Univariate Analysis  
We begin the analysis by examining the univariate results for our main variables of interest. 
From our Hypothesis above, we expect IFRS adoption, and Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) UAI 
variable to have a positive (beneficial) impact on the liquidity and cost of equity of adopters.  
Table III-8: Univariate Analysis 
Group Value (1) Obs (1) Value (2) Obs (2) (1)-(2) 
UAI -4.899 12,363 -5.086 8,035 0.1866*** 
IFRS -4.951 14,971 -5.034 5,427 0.0083*** 
IFRS_UAI -4.910 8,987 -5.023 11,411 0.1127*** 
M -5.078 11,603 -4.835 8,795 -0.2428*** 
M_UAI -5.138 6,251 -4.900 14,147 -0.2379*** 
V -4.347 548 -4.991 19,850 0.6438*** 
V_UAI -4.289 518 -4.991 19,880 0.6955*** 
VM -4.548 2,820 -5.042 17,577 0.494*** 
VM_UAI -4.411 2,288 -5.042 18,179 0.6309*** 
IFRS is a binary indicator variable. IFRS_UAI is the variable created as a product of the IFRS variable and UAI. UAI is a 
score developed by Hofstede (2001). M is a binary variable equal to one if the firm adopts IFRS for the first time when 
adoption becomes mandatory. V is a binary variable equal to one if the firm adopts IFRS prior to it becoming mandatory. 
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VM is a binary variable equal to one if the firm had adopted IFRS before it became mandatory and continues to use IFRS 
after it becomes mandatory. 
Table III-8 above shows the univariate results conducted on the dataset.  
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that a higher score for UAI is associated with an 
increase in the cost of equity. Consistent with Daske et al’s (2013) findings, the univariate 
suggests that the IFRS variable is associated with a significant and positive effect on the cost 
of equity. This suggests that IFRS adoption leads to an increase in the cost of equity. 
Moving on to the interaction of IFRS and UAI, we see that IFRS adoption and the interaction 
of UAI actually causes an increase in the cost of equity. On further analysis, we see that this 
result is being caused due to the voluntary and the VM group displaying a positive 
relationship, while the mandatory group suggests a negative relationship. Therefore, the cost 
of equity test suggests that the benefit of IFRS adoption and the influence of UAI is different 
depending on whether the firm is a voluntary, voluntary/mandatory, or mandatory adopter. 
The positive relationship for the cost of equity test is in line with results found by Daske et 
al (2013). 
In order to further examine the results from our univariate analysis, we move on to our 
multivariate analysis below. 
5. Analyses and Results of the Total sample period (2000-2013) 
We begin the analysis by examining whether the cost of equity differed for IFRS adopters, 
and whether the heterogeneity in the economic benefits was influenced by the level of 
uncertainty avoidance (UAI) present in the country. The main prediction for this section is 
that the economic benefits from IFRS adoption should be greater for those firms that are 
located in higher UAI countries. 
5.1. Analysis of IFRS adoption and UAI on capital market benefits 
We begin the analysis by examining the influence of UAI on cost of Equity (Realized 
returns) between firms reporting using IFRS. In Table III-9, we estimate the empirical 
specification in Equation (1), and include Daske et al’s (2013) SERIOUS adopter variables 
as additional control variables in subsequent equations. For each dependent variable, our 
first regression excludes IFRS as an explanatory variable, our second regression includes the 
IFRS variable as an additional explanatory variable, the third regression adds the interaction 
of UAI with IFRS alongside the main variables of interest (IFRS and UAI), while the fourth, 
fifth and sixth variables add each of the SERIOUS variables as an additional control variable. 
We expect the IFRS variable to be significant and negative for the cost of equity tests, while 
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we expect the UAI variable to be significant and positive, and finally, we expect the 
interaction term to be significant and negative.    
Table III-9:  Analysis of IFRS Adoption and UAI on cost of equity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES LNRW LNRW LNRW LNRW LNRW LNRW 
       
IFRS  0.2265*** 0.2927*** 0.2928*** 0.2911*** 0.2820*** 
  (6.3815) (6.7290) (6.7540) (6.6976) (6.4797) 
UAI 0.2503*** 0.2388*** 0.3220*** 0.2995*** 0.3038*** 0.3193*** 
 (9.7297) (9.3094) (6.7292) (6.2677) (6.3124) (6.6940) 
IFRS_UAI   -0.1134** -0.1048** -0.1063** -0.1168** 
   (-2.1457) (-1.9874) (-2.0109) (-2.2157) 
SERIOUS1    -0.1407***   
    (-5.1804)   
SERIOUS2     -0.0810***  
     (-3.3788)  
SERIOUS3      -0.1986*** 
      (-6.1412) 
WLNMCUSD -0.1197*** -0.1279*** -0.1270*** -0.1215*** -0.1206*** -0.1043*** 
 (-22.6829) (-23.5775) (-23.4704) (-22.0819) (-20.8369) (-16.0448) 
WLNMR -0.0139** -0.0142** -0.0140** -0.0138** -0.0143** -0.0145** 
 (-2.3071) (-2.3508) (-2.3266) (-2.2914) (-2.3740) (-2.4127) 
USGAAP 0.6897*** 0.8007*** 0.7871*** 0.7865*** 0.7870*** 0.7724*** 
 (9.1978) (10.6385) (10.4354) (10.5078) (10.4738) (10.3014) 
WVOL 2.1394*** 2.1190*** 2.1165*** 2.1152*** 2.1172*** 2.1264*** 
 (7.6104) (7.5681) (7.5541) (7.5553) (7.5740) (7.6374) 
LOSS 0.0465* 0.0457* 0.0462* 0.0458* 0.0449* 0.0456* 
 (1.8452) (1.8137) (1.8337) (1.8210) (1.7841) (1.8124) 
WLEV -0.0266 -0.0252 -0.0250 -0.0249 -0.0229 -0.0247 
 (-0.5410) (-0.5135) (-0.5092) (-0.5082) (-0.4672) (-0.5028) 
ENF_EU -0.0266 -0.0356 -0.0382 -0.0400 -0.0380 -0.0588 
 (-0.6068) (-0.8080) (-0.8672) (-0.9099) (-0.8641) (-1.3277) 
Constant -3.4285*** -4.5446*** -4.6070*** -4.6436*** -4.6509*** -4.8531*** 
 (-28.1776) (-37.3099) (-37.2676) (-37.6316) (-37.3668) (-37.3998) 
Observations 20,398 20,398 20,398 20,398 20,398 20,398 
R-squared 0.1272 0.1295 0.1298 0.1313 0.1304 0.1318 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IFRS is a binary indicator variable. IFRS_UAI is the variable created as a product of the IFRS variable and UAI. UAI is a 
score developed by Hofstede (2001). SERIOUS 1, 2 and 3 are the firm level transparency variables created by Daske et al 
(2013). NMCUSD is the natural log of Market Value of Equity in USD. RM is the annualized returns on the relevant index. 
US is an indicator variable to take into account financial statements prepared using US GAAP. Return VOL is the natural 
log of the calculated annualized volatility for the stock. LOSS is an indicator variable that is 1 if the firm had a net loss in 
the prior period. Leverage is the ratio of Total Debt to Book Value of Equity. ENF_EU is a variable obtained from Hail et 
al (2013) that controls for country level differences in regulatory enforcement changes. The coefficients have been 
normalised in order to aid in understanding. Control variables denoted with W have been winsorised at the 1% level. t-
statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Table III-9 above presents the results for the cost of equity test (LNBAS). The coefficients 
for IFRS are significant and positive in all the regressions, suggesting that the use of IFRS 
results in an increase in the cost of equity. This result is not in line with our expectation that 
IFRS use should lead to a reduction in the cost of equity, but the results are in line with 
Daske et al(2013), and suggest that IFRS adoption alone may not be a sufficient factor in 
reducing the cost of equity.   
Moving on to the UAI variable, as expected, the variable is found to be significant and 
positive in all the regressions, suggesting that a higher level of UAI is generally associated 
with a higher cost of equity. This result is in line with our first hypothesis.   
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However, the IFRS_UAI variable as expected, was found to be significant and negative, 
which suggests that the use of IFRS and a higher UAI score interact to cause an improvement 
(reduction) in the cost of equity. This result is in line with our second hypothesis. However, 
if we examine the coefficients of the IFRS, UAI, and the interaction terms, it appears that 
IFRS adopters in higher UAI countries actually suffer from an increase in their cost of equity. 
This result is not in line with our expectations and will be examined in more detail below. 
In terms of the control variables, the three SERIOUS variables are observed to be significant 
and negative as expected. The results therefore imply that financial reporting transparency, 
whether measured by reporting incentives (SERIOUS 1), improvement in accruals quality 
(SERIOUS 2), or increased analyst coverage (SERIOUS 3), all seem to indicate a reduction 
in the cost of equity. This result is consistent with our expectation and is in line with Daske 
et al (2013).  
The proxy for market value of the firm (WLNMCUSD) was found to be significant and 
negative, suggesting that larger firms tend to enjoy a lower cost of equity This result is in 
line with previous literature (Daske et al 2013, Fu et al, 2012). The proxy for market 
momentum (WLNMR) is found to be negative and significant, suggesting that increased 
market returns results in a decrease in the cost of equity, the results are similar to those found 
by Daske et al(2008) and Daske et al(2013), when they use market variability as a proxy for 
market momentum. The indicator variable for firms using US GAAP was found to be 
significant and positive for, suggesting that the use of US GAAP results in an increase in the 
cost of equity. the results are not in line with Daske et al (2013), who do not find US GAAP 
to be significant. The WVOL variable was found to be significant and positive, suggesting 
that increased firm level return volatility results in an increase in the cost of equity. The 
LOSS variables were found to be significant and positive, suggesting that firms that have 
exhibited a loss in the prior period, tend to observe a higher cost of equity. The leverage 
variable was not found to be significant. Finally, the Hail et al (2013) enforcement variable 
was found to be negative, though not significant in all the tests. 
5.2. Analysis of Mandatory, Voluntary, and Voluntary/Voluntary, and 
UAI on capital market benefits 
In this section, we explore whether the heterogeneity in capital market benefits is driven by 
whether a firm is an early adopter (V), Voluntary/Mandatory(VM) or a mandatory adopter 
(MA). In Table III-10, we estimate the empirical specification in Equation (1) except that 
we bifurcate IFRS into V, VM and M adopters, and include Daske et al’s (2013) SERIOUS 
adopter variables as additional control variables in subsequent equations. We expect the V, 
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VM and M adopters and the UAI variable to be significant and negative for the cost of equity 
tests, while we expect the UAI variable to be significant and positive, and finally, we expect 
the interaction terms of the adoption groups and UAI to be significant and negative.    
Table III-10:  Analysis of Mandatory versus Voluntary Adoption and UAI on cost of equity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES LNRW LNRW LNRW LNRW LNRW LNRW 
       
M  -0.0210 0.1661*** 0.1681*** 0.1651*** 0.1592*** 
  (-0.5435) (3.6965) (3.7454) (3.6743) (3.5406) 
V  0.8257*** 0.5050* 0.5053* 0.5095* 0.4693* 
  (10.7099) (1.7874) (1.8225) (1.8061) (1.6545) 
VM  0.4505*** 0.1559** 0.1542** 0.1549** 0.1322* 
  (9.0449) (2.2389) (2.2204) (2.2217) (1.8981) 
UAI 0.2503*** 0.1635*** 0.3482*** 0.3254*** 0.3299*** 0.3459*** 
 (9.7297) (6.4217) (7.2627) (6.7940) (6.8358) (7.2306) 
M_UAI   -0.3562*** -0.3478*** -0.3490*** -0.3588*** 
   (-6.5451) (-6.4027) (-6.4108) (-6.6044) 
V_UAI   0.2864 0.2879 0.2848 0.3073 
   (0.9799) (1.0031) (0.9761) (1.0478) 
VM_UAI   0.3085*** 0.3228*** 0.3166*** 0.3149*** 
   (3.7099) (3.8886) (3.8053) (3.7909) 
SERIOUS1    -0.1406***   
    (-5.3183)   
SERIOUS2     -0.0809***  
     (-3.4433)  
SERIOUS3      -0.1769*** 
      (-5.6292) 
WLNMCUSD -0.1197*** -0.1224*** -0.1186*** -0.1132*** -0.1123*** -0.0984*** 
 (-22.6829) (-23.0286) (-22.5232) (-21.2032) (-19.9516) (-15.5086) 
WLNMR -0.0139** -0.0117** -0.0106* -0.0104* -0.0109* -0.0111* 
 (-2.3071) (-1.9646) (-1.7887) (-1.7537) (-1.8371) (-1.8719) 
USGAAP 0.6897*** 0.8101*** 0.7789*** 0.7785*** 0.7789*** 0.7658*** 
 (9.1978) (10.4791) (10.1273) (10.1917) (10.1652) (10.0098) 
WVOL 2.1394*** 2.0422*** 2.0133*** 2.0120*** 2.0140*** 2.0231*** 
 (7.6104) (7.5689) (7.4791) (7.4783) (7.4987) (7.5527) 
LOSS 0.0465* 0.0446* 0.0455* 0.0451* 0.0442* 0.0450* 
 (1.8452) (1.7897) (1.8304) (1.8169) (1.7798) (1.8119) 
WLEV -0.0266 -0.0259 -0.0200 -0.0199 -0.0179 -0.0196 
 (-0.5410) (-0.5320) (-0.4112) (-0.4088) (-0.3687) (-0.4038) 
ENF_EU -0.0266 -0.0483 -0.0604 -0.0623 -0.0602 -0.0785* 
 (-0.6068) (-1.0656) (-1.3636) (-1.4143) (-1.3632) (-1.7594) 
Constant -3.4285*** -4.3677*** -4.5238*** -4.5377*** -4.5675*** -4.7374*** 
 (-28.1776) (-34.1275) (-34.3932) (-34.5126) (-34.5634) (-34.6027) 
       
Observations 20,398 20,397 20,397 20,397 20,397 20,397 
R-squared 0.1272 0.1448 0.1503 0.1518 0.1509 0.1519 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES 
M is a binary indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm adopted IFRS for the first time when it became mandatory. V is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the firm adopted IFRS prior to it becoming mandatory. VM is equal to 1 if the firm was a V 
prior to 2005 and continues to use IFRS. M_UAI, V_UAI, and VM_UAI are the variables created as a product of the M, 
V, and VM variables and UAI. UAI is a score developed by Hofstede (2001). SERIOUS 1, 2 and 3 are the firm level 
transparency variables created by Daske et al (2013). LNMCUSD is the natural log of Market Value of Equity in USD. 
RM is the annualized returns on the relevant index. US is an indicator variable to take into account financial statements 
prepared using US GAAP. Return VOL is the natural log of the calculated annualized volatility for the stock. LOSS is an 
indicator variable that is 1 if the firm had a net loss in the prior period. Leverage is the ratio of Total Debt to Book Value 
of Equity. ENF_EU is a variable obtained from Hail et al (2013) that controls for country level differences in regulatory 
enforcement changes. The coefficients have been normalised in order to aid in understanding. Control variables denoted 
with W have been winsorised at the 1% level. t-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table III-10 above shows the analysis conducted on the M, VM, and M adopters.  All three 
groups have coefficients that are significant and positive, suggesting that all three types of 
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adopters suffer from an increase in the cost of equity, though their coefficients are not of the 
same magnitude.  
Moving on to the UAI variable, as in the above analysis, we find that the variable is 
significant and positive, suggesting that a higher UAI score is associated with a higher cost 
of equity. This result is in line with our first hypothesis.  
Moving on to the three interaction terms, we find mixed results, we find that the V term is 
not significant though it is found to be positive, while the VM term is found to be positive 
and significant. Only the M term was found to be significant and negative. When we combine 
the M variable, with UAI and the M_UAI term, we find that mandatory adopters in higher 
UAI countries actually benefit from a decrease in their cost of equity. We find that voluntary 
and voluntary/mandatory adopters actually suffer from an increase in their cost of equity, 
and this increase is greater for higher UAI companies. 
The above result is not in line with our expectations, however if we examine Table III-6, we 
can see the M group is positively related to firm size, the three Daske et al(2013) measures, 
to the market momentum measure, and to be negatively related to the volatility measure. 
This suggests that mandatory firms are larger, are more likely to be SERIOUS adopters, and 
that they are less likely to experience large volatility in their returns.  
Compared to the M group, we find that both the V and VM firms tend to be smaller, less 
likely to be SERIOUS firms, and to be more likely to experience large volatility in their 
returns. This difference between the group’s composition is likely causing the difference we 
observed above, given how these variables are expected to and do behave in our results 
above. 
Moving on to the control variables, all the variables behave as in Table III-9 above and are 
consistent with prior literature and with our expectations.  
6. Analyses and results by sub sample periods  
We next examine whether earlier adopters were influenced by the level of uncertainty 
avoidance (UAI) present in the country. The main prediction in this section is that for early 
adoptions, that is, firms that voluntarily adopted prior to the 2005 EU wide adoption of IFRS, 
should benefit more from their IFRS decision and that this adoption should cause a larger 
effect for firms in higher UAI countries. We also expect that once market participants have 
a benchmark to gauge the IFRS adoption benefits against, that is, the EU wide adoption of 
IFRS, that irrespective of whether a firm is an early adopter or a mandatory adopter, that 
they should be treated identically by market participants.  
In this section and the subsequent section, for brevity, we exclude the control variables from 
our reports in the tables. The first equation for each test is conducted using the SERIOUS1 
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variable, the second using the SERIOUS2 variable, and the third using the SERIOUS3 
variable.  
We also examine the results from the sub-period 2008-2013, which is used to examine 
whether the results are different for the period after the global recession. 
Table III-11: Sub-period analysis. (Control variables not shown) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES 2000-2007  2000-2007  2000-2007  2000-2004  2000-2004  2000-2004  2008-2013  2008-2013  2008-2013  
          
M 0.1558** 0.1639** 0.1502**    0.1056 0.0942 0.0901 
 (2.2255) (2.3360) (2.1510)    (0.8604) (0.7687) (0.7339) 
V 0.4470 0.4577 0.3944 0.3933 0.4067 0.3261    
 (1.5701) (1.5838) (1.3534) (1.3471) (1.3583) (1.0784)    
VM 0.1580 0.1847 0.1232    0.0524 0.0425 0.0335 
 (1.0090) (1.1745) (0.7812)    (0.3881) (0.3144) (0.2476) 
UAI 0.2111*** 0.2134*** 0.2354*** 0.1164 0.1281* 0.1532** 0.3799*** 0.3741*** 0.3815*** 
 (3.6656) (3.6289) (4.1066) (1.6203) (1.7212) (2.1492) (2.9131) (2.8580) (2.9154) 
M_UAI -0.1503* -0.1626** -0.1652**    -0.4632*** -0.4545*** -0.4568*** 
 (-1.8568) (-2.0071) (-2.0493)    (-3.4727) (-3.4049) (-3.4181) 
V_UAI 0.4102 0.4008 0.4324 0.4767 0.4640 0.5076    
 (1.3911) (1.3399) (1.4345) (1.5732) (1.4940) (1.6215)    
VM_UAI 0.6352*** 0.6057*** 0.6175***    0.1176 0.1229 0.1251 
 (3.7329) (3.5501) (3.6148)    (0.7792) (0.8130) (0.8271) 
SERIOUS1 -0.1763***   -0.2874***   -0.0816**   
 (-4.1921)   (-4.2420)   (-2.3583)   
SERIOUS2  -0.1102***   -0.1414**   -0.0502  
  (-2.7285)   (-2.1968)   (-1.6419)  
SERIOUS3   -0.3058***   -0.3471***   -0.0535 
   (-5.9035)   (-4.6838)   (-1.3501) 
ENF_EU -0.0229 -0.0277 -0.0600 -0.0865 -0.0930 -0.1090 -0.1217** -0.1181** -0.1220** 
 (-0.3046) (-0.3711) (-0.8005) (-0.7527) (-0.8095) (-0.9510) (-2.2504) (-2.1779) (-2.2366) 
Observations 7,542 7,542 7,542 3,718 3,718 3,718 10,077 10,077 10,077 
R-squared 0.1808 0.1797 0.1833 0.2257 0.2227 0.2268 0.1301 0.1298 0.1297 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
M is a binary indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm adopted IFRS for the first time when it became mandatory. V is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the firm adopted IFRS prior to it becoming mandatory. VM is equal to 1 if the firm was a V 
prior to 2005 and continues to use IFRS. M_UAI, V_UAI, and VM_UAI are the variables created as a product of the M, 
V, and VM variables and UAI. UAI is a score developed by Hofstede (2001). SERIOUS 1, 2 and 3 are the firm level 
transparency variables created by Daske et al (2013). LNMCUSD is the natural log of Market Value of Equity in USD. 
RM is the annualized returns on the relevant index. US is an indicator variable to take into account financial statements 
prepared using US GAAP. Return VOL is the natural log of the calculated annualized volatility for the stock. LOSS is an 
indicator variable that is 1 if the firm had a net loss in the prior period. Leverage is the ratio of Total Debt to Book Value 
of Equity. ENF_EU is a variable obtained from Hail et al (2013) that controls for country level differences in regulatory 
enforcement changes. The coefficients have been normalised in order to aid in understanding. Control variables denoted 
with W have been winsorised at the 1% level. t-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
6.1. Analysis and results for the 2000-2007 period 
In this section, we explore whether the results are persistent or whether they are time specific. 
We conduct this examination by using a sub-sample of the data used in the main analysis. 
The subsample consists of the entire database of firms, but only takes into account the 2000-
2007 period. This subsample period therefore ignores the global recession of 2008. 
The results from this test should be treated with some caution. Since this sample ends in 
2007, the results may not provide a complete picture of the influence of IFRS on the liquidity 
and cost of equity for the firms in question, given that the influence of the global recession 
is excluded. It may be the case that capital markets may only gradually be able to fully 
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internalize the transition to a new set of accounting standards, and that by excluding six years 
from the dataset, we might be excluding key information from the analysis. 
We expect the V,VM, and M, and their interaction terms to be negative and significant for 
the three tests, while we expect the UAI variable to be significant and positive. Equations 1-
3 in Table III-11 presents results from the OLS regressions with robust standard errors that 
are clustered by firm 
We find only the M variable to be significant and positive, while we find the UAI variable 
to be significant and positive for all three tests in line with our expectations. We find the 
V_UAI variable to be insignificant but positive. We also find the VM_UAI variable to be 
significant and positive. Finally, we find the M_UAI variable to be significant and negative. 
Overall the results suggest that all three types of firms appear to exhibit an increase in their 
cost of equity, though it appears that M firms generally benefit slightly with a lower cost 
compared to the VM firms, however, all three types suffer compared to identical firms in 
lower UAI countries.  
The control variables behave in almost identical manner to that observed above. 
6.2. Analysis and results for Pre-EU IFRS adoption 
In this section, we examine whether early (Voluntary) adopters were able to benefit more 
than mandatory or non-adopters prior to the mandatory adoption of IFRS by the EU on the 
1st of January 2005. The main prediction for this sub-sample is that early adopters should 
benefit more than other groups of firms and this effect should be directly linked to the level 
of UAI present in the relevant country.  
Equations 4-6 in Table III-11 above reports the results conducted on a sample encompassing 
the five year period 1st of January 2000 to 31st December 2004. This sub-sample excludes 
data from the 1st of January 2005 onwards, the date from which IFRS became mandatory for 
all EU listed entities. This test is meant to examine whether voluntary adopters exhibited 
different capital market outcomes compared to mandatory adopters during this particular 
time period, and whether firms benefited from their adoption decision. 
As can be seen, there are no Mandatory or Voluntary/Mandatory adopters in this test. The 
coefficient of the V variable is insignificant, but positive.  
Moving on to the UAI variable, we find that the variable is significant and positive, 
suggesting that a higher value for UAI leads to an increase in the cost of equity, which is 
consistent with our expectation.  
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Finally, as expected, in line with our previous results, we do not find the interaction term to 
be significant. Overall, the results suggest that voluntary adopters in higher UAI countries 
suffered an increase in the cost of equity compared to firms in lower UAI countries.  
The control variables behave in a similar manner to that observed above previously. 
6.3. Analysis and results for Post-EU IFRS adoption (2008-2013) 
In this section we examine whether the economic benefits experienced by the two sets of 
firms were persistent or whether market participants treated the groups of firms as identical. 
The prediction is that following the EU mandate of compulsory IFRS adoption beginning in 
2005, market participants had a benchmark against which they could gauge the potential 
costs and benefits from the adoption of IFRS. As a result, there should be a lower level of 
uncertainty attached to adoption post 2005, given that market participants have an 
expectation based on the previous experience of EU listed entities. As a result, we expect 
that both mandatory and voluntary/mandatory adopters in higher UAI countries should 
experience similar economic consequences from adoption. 
Equations 7-9 in Table III-11 above, reports the results conducted on a sample encompassing 
the six year period 1st of January 2008 to 31st December 2013. This sub-sample includes data 
from the 1st of January 2008 onwards, i.e., we include observations that fall within the Global 
Recession of 2008. This test is meant to examine whether voluntary/mandatory exhibited 
different capital market outcomes compared to mandatory adopters, once IFRS became 
mandatory for all EU listed entities. 
Unlike the main analysis, we observe that neither the M nor the VM coefficients are 
significant and positive, suggesting that during this time period, IFRS adoption by itself did 
not lead to an increase in the cost of equity.  
As expected the UAI variable is significant and positive, which is in line with our predictions 
and earlier results. 
Finally, in terms of the interaction effect, we only find the M group to be significant and 
negative. The coefficient for the interaction term for the M group is larger than the coefficient 
for the UAI variable, suggesting that during this time period, mandatory adopters in higher 
UAI countries actually benefited from a decrease in their cost of equity compared to identical 
firms in lower UAI countries.  
The control variables behave as expected and are similar to those earlier. 
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The main prediction is that the influence of uncertainty avoidance (UAI), should be similar 
for both mandatory and voluntary/mandatory adopters once IFRS adoption became 
compulsory in the EU. We however do not find for this to be the case, we find that the VM 
group suffers from an increase in the cost of equity, while the M group appears to benefit 
from a decrease in its cost of equity.  
The findings therefore are complementary to previous research that has found the quality 
and quantity of disclosure to be a means to signal quality and to influence capital market 
outcomes (Verrecchia 2001, Diamond & Verrecchia 1991, Diamond 1985). 
7. Robustness Tests 
In this section, we test the sensitivity and robustness of the results to various research design 
choices by substituting the key cross-country variable with competing variables used in prior 
research. For brevity, we only show the coefficient and t-statistics of the main variables of 
interest and exclude the statistics for the control variables from the tables. Unless stated 
otherwise, we estimate the regressions using the same models as in sections 5 and 6.  
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Table III-12: Robustness tests with CIFAR, Schwartz (HAR), and Hofstede 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES CIFAR  CIFAR  CIFAR  HAR  HAR  HAR  HOFSTEDE  HOFSTEDE  HOFSTEDE  
          
M 0.1380*** 0.1354*** 0.1302*** 0.1659*** 0.1613*** 0.1543*** 0.6747*** 0.6719*** 0.6806*** 
 (3.1042) (3.0427) (2.9223) (3.6624) (3.5584) (3.3999) (3.6983) (3.6751) (3.7537) 
V 0.3144 0.3175 0.2830 0.1699 0.1736 0.1626 1.2340** 1.2046** 1.0900** 
 (1.2027) (1.1950) (1.0592) (0.7063) (0.7207) (0.6796) (2.4836) (2.3370) (2.1176) 
VM 0.0846 0.0853 0.0653 0.1297* 0.1276* 0.1036 0.5467** 0.5572** 0.5642** 
 (1.2040) (1.2092) (0.9266) (1.8273) (1.7966) (1.4611) (2.3707) (2.4231) (2.4534) 
UAI 0.1427*** 0.1489*** 0.1622***    0.7524*** 0.7556*** 0.7703*** 
 (2.9783) (3.0926) (3.3901)    (14.3626) (14.3023) (14.6395) 
PDI       -0.6727*** -0.6666*** -0.6627*** 
       (-11.5132) (-11.4730) (-11.4189) 
IDV       0.6459*** 0.6379*** 0.6482*** 
       (4.1275) (4.0655) (4.1825) 
MAS       0.2701*** 0.2626*** 0.2567*** 
       (4.7162) (4.5922) (4.4966) 
SERIOUS1 -0.1286***   -0.1297***   -0.1793***   
 (-4.9104)   (-4.8887)   (-6.9866)   
SERIOUS2  -0.0637***   -0.0749***   -0.0891***  
  (-2.7299)   (-3.2299)   (-3.8764)  
SERIOUS3   -0.1580***   -0.1650***   -0.1445*** 
   (-5.0444)   (-5.2998)   (-4.6999) 
M_UAI -0.3501*** -0.3521*** -0.3601***    -0.5683*** -0.5702*** -0.5803*** 
 (-6.5286) (-6.5502) (-6.7144)    (-9.2640) (-9.2701) (-9.4354) 
V_UAI 0.4035 0.4010 0.4203    -0.3967 -0.3893 -0.3762 
 (1.4912) (1.4595) (1.5218)    (-1.0891) (-1.0580) (-1.0190) 
VM_UAI 0.2884*** 0.2816*** 0.2811***    -0.0301 -0.0371 -0.0387 
 (3.4691) (3.3778) (3.3805)    (-0.3595) (-0.4421) (-0.4612) 
M_PDI       0.3825*** 0.3804*** 0.3794*** 
       (5.4094) (5.3858) (5.3723) 
V_PDI       0.0101 -0.0112 -0.0042 
       (0.0458) (-0.0508) (-0.0192) 
VM_PDI       -0.4894** -0.5080** -0.5365** 
       (-2.2649) (-2.3623) (-2.4962) 
M_IDV       -0.4685*** -0.4701*** -0.4815*** 
       (-2.9446) (-2.9478) (-3.0534) 
V_IDV       -0.7244* -0.6945* -0.6194 
       (-1.8219) (-1.6691) (-1.4938) 
M_MAS       -0.0418 -0.0416 -0.0441 
       (-0.6625) (-0.6605) (-0.6989) 
V_MAS       0.4384* 0.4403* 0.4565* 
       (1.8296) (1.8351) (1.8951) 
VM_MAS       0.1775** 0.1895** 0.1937** 
       (2.0928) (2.2343) (2.2824) 
ENF_EU 0.0255 0.0275 0.0107 -0.1103** -0.1107** -0.1318*** 0.0343 0.0340 0.0156 
 (0.5895) (0.6345) (0.2461) (-2.5559) (-2.5659) (-3.0271) (0.6754) (0.6675) (0.3045) 
HAR    0.3767*** 0.3817*** 0.3884***    
    (7.8021) (7.9185) (8.0930)    
M_HAR    -0.3478*** -0.3459*** -0.3517***    
    (-6.3341) (-6.2987) (-6.4060)    
V_HAR    0.6716*** 0.6686*** 0.6640***    
    (2.6706) (2.6539) (2.6510)    
VM_HAR    0.3394*** 0.3369*** 0.3419***    
    (4.0414) (4.0109) (4.0778)    
ACC_STD -0.3694*** -0.3699*** -0.3679***       
 (-13.0431) (-13.0560) (-13.0448)       
Observations 20,397 20,397 20,397 20,397 20,397 20,397 20,397 20,397 20,397 
R-squared 0.1616 0.1607 0.1617 0.1547 0.1539 0.1548 0.1849 0.1832 0.1836 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
M is a binary indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm adopted IFRS for the first time when it became mandatory. V is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the firm adopted IFRS prior to it becoming mandatory. VM is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the firm was a V and continues to use IFRS.  M_UAI, VM_UAI, and V_UAI are the variables created as a product of the 
M, VM, and V variables and UAI. CIFAR is the score obtained from CIFAR (1995). HAR is a score developed by Schwatz 
et al (2005). V_HAR, VM_HAR and M_HAR are the interaction term of M,V,VM and the HAR variable.  UAI, PDI, IDV, 
and MAS are the scores developed by Hofstede (2001). V_UAI, VM_UAI, and M_UAI are the interaction term of V, VM, 
and M and UAI. V_PDI, VM_PDI, and M_PDI are the interaction terms of V,VM, and M with PDI. V_IDV, VM_IDV, 
and M_IDV are the interaction terms of V,VM and M and IDV. V_MAS, VM_MAS, and M_MAS are the interaction terms 
of V, VM and M and MAS. SERIOUS 1, 2 and 3 are the firm level transparency variables created by Daske et al (2013).  
LNMCUSD is the natural log of Market Value of Equity in USD. RM is the annualized returns on the relevant index. US 
is an indicator variable to take into account financial statements prepared using US GAAP. Return VOL is the natural log 
of the calculated annualized volatility for the stock. LOSS is an indicator variable that is 1 if the firm had a net loss in the 
prior period. Leverage is the ratio of Total Debt to Book Value of Equity. ENF_EU is a variable obtained from Hail et al 
(2013) that controls for country level differences in regulatory enforcement changes. The coefficients have been normalised 
in order to aid in understanding. Control variables denoted with W have been winsorised at the 1% level. t-statistics in 
parentheses:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
7.1. Quality of Local Accounting Standards 
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In the first robustness check, we explore whether the results above are biased due to the 
historical quality of financial reporting standards of the sample countries. We use a survey 
compiled in 1995 by the Centre for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR), 
this survey data has also been used previously used in related research (Fidrmuc & Jacob, 
2010). The data used in the analysis should be interpreted with caution for two main reasons. 
First, as seen in Table III-4, the data is missing for 7 of the sample countries and as a result, 
we are using a sub-set of the sample used in the earlier analysis. Second, the data is historical 
and does not take into account any changes made to accounting standards from 1995 
onwards.   
We include the CIFAR dataset in order to examine whether the IFRS and UAI variables are 
still significant explanatory variables, once we include the historical quality of the financial 
standard of the relevant countries. The higher the score for the accounting standards variable, 
the better the existing local standards are meant to be in terms of quality and quantity of 
financial statement disclosures. We therefore expect that the higher the accounting standards 
score, the lower the cost of equity. We conduct two sets of tests to gauge the importance in 
the distinction between the two groups of IFRS adopters and whether this has a significant 
impact on the results. We partition the total IFRS observations into the Voluntary, 
Voluntary/Mandatory, and Mandatory groups as mentioned before, and incorporate the three 
indicator variables into the regressions for the tests. Similar to Daske et al (2013), we include 
the three SERIOUS variables as controls. We create a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
country’s CIFAR score is above the median for the dataset, and 0 otherwise. Our main 
variables of interest are V, VM, M, UAI, the three SERIOUS variables, the CIFAR variable, 
and the interaction terms for these variables. 
Equations 1-3 in Table III-12, shows the results when we add the CIFAR variable as an 
additional variable. Only the M coefficient was found to be significant and positive.  
The UAI score is found to be significant and positive in line with our expectations. Also, as 
expected the CIFAR variable was found to be significant and negative, suggesting that a 
higher level of pre-existing accounting standards in a country implies that the country will 
benefit from a reduction in the cost of equity.  
In terms of the interaction effect, the M group was found to exhibit a significant and negative 
term, with the implication that mandatory adopters in higher UAI countries appear to benefit 
from a decrease in their cost of equity. The result for the VM group was observed to be the 
opposite of that for the M group. 
 58 
 
Overall, the results are in line with our earlier analysis and suggests that mandatory adopters 
in higher UAI countries appear to benefit from a decrease in their cost of equity, while V 
and VM adopters appear to suffer from an increase in the cost of equity.  
As mentioned above, we need to be cautious with the results from Table III-12 because of 
the incomplete coverage of the data and the historical nature of the data.  
7.2. Schwartz’s Cultural Dimensions  
The next robustness test uses Schwartz’s (2005) cultural dimensions. Harmony relates to the 
level to which individuals are content with the natural and social environment they find 
themselves in and where they seek to protect the existing environment, rather than attempt 
to change it. The Schwartz cultural data is not complete and there is only sufficient 
information for 19 out of the 22 countries of the sample, as shown in Table III-3 above. For 
the purpose of this analysis, we replace the UAI and the interaction variables of UAI, with a 
variable for Harmony (HAR).  
In terms of the expected interaction of Schwartz’s cultural variable with the liquidity and 
Cost of Equity tests, we expect the Harmony variable to influence the results in a similar 
fashion to UAI. The harmony dimension measures the degree to which society values the 
status quo and takes precautions against changing the environment, hence, the influence of 
this variable should be very similar to that of UAI, given that UAI measures the degree to 
which individuals in society are intolerant towards change. Similar to Hofstede’s UAI 
variable, we expect that in terms of the results, the Harmony variable should have a 
beneficial influence on the cost of equity for adopters. 
In equations 4-6 in Table III-12 we find that only the M and VM groups observe a 
significant and positive relationship, and the V group is observed to not be significant.   
Unsurprisingly, we find that once we replace Hofstede’s (2001) Uncertainty Avoidance 
Index (UAI) with Schwartz’s proxy for uncertainty, we find similar results to those found in 
the main analysis, that is, we find the HAR variable to be significant and positive, suggesting 
that a higher score for HAR implies an increase in the cost of equity.  
We find the interaction terms to be mixed. We find the variable to be significant and negative 
for the M group, but to be significant and positive for the VM and V groups, suggesting that 
compared to the V and VM groups, M groups in higher UAI countries observe a decrease in 
their cost of equity.  
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Overall, when we replace Hofstede’s (2001) UAI variable with Schwartz’s et al (2005) HAR 
variable, we find results that are similar to those find in the main analysis for the HAR 
variable, which is meant to proxy UAI.  
7.3. Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions 
We next examine the four cultural dimensions introduced by Hofstede (2001). These include 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI), Power Distance Index (PDI), Individualism (IDV) and 
Masculinity (MAS). The Power distance index (PDI) is constructed in order to measure the 
degree to which the less powerful members of society within a given country accept the 
unequal distribution of power amongst individuals. Where, a higher score for power distance 
implies that individuals accept the status quo of society and accept the unequal distribution 
of power. The Individualism (IDV) score is constructed in order to measure the degree to 
which individuals in a country are geared towards the actualisation of their own self-interest 
and goals, at times at the expense of the wider social goals and interests. Where, a higher 
score implies that individuals are more geared towards achieving their own interests and 
goals, while a lower score implies that individuals are more integrated into achieving the 
interests and goals of society. Masculinity (MAS) is constructed in order to measure the 
degree to which societies as a whole are more competitive, assertive and tough. Where, a 
higher score implies that society as a whole is more competitive and assertive while a lower 
score implies that the society is less competitive. We have already mentioned Uncertainty 
Avoidance before. 
For the purpose of this test, we add the other three cultural dimensions to the existing UAI 
dimension in equation (1), and show the interaction terms of the three additional variables 
in the equation. The results from the tests are reported in equations 7-9 in Table III-12 above. 
We find the coefficients of all adoption groups to be significant and positive as previously 
observed above.  
The UAI variable as before, is found to be significant and positive for the tests, which is in 
line with our expectation. The PDI variable is found to be significant and negative, while the 
IDV and MAS variables are found to be significant and positive. 
However, the addition of the three Hofstede (1980,2001) variables does not change the 
significant or direction of either the UAI, or the interaction terms, which behave as before, 
that is, the term associated with M is significant and negative, while the terms associated 
with V and VM were not found to be significant. The results, as before suggest that 
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mandatory adoperts in higher UAI countries tend to experience a reduction in their cost of 
equity. 
However, the other cultural variables appear to give inconsistent results compared to that 
found for the UAI variable. Only the UAI variable was found to give robust and consistent 
results when examined and the other variables when individually found to not give consistent 
results in terms of direction and magnitude, when compared to the UAI variable presented 
in the paper. 
We therefore can conclude that changing the research design by incorporating all four of the 
cultural dimensions is found to be unsuitable, and that this test proves that our earlier 
research design of only including the UAI variable is both economically and statistically 
robust.  
The results are not surprising given that earlier research has found that the only robust 
cultural dimension in empirical research was UAI (Salter & Niswander, 1995; Sudarwan & 
Fogarty, 1996). Saudagaran and Meek (1997) argue that this result arises because the UAI 
variable dominates the other cultural dimensions due to UAI acting as a ‘summary index for 
the other three cultural dimensions’ (1997,p 130). So, in essence the above results are being 
caused by multicollinearity between the four dimensions, which is primarily being driven by 
the high level of correlation that exists between the four variables (Salter & 
Niswander,1995).   
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Table III-13: Robustness checks Religion, GLOBE, and LaPORTA. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES RELIGION RELIGION RELIGION GLOBE GLOBE GLOBE LAPORTA LAPORTA LAPORTA 
          
M 0.4200*** 0.4122*** 0.3982*** 0.0749* 0.0714* 0.0611 -0.0290 -0.0360 -0.0543 
 (4.0214) (3.9563) (3.8039) (1.9521) (1.8587) (1.5890) (-0.4977) (-0.6183) (-0.9323) 
V 0.6375 0.6376 0.6672 0.4597*** 0.4561*** 0.4434*** 0.3475 0.3307 0.3093 
 (1.3912) (1.3993) (1.4524) (2.9417) (2.8989) (2.8483) (1.5937) (1.4802) (1.4125) 
VM 0.5426*** 0.5508*** 0.5059*** 0.1367** 0.1396** 0.1142** 0.0442 0.0481 0.0155 
 (2.9669) (3.0386) (2.7711) (2.3527) (2.4115) (1.9658) (0.3728) (0.4020) (0.1294) 
ANTISD       0.0876 0.0693 0.0614 
       (1.5628) (1.2360) (1.1008) 
DISCLOSE       0.6957*** 0.6880*** 0.6954*** 
       (11.5649) (11.4400) (11.6164) 
SERIOUS1 -0.1929***   -0.1646***   -0.1515***   
 (-7.2366)   (-6.5470)   (-5.9137)   
SERIOUS2  -0.1430***   -0.0923***   -0.0620***  
  (-6.0958)   (-4.0674)   (-2.6959)  
SERIOUS3   -0.1969***   -0.1989***   -0.1928*** 
   (-6.2632)   (-6.3355)   (-6.1799) 
M_ANTISD       0.1634** 0.1670*** 0.1795*** 
       (2.5562) (2.6092) (2.8069) 
V_ANTISD       -0.0667 -0.0306 -0.0185 
       (-0.2280) (-0.1031) (-0.0631) 
VM_ANTISD       0.0223 0.0280 0.0450 
       (0.1715) (0.2145) (0.3443) 
M_DISCLOSE       -0.1971*** -0.1946*** -0.1898*** 
       (-2.9390) (-2.9019) (-2.8347) 
V_DISCLOSE       0.3180 0.3367 0.3350 
       (1.3618) (1.4113) (1.4299) 
VM_DISCLOSE       0.3286** 0.3149** 0.3187** 
       (2.5749) (2.4494) (2.4725) 
GUAI    0.8613*** 0.8615*** 0.8714***    
    (17.5571) (17.5441) (17.7894)    
M_GUAI    -0.2807*** -0.2836*** -0.2906***    
    (-4.9282) (-4.9700) (-5.0966)    
V_GUAI    0.0294 0.0374 0.0270    
    (0.1677) (0.2120) (0.1543)    
VM_GUAI    0.0691 0.0588 0.0581    
    (0.8910) (0.7596) (0.7493)    
ENF_EU -0.2361*** -0.2362*** -0.2652*** -0.4681*** -0.4666*** -0.4947*** -0.3476*** -0.3494*** -0.3768*** 
 (-4.7823) (-4.8133) (-5.3540) (-9.4819) (-9.4812) (-9.9636) (-7.5465) (-7.5848) (-8.1379) 
CATH 0.0026** 0.0027** 0.0030**       
 (2.1335) (2.2354) (2.4668)       
PROS 0.0089*** 0.0091*** 0.0091***       
 (4.7920) (4.9457) (4.9064)       
ORTH -0.0050** -0.0048** -0.0046**       
 (-2.3848) (-2.3214) (-2.2413)       
M_CATH -0.0056*** -0.0056*** -0.0057***       
 (-4.1819) (-4.1453) (-4.2202)       
V_CATH -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0021       
 (-0.2242) (-0.2488) (-0.3397)       
VM_CATH -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0020       
 (-0.8320) (-0.8940) (-0.8190)       
M_PROS -0.0080*** -0.0080*** -0.0079***       
 (-4.0075) (-4.0162) (-3.9233)       
V_PROS 0.0077 0.0080 0.0073       
 (1.0565) (1.0981) (0.9970)       
VM_PROS -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0002       
 (-0.1380) (-0.2177) (-0.0691)       
M_ORTH 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012       
 (0.5116) (0.5274) (0.5944)       
V_ORTH 0.0257*** 0.0261*** 0.0248***       
 (2.7364) (2.8103) (2.6210)       
VM_ORTH 0.0070* 0.0068* 0.0075*       
 (1.6961) (1.6862) (1.8712)       
Constant -4.6829*** -4.7504*** -4.9055*** -4.6239*** -4.6545*** -4.8371*** -4.7840*** -4.7820*** -4.9765*** 
 (-29.5356) (-29.9007) (-29.8259) (-36.2982) (-36.2684) (-36.2699) (-35.9923) (-35.7164) (-36.0042) 
          
Observations 20,397 20,397 20,397 20,397 20,397 20,397 20,397 20,397 20,397 
R-squared 0.1553 0.1544 0.1545 0.1900 0.1888 0.1900 0.1770 0.1756 0.1772 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
M is a binary indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm adopted IFRS for the first time when it became mandatory. V is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the firm adopted IFRS prior to it becoming mandatory. VM is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the firm was a V and continues to use IFRS.  CATH, PROS, and ORTH are the percentage of religious groups obtained 
from the CIA World Fact Book. V_CATH, VM_CATH, and M_CATH are the interaction terms of V, VM and M with 
CATH. V_PROS, VM_PROS, and M_PROS are the interaction terms of V,VM, and M with PROS. V_ORTH, 
VM_ORTH, and M_ORTH are the interaction terms of V,VM, and M with ORTH. GUAI is the UAI index created by the 
GLOBE network. V_GUAI, VM_GUAI, and M_GAUI are the interaction terms of V, VM and M with GAUI. ANTISD 
and DIS are the two variables introduced by La Porta et al (2006). V_ANTISD, VM_ANTISD, and M_ANTISD are the 
interaction terms of V, VM and M with ANTISD. V_DISCLOSE, VM_ DISCLOSE, and M_ DISCLOSE are the 
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interaction terms of V, VM and M with DISCLOSE.SERIOUS 1, 2 and 3 are the firm level transparency variables created 
by Daske et al (2013). LNMCUSD is the natural log of Market Value of Equity in USD. RM is the annualized returns on 
the relevant index. US is an indicator variable to take into account financial statements prepared using US GAAP. Return 
VOL is the natural log of the calculated annualized volatility for the stock. LOSS is an indicator variable that is 1 if the 
firm had a net loss in the prior period. Leverage is the ratio of Total Debt to Book Value of Equity. ENF_EU is a variable 
obtained from Hail et al (2013) that controls for country level differences in regulatory enforcement changes. The 
coefficients have been normalised in order to aid in understanding. Control variables denoted with W have been winsorised 
at the 1% level. t-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
7.4. Religious Demographics 
We next examine whether Religion has an influence on the benefits of IFRS adoption on the 
cost of equity. We obtain the data for the 22 countries from the CIA World Fact book. We 
limit ourselves to three different categories of religion. The classifications are Catholic, 
Protestant, and Orthodox. 
Prior research (La porta et al, 1999a,Kumar 2011) finds that different religious demographics 
are able to exert different influences on capital markets. La Porta et al (1999a) find that 
Catholics and Muslim religious populations are associated with an inferior level of 
government performance. Kumar et al (2011) find that higher Catholic dominated areas 
exhibit a stronger propensity to hold lottery type stocks, have more firms with employee 
stock option plans, and have higher incidences of the initial day returns after an IPO to be 
greater. 
We hypothesize that the Catholic variable will be more closely associated with the UAI 
variable. The expectation arises due to prior research that finds that this religious group is 
associated closely with maintaining the status quo of society and being unwilling and slow 
to change the social and economic environment when faced with changing circumstances 
(La Porta et al, 1999a).  
For the purpose of this test, we replace the UAI variable in equation (1) with the three 
religious categories and create corresponding interaction terms for the variables and the two 
groups of adopters. The results from the tests are reported in equations 1-3 in Table III-13 
above. 
As in the main analysis, the M and VM groups have positive and significant coefficients, 
while the V group was not found to be significant.  
In terms of the religious groups, we find that all religious groups appear to be significant, 
but only the CATH and PROS groups were found to be significant and positive, while the 
ORTH group was found to be significant and negative. The results for the CATH group is 
in line with our expectations, but the results were the PROS group are not in line with our 
expectations. 
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In terms of the interaction terms, we find only the terms related to the M group to be 
significant and negative, suggesting that mandatory adopters exhibited a decrease in only the 
CATH dominated countries. The V group associated was found to be significant and 
positive, suggesting that voluntary adopters faced a higher cost of equity. However, this 
should be treated with some scepticism, given that the ORTH group is largely driven by one 
country (Greece).  
The three SERIOUS and the ENF_EU variables behave as expected, that is, improved 
financial reporting transparency and a higher degree of regulatory enforcement leads to a 
reduction in the cost of equity. 
To summarize, when we use religious demographics to examine the cost of equity benefits, 
we find some evidence to support the notion that certain types of religious orientation 
influences liquidity and the cost of equity. We find results for the Catholic group that mirrors 
the results found for the UAI group in our main analysis. Our results are consistent with our 
expectation for the Catholic group. However, there is some evidence to suggest that certain 
religious groups appear to influence the economic benefits in a similar manner as the UAI 
measure and the results are complimentary to those found in earlier studies referenced above.  
7.5. Globe Data 
We next examine whether our results are robust to data obtained from GLOBE. The Global 
Leadership and Organisational Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE) is a cross cultural 
research effect that involves researchers based in 62 countries across the world. The 
international team collected data from 17,300 middle managers in 951 firms. The GLOBE 
research effort was borne out of a concern at possible biases being incorporated in earlier 
cultural findings such as Hofstede (2001) and Schwartz (2005), due to the reliance on a 
single firm, or investigations conducted by a single team. In order to reduce the level of 
‘response bias’ in the existing culture datasets, the GLOBE research effort has re-examined 
and updated existing cultural dimensions of Hofstede and other researchers. 
For the purpose of this test, we will be using a variable developed by GLOBE; Uncertainty 
Avoidance (GUAI). The GUAI is the GLOBE constructed version of Hofstede’s UAI used 
in our earlier analysis. In essence, this variable is meant to be more robust and free of bias 
(response and selection bias), compared to Hofstede’s UAI. Prior research (Baskerville , 
2003) has criticised the construction of Hofstede’s dimensions and argue that the variable is 
biased due to the method of construction and due to the reliance on a single firm (IBM). This 
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test is meant to examine whether an almost identical variable, constructed in a more robust 
fashion, is able to show similar results to the one obtained previously. 
The GLOBE data is not complete, and we only have data for 17 out of the 22 countries in 
the sample (Table III-4). We replace the UAI variable in equation (1) with the variable 
obtained from GLOBE and run the regression in the same manner as in section 5. The results 
of the test are shown in equations 4-6 in Table III-13 above. 
We find the coefficients of all three adopters to be significant and positive, suggesting that 
IFRS adoption leads to an increase in the cost of equity. 
The GUAI, our proxy for the UAI used in the main analysis was found to be significant and 
positive as expected, suggesting that a higher score for the GUAI results in an increase in 
the cost of equity.  
Finally, in terms of the interaction terms, only the terms associated with the M group were 
found to be significant and negative, suggesting that only the M group benefits from a 
decrease in the cost of equity.  
The SERIOUS and the ENF_EU variables behave as expected, that is, improved financial 
reporting transparency and a higher degree of regulatory enforcement both lead to a 
decrease in the cost of equity. 
Overall, the results appear to give some support to our results from the main analysis, and 
suggest that there appears to be some cost of equity benefits for mandatory adopters in 
higher GUAI countries.  
7.6. La-Porta’s Country level factors 
The final robustness test uses two variables introduced by La Porta et al (2006). The first 
variable is the Anti- Self-Dealing index (ANTI-SD) and measures the intensity of regulation 
of self-dealing by managers along a number of dimensions, covering both public and private 
enforcement mechanisms. The second variable Disclose, is an index meant to measure the 
level of existing disclosure requirements for shareholders and other capital market 
participants. 
The Anti-SD and Disclose variables are constructed to measure the level of protection 
offered, and the level of disclosure made by a firm respectively. We expect the Anti-SD 
variable to be directly (adversely) related to the benefits, given that this variable measures 
the intensity of existing regulations protecting market participants from firm managers. IFRS 
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adoption should improve the level and quality of information available to these market 
participants, and thereby a country with a higher ANTI-SD score should only have a 
marginal benefit from IFRS adoption. 
The Disclose variable is expected to have a negative (beneficial) relationship with the cost 
of equity benefits. If a country has a higher disclose score, it implies that the country has a 
higher level of existing regulation that enforces disclosures should be made by the firm. The 
introduction of IFRS may therefore be beneficial for market participants. 
However, the Dataset for the two variables is not complete. We only have data for 21 
countries for both the Anti-SD variable and the Disclose variable (as seen in Table III-4). For 
the purpose of this test, we replace the UAI variable in equation (1) with the two La Porta 
variables and generate the resulting interaction terms. The results of the tests are shown in 
equations 7-9 in Table III-13 above. 
We do not find any of the three adopter groups to be significant. We also do not find the 
ANTISD variable to be significant. However, as expected, we find the DISCLOSE variable 
to be significant and positive, suggesting that a higher score for DISCLOSE leads to an 
increase in the cost of equity. 
We only find the interaction terms associated with the M group to be significant. However, 
in line with our expectation, we find that a higher score for ANTISD interacts to lead to an 
increase in the cost of equity, whereas a higher score for DISCLOSE interacts to lead to a 
decrease in the cost of equity. 
The control variables for the three SERIOUS and the ENF_EU variables behave as expected.  
The results generally suggest that our proxy for uncertainty avoidance (DISCLOSE) appears 
to suggest that there is some explanatory power in determining the heterogeneity in the cost 
of equity benefits observed by firms.  
8. Conclusion 
This paper examines the influence of uncertainty avoidance on the cost of equity benefits 
associated with IFRS adoption around the world. We focus on firm-level heterogeneity in 
the consequences, recognising that firms can differ in their motivations and the influence of 
uncertainty avoidance (UAI) on IFRS. Some firms may adopt new IFRS standards as a 
means to signal their quality, others may adopt without making any material changes to their 
reporting policies, while some may adopt IFRS as part of a broader strategy to improve their 
commitment to greater capital market transparency. The possibility of such differences 
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implies significant heterogeneity in the economic consequences around IFRS adoption due 
to selection effects. 
Our main prediction for the influence of uncertainty avoidance on the cost of equity benefit 
derived from IFRS adoption is that the prevailing cultural attitudes towards uncertainty in 
higher UAI countries, would result in a higher marginal benefit to investors compared to 
lower UAI countries. We predict this hypothesis due to our expectation that the pre-existing 
cultural norms in higher UAI countries would pre-dispose these countries to adopt 
accounting standards that would provide the disclosure of a lower quality or quantity of 
information compared to that offered by IFRS adoption. Hence, these types of countries 
should benefit to a greater degree from IFRS adoption compared to lower UAI countries.  
We predict that Voluntary adopters would benefit more in higher UAI countries than their 
counterparts and compared to mandatory and voluntary/mandatory adopters due to the 
ability to signal their quality by going counter to the cultural norms of society.   
To show the existence of such effects, we create and use two sets of variables in the paper. 
The first set of variables takes into account whether the firm observation uses IFRS, and in 
later analysis, whether the observation contains a Mandatory, Voluntary/Mandatory, or a 
Voluntary adopter. The second set of variables takes into account the influence of 
uncertainty avoidance on the firm’s adoption decision, and the resulting economic 
consequences (UAI). We examine the economic consequences of uncertainty avoidance on 
IFRS adoption for mandatory, voluntary/mandatory, and voluntary adoption firms in a large 
EU based panel dataset from 2000-2013. 
We find that for IFRS adopters as a whole, the UAI variable has a significant positive 
relationship on cost of equity. That is, higher UAI implies a higher cost of equity. These 
results are consistent with our hypothesis. We further find that for the cost of equity, the 
three SERIOUS variables as introduced by Daske et al (2013), are significant and negative, 
implying that improved financial reporting transparency results in a decrease in the cost of 
equity. In terms of the interaction effect, in line with our hypothesis, we find that the use of 
IFRS and a higher UAI score for the country interact to lead to a reduction in the cost of 
equity, that is, the interaction terms are significant and negative, however, we find that the 
benefit from the interaction term is not sufficient to overcome the effect of the UAI variable. 
Examining the IFRS group by mandatory, voluntary, and voluntary/mandatory adopters 
suggests the effect of IFRS adoption and UAI are not uniform, but rather that mandatory 
adopters in higher UAI countries appear to benefit more than firms in lower UAI countries 
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or any other type of IFRS adopter. We find that voluntary/mandatory firms tend to suffer 
from an increase in their cost of equity. 
We check the robustness of the results and replace the UAI variable with several competing 
cross-country variables used in prior literature. We find that all the other competing cross-
country variables previously used generally appear to suggest that uncertainty avoidance (or 
a proxy of UAI), may be able to partly explain the cross-country differences in the economic 
benefits from IFRS adoption. Therefore, the robustness tests provide additional support to 
our conclusions from the main analysis.  
The study also contributes to the literature on the role of the influence of uncertainty 
avoidance on IFRS adoptions and the resulting capital market outcomes. It highlights the 
role of cross-country differences in uncertainty avoidance, and how these differences can be 
used to explain part of the heterogeneity in capital market outcomes across firms and 
countries. We present evidence that suggests that the level of uncertainty avoidance can 
influence the economic benefits that firms can accrue from the adoption of IFRS. Also, 
unlike other existing studies on IFRS, we do not focus on just cross sectional data, but we 
also include time series data. This allows us to examine whether the differences between 
countries and firms are persistent or time specific. This is important as there may be incorrect 
inferences drawn, if we only focused on a specific time period. 
Finally, we caution the reader that the results should not be interpreted as implying that 
uncertainty avoidance is the primarily driver for the cross-country heterogeneity in cost of 
equity, but rather a factor that is able to explain part of the difference in the results. We do 
not claim that managers were able to benefit from using the level of uncertainty avoidance 
in their respective countries. But rather the paper claims that managers could have benefited 
from the level of uncertainty avoidance.  While we show that uncertainty avoidance plays 
an important role for the sign and magnitude of the market reactions from IFRS adoption, 
the tests are not designed to analyse the relative contribution of standards and incentives. 
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V. Paper 2: ‘Accounting Choice and Debt design’ 
 
1. Introduction 
In the second half of 2007, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) introduced similar accounting standards to 
cater towards ‘Fair Value’ accounting for assets and liabilities. Several papers have been 
published in recent years that examine the influence of Fair Value accounting on volatility 
of earnings (Fiechter, 2011), illiquid and long lived assets (Platin et al, 2008), and the 
inclusion of financial covenants (Demerjian, 2011). Our paper is an attempt to introduce a 
theoretical model that examines the influence of Fair Value accounting (FVA) compared to 
a Historical cost accounting (HCA) based model. 
In Historical Cost accounting, assets are recorded at historical cost, which normally equals 
the fair value at the time the assets were originally bought. Historical cost of an asset is 
adjusted for amortization and impairments, but any asset value increases are only recorded 
if the asset is sold. When asset values decline and impairment is not restricted, fair value and 
historical cost accounting should be consistent. However, in practise, the impairment test 
differs across assets. Furthermore, whether or not the value of an impaired asset is written 
down and the loss is recognised in the income statement depends on the asset in question 
and whether the impairment is deemed as being not ‘temporary’ (Laux and Leuz, 2010). 
FVA, also referred to as “Marked-to-market”, is an accounting regime wherein the firm has 
to periodically revalue its assets and liabilities to match the securities to their observable 
market values (Level 1), or to use observable market values of a similar type of security 
(Level 2), or to provide observable valuation inputs for securities that do not have verifiable 
market values (Level 3).  Under a FVA regime, the firm will be required to revalue its assets 
and liabilities on each reporting date, and therefore, disclose any gains or losses due to the 
revaluation in the financial statements.10 
Managers may disclose information to outsiders via two mechanisms; they can either 
‘commit’ or ‘voluntarily’ disclose. When a firm commits to disclose information to 
outsiders, this is an ex ante decision made by the manager to disclose regardless of the 
observed outcome. When a manager voluntarily discloses information, this is an ex post 
decision to disclose once the outcome has been observed. FVA is a commitment made by 
managers, whereas, any revaluation under Historical Cost would be a voluntary disclosure.  
                                                             
10 The exact disclosure of the gain/loss will differ depending on whether the security is classified as “Trading 
securities”, “Available for Sale”, or “Held-to-Maturity”. 
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The traditional view on debt covenants as stated in Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggests 
that covenants are meant to control agency problems by restricting managerial activities that 
may expropriate wealth from debt holders. In practise, covenants are constructed using a 
variety of accounting ratios (Leftwich, 1983, Dichev and Skinner, 2002). However, little 
theoretical or empirical work exists on the influence of fair value accounting on the 
construction of debt covenants, the strictness of the covenants, and the cost of debt. 
Our paper examines the design and renegotiation of covenants in debt contracts under 
asymmetric information and extends the model introduced by Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009). 
In particular, we assume that the choice of accounting regime, that is, whether the firm uses 
HCA or FVA, influences the lender’s expectation of the potential wealth transfer (𝑥), which 
is a reduced-form agency cost. In the model future investments are efficient in some states 
but also result in a transfer from the Lender to the Entrepreneur. The model has symmetric 
information concerning the efficiency of the investments, however, the firm is better 
informed about any potential transfers compared to the lender. Compared to Garleanu and 
Zwiebel (2009), we introduce a world in which the Lender will bear different costs and 
observe different information sets based on the accounting policy the Entrepreneur follows.  
Under our base case scenario, we assume that there are two types of firms, FVA or HCA 
types, and we assume that information acquisition differs under the two different accounting 
regimes. Under the FVA regime, the Lender obtains the true realisation of the transfer value 
prior to the investment being made. However, under the HCA regime, the lender has to 
acquire this information at a cost. The base model in our paper assumes that the use of FVA 
results in the acquisition of information that is unbiased, timely, and easily verifiable, 
therefore, it could be thought of as relating to the use of the Level 1 FVA classification as 
Liao et al (2013), Ryan (2008), and Demerjian et al (2014) have found that the Level 1, 
compared to the Level 2 and 3 classifications, discloses timely information that is easier to 
verify and confirm.  
However, against the change in the information set under the two broad accounting regimes, 
we also incorporate differences in account preparation costs and information acquisition 
costs. We assume that the use of FVA results in a marginal increase in the cost (K) of 
preparing the financial statements for the firm, whereas, under the HCA regime, the lender 
is required to spend (C) in order to acquire the true realisation of the wealth transfer. We 
simplify the assumptions and state in our paper that the marginal cost of preparing the 
information is equal to the marginal cost of acquiring the information. Therefore, our model 
differs from Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009) in that we introduce a further layer of costs of 
 75 
 
information preparation and acquisition that are either borne entirely by the lender or by the 
firm depending on the accounting regime being followed.  
Given the above setting, we show that the presence of asymmetric information between the 
entrepreneur and the lender, and the two different accounting regimes leads to the allocation 
of a greater decision rights (covenants) ex ante to the more uniformed party, which is the 
lender facing a HCA regime, then would be the case under symmetric information.  
The model also suggests that firms that use FVA should be rewarded ex ante by the lender 
via requiring a lower yield on the debt contracts.  
We subsequently relax some of our assumptions concerning the accounting regimes, in 
particular, we relax the assumption concerning the ability of the HCA firm to engage in ex 
post revaluation and information sharing, and we are able to show that such a setting would 
result in a reduction in the number of ex ante covenants given to the lender than would be 
the case under a HCA regime, and that the cost of debt should be lower than would be the 
case under the HCA regime case. 
We further extend the model by assuming a scenario in which the firm uses a method of 
FVA that results in ‘noise’ being introduced into the information set, that is, we try to model 
how the level 2 and level 3 classifications are expected to influence the design of loan 
contracts. We find that compared to our base case model (Level 1), the extension results in 
an increase in the number of ex ante covenants given to the lender, and a higher cost of debt 
demanded by the lender. 
We test these predictions in the third chapter, wherein we obtain a sample of private US loan 
data from the LPC/DealScan loan database, and are able to find that the Level 1 classification 
results in a reduction in the number of balance sheet covenants, and a reduction in the initial 
yield spread.  
Our paper compliments existing literature by incorporating the influence of accounting 
choice on contract design and renegotiation. In particular, the paper is the first of its type 
that examines the influence of FVA on debt covenants, initial yield and renegotiations. 
This paper is structured out as follows. Section 2  presents the related literature. Section 3 
introduces the model. Section 4 discusses the equilibrium of the model. Section 5 presents 
two extensions to the base model. Section 6 examines the empirical predictions. Section 7 
concludes.  
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2. Related Literature 
In this section, we highlight some of the existing literature surrounding covenants, the use 
of accounting information in debt design, and recent literature on ‘Conservatism’ and FVA. 
The Costly Contracting Hypothesis (CCH), as articulated by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
views the firm as a centre of contracts made between the firm and its various stakeholders. 
Under the CCH theory, managers/insiders will, at times, pursue strategies that benefit 
themselves at the expense of outsiders. Outside investors will anticipate the potential for 
wealth expropriation and will ‘price-protect’ themselves by offering a lower price (i.e., a 
higher costs) for a given ownership claim. Insiders bear (and therefore have an incentive to 
mitigate) these costs. Insiders are able to mitigate these costs by entering into monitoring 
and bonding agreements and providing timely information to outsiders. Smith and Warner 
(1979) argue that if the CCH is correct, then we should observe restrictions (covenants) 
written into debt contracts. 
Besides covenants authors have found several other mechanisms that can be employed to 
protect bondholders. Prior studies have examined anti-takeover laws (Francis et al. 2010), 
the influence of political and legal institutions (Qi et al, 2010), the use of audit as a 
monitoring mechanism (Minnis, 2011), and Board independence and board structure 
(Anderson et al, 2004), amongst others.  
Rajan and Winton (1995) argue that both covenants and collateral can be motivated as 
contractual devices that increase a lender's incentive to monitor firms’ management. Billett 
et al (2007) find that covenant protection is increasing in growth opportunities, debt 
maturities, and leverage. The authors also argue that a negative relationship between 
leverage and growth opportunities is significantly attenuated by covenant protection, 
suggesting that covenants can mitigate the agency cost of debt for high growth firms. Chava 
et al (2010) argue that managerial entrenchment and the risk of managerial fraud 
significantly influences the use of covenants in the direction predicted by the agency-
theoretic framework. Entrenched managers aggravate investment risk, but ameliorate risk 
from shareholder opportunism. Furthermore, covenant use responds efficiently to the quality 
of information available regarding the risk of managerial fraud. 
Healy and Papelu (1990) find that accounting based covenants are effective means for 
bondholders to restrict firm’s dividend policies. More recent literature that builds on the 
traditional view suggests that covenants are similar to trip wires that provide lenders with 
the option to renegotiate the loan terms by threatening the borrower with default after a 
decline in economic performance (Berlin and Mester (1992), Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009)).  
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Covenants are created in terms of a variety of accounting ratios (Leftwich (1983), Dichev 
and Skinner (2002)). Information asymmetry between the borrower and lender makes it 
difficult for the lender to assess the profitability of the firm’s investment opportunities. If 
the lender cannot adequately asses the firm’s profitability, it will under-price the firm’s 
projected profitability and over-price firms with low profitability, which may potentially 
lead to market failure. This is the “lemons problem” introduced by Akerlof (1970), and it 
leads to incentives for borrowers to disclose additional information to the lender in order to 
mitigate the potential ‘lemons problem’.  
Accounting can have two roles in debt contracting: an information role and a direct 
contracting role. In the informational role, the lender uses accounting information in the 
initial contracting of the loan. The accounting information allows the lender to determine the 
likelihood of default and the potential loss given default (Amiram, 2011), and the associated 
loan price. The Accounting information will also allow the lender to engage in loan 
renegotiation (Roberts and Sufi, 2009). 
Debt covenants written on accounting ratios allocate control rights to the lender in the event 
of poor financial performance (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). Other provisions sometimes 
written on accounting variables include dividend restrictions (Kalay, 1982; Li et al, 2013), 
performance pricing provisions (Asquith et al, 2005), and cash flow sweeps. 
The direct contracting role of accounting relates to contract provisions written explicitly on 
accounting values. Covenants written on accounting ratios allocate control rights to the 
lender in the event of poor financial performance (Aghion and Bolton, 1992, Leftwich, 1983, 
Dichev and Skinner, 2002).  
Information asymmetry between the borrower and lender makes it difficult for the lender to 
assess the profitability of the firm’s investment opportunities. If the lender cannot adequately 
asses the firm’s profitability, it will under-price the firm’s projected profitability and over-
price firms with low profitability, which may potentially lead to market failure. This is the 
“lemons problem” introduced by Akerlof (1970), and it leads to incentives for borrowers to 
disclose additional information to the lender in order to mitigate the potential ‘lemons 
problem’.  
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), and Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) suggest that a credible 
commitment by managers to improve disclosure results in a reduction in information 
asymmetry costs related to cost of capital and trading liquidity. Under a commitment 
mechanism, the manager agrees to disclose information to the financier in a timely fashion, 
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irrespective of the observed outcome. This results in the financier needing to place a lower 
reliance on external information acquisition mechanisms in order to acquire information in 
a timely fashion. The manager bears the full cost of this information disclosure, and the 
financier in turn rewards the manager with lesser covenants and a lower cost of debt.  
Under the Voluntary disclosure mechanism, Verrecchia (2001) argues that the informational 
asymmetry exists due to managers being reluctant to disclose information that may be 
detrimental to their own interests. Financiers would perceive this incentive by managers to 
not disclose detrimental information under a voluntary disclosure regime, and thereby, this 
information asymmetry would be priced into the debt contract in the form of a higher cost 
of debt and a higher number of covenants. 
In order to mitigate the information asymmetry being faced by lenders, borrowers may 
attempt to use Conservatism. 11 Basu (1997) and Watts (2003a, 2003b) find that losses 
reported by management are informative even if they cannot be verified by external parties 
due to management incentive to prevent disclosure of bad news while gains reported by 
management are deemed less informative due to management’s incentive to report good 
news. Further, Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) argue that financial reporting 
conservatism is one potential mechanism to address agency problems between owners and 
managers.  
However, Gigler et al (2009) and Gow (2008) suggest that conservatism may reduce the 
efficiency of debt contracts due to debt contracts being designed differently in accordance 
with the conservatism of the accounting system.  
Moving away from conservatism, authors find that timely loss recognition is able to increase 
reliance of accounting information in debt contracts (Nikolaev ,2010) and to reduce the bid-
ask spread on traded debt (Wittenberg-Moerman ,2008).  
In terms of the use of FVA, Barth (1994) finds that fair value estimates are relevant to 
investors, but that the change in fair value are less relevant, compared to the HCA method. 
Fiechter (2011) finds that the fair value option is able to reduce the volatility of bank’s 
earnings. Further, Laux and Leuz (2009) argue that though there are legitimate concerns 
surrounding marking to market in times of financial crises, it is less clear that these problems 
apply to FVA as stipulated under either US GAAP or IFRS. They further argue that HCA is 
                                                             
11 “Conservatism” occurs when a higher degree of verification is required for gains compared to losses, that 
is, firms recognise losses in a timely manner, but delay the recognition of gains. 
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not a remedy and that there are a number of concerns surrounding historical cost and that 
these problems could be larger than those associated with FVA.  
Authors have also raised concerns about the potential damage done by FVA when assets are 
illiquid or long lived, (Platin et al, 2008, Demerjian et al, 2014, Benson, 2008). The argument 
mainly stems from a concern that fair values not based on actual market prices will be costly 
to apply, and that fair values levels 2 and 3 could be easily manipulated and are not easily 
verifiable. 
Further, research shows that FVA disclosures may only provide a limited incremental 
information value relevance role (Eccher et al, 1996), that debt contracts may be less likely 
to include financial covenants affects by FVA (Demerjian ,2011, Ball et al ,2013).  
If fair values under SFAS 159 makes accounting information more(less) useful in the direct 
contracting role, lenders could increase (decrease) their use of financial covenants in debt 
contracts (Ball et al, 2013; Demerjian, 2011). Alternatively, lenders could modify contract 
definitions of financial covenants to adjust for the effects of SFAS 159 (Leftwich, 1983; Li, 
2010, Demerjian et al, 2014). Furthermore, market values may capture information that is 
uninformative for debt contracting, such as temporary shocks unrelated to the borrower’s 
future cash flows (Shivakumar, 2013). Kothari et al (2010) and Benson (2008) argue that the 
use of fair value also grants managers increased reporting discretion, particularly for Level 
2 and Level 3 assets, and that this increase discretion could lead to reporting opportunism. 
However, Liao and Beatty (2014) find that the three level hierarchy under SFAS 157 
provides investors with useful information.   
Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009) examine the design and renegotiation of debt covenants. They 
introduce a model where managers are better informed than lenders regarding potential 
transfers (𝑥) from the debtholders to equity-holders associated with future investments. They 
conclude that the adverse selection problem leads to the allocation of greater ex ante 
covenants (decision rights) to the lender (the uninformed party), then would be the case 
under symmetric information.  
3. A model of the influence of accounting disclosure choice 
This section introduces a model which illustrates how differences in accounting disclosure 
choice may influence debt contracts, covenants, and the renegotiation process. The model 
shows how different accounting regimes cause different expectations to arise for the lender 
in relation to the expected loss due to activities undertaken by the equity holder to 
 80 
 
expropriate wealth from the lender for themselves. The paper makes use of and extends the 
model introduced by Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009). 
Model assumptions and set-up 
Similar to the Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009) model, there is a wealth constrained Equity 
holder (E) that needs financing of I at time 0 to invest in a project. Ex ante E faces a 
competitive lending market and as a result she offers a break-even contract to a Lender L 
in return for𝐼. Both E and L are assumed to be risk-neutral, and we assume that the 
discount rate is 0. If undertaken, the project will yield a certain return R at time T. To 
obtain this funding, E signs a contract {CR,D} specifying a promised (deterministic) 
payment D to L when the returns are realized, and an allocation of the time 𝑡2 decision 
right to one party (covenants) CR ϵ {E,L}, where E implies no debt covenants issued and L 
implies that debt covenants are included in the loan agreement.  We assume that the net 
cash flows are always sufficient to pay back D in all the scenarios.12 
Figure V-1: Time Diagram 
 
 
 
 
If the two parties agree and enter into such a contract, events will occur as described in the 
figure above. Conditional on taking on the project at time t0, there is an opportunity to 
undertake a further investment at time T. This could be an expansion option on the existing 
project, where the additional expansion requires no further funding from the Lender. We 
denote this option to take or pass on the additional investment by A (accept) and NA (Not 
accept), respectively. The time t0 contract specifies who has the right to make the investment 
decision: if this right is assigned to L, then we term this right as a covenant (CR = L),13 and 
if the right is assigned to E, then we term this right as no covenant (CR = E).  
                                                             
12 Net cash flows imply the cash flows realized after taking into account any additional financial reporting 
costs or other administrative costs. 
13 This can be viewed as a form of debt covenant that allows debt-holders to veto investments contingent on a 
verifiable state of the world, for example the debt to EBITDA ratio being too low. 
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Similar to Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009), we assume that the parties have the option to 
renegotiate prior to the investment decision, and that the party that does not have the decision 
right may need to pay the other party in order to acquire the right to decide.  
After the project is undertaken at time t0, at time t1 the state of the world is revealed to be 
either good (G) or bad (B) to both the entrepreneur and the lender. An ex ante contract that 
is contingent on the realization of the state is assumed to be impossible to write at time 0. 
Prior to the revelation of the state, both E and L only know that the probability of state G 
is 𝑝, and therefore the probability of state B is 1 − 𝑝. The state will not change after 𝑡1and 
until 𝑇. The investment at time T is efficient in state G and inefficient in state B because at 
time T, the investment will yield an additional expected return of 𝑦 > 0 for E and 0 for L in 
state G, and additional expected returns of −𝑦 for L and 0 for E in state B, where 𝑦 is 
deterministic and known ex ante by both parties.14  
The time T investment will also result in an additional wealth transfer 𝑥15 from L to E, due 
to the increased level of risk (‘asset substitution’)16 or, it can also be considered as the value 
that E can funnel out of the firm for herself owing to the added complexity of future 
investment. We also assume that the value of 𝑥 is a function of the value of assets of the 
firm, 𝑅. We assume that E knows the true realization of 𝑥 at 𝑡0, that is, we assume that E has 
complete information at 𝑡0, while L only knows that 𝑥  is distributed over the interval [a,b], 
with 0 ≤  a < b, according to the cdf J, that is, the functional form of 𝑥 is private 
information known by only E at 𝑡0. The reasoning behind this is the assumption that E may 
know more about the future risks inherent in a project than L due to the presence of 
asymmetric information. For simplicity, the model assumes that J is atom-less with full 
support over [a,b]. 
An important idea to note is that 𝑥 is related to the wealth expropriation that E can engage 
in at the expense of L. Therefore, similar to Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009), we model this as 
occurring only when CR=E and to be the same for both states of the world. Given that 𝑥 is 
a wealth expropriation from L, it can only exist when CR=E, that is, when the L does not 
have the control rights (covenants) in place to prevent activities that would transfer value 
from itself to E. (Tirole, 2006)  
                                                             
14 𝑦 relates to the Net present Value of the new investment. 
15 𝑥 relates to the potential wealth transfer between the L and E and is independent of the additional project 
being undertaken. 
16 “actions increasing risk (“asset substitution): shareholders with their convex claim, benefit from increased 
risk taking while debt holders, with their concave claim are hurt.” Tirole,J (2006) “The theory of corporate 
finance” p 85. 
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Secondly, we assume that 𝑥 is a constant under both the Good and Bad states of the world. 
This is based on our earlier assumption that 𝑥 is a function of 𝑅 and given that 𝑅 is a constant 
in both states of the world, 𝑥 should exist in both states of the world and be the same. As in 
Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009), our model assumes that the only difference between the Good 
and Bad states of the world is that in the Good state, the additional investment will result in 
a positive value (𝑦) to E, while in the Bad state, the additional investment will add no value 
to E, while destroying value for L (−𝑦).  
In our model, we operationalize the difference in the information set between the two types 
of accounting regimes as a filtration, whereby, under one regime (FVA), the filtration allows 
continuously updated information, and in the other regime, the information is static. This 
information setup is very similar to those employed by Lambert et al (2007), Sridhar and 
Magee (1997) and Lambert et al (2011). These papers and more, primarily show how the 
quality of accounting information about a firm is able to affect its cost of capital, information 
asymmetry and debt covenants. In a similar fashion to our model, these papers operationalise 
the difference in accounting information (standards) as a change in the information set which 
then influences equity and debt-holders decisions. 
For simplicity in the model, we assume that all firms in the world are one of two types; they 
either all use HCA (H) or FVA (F) accounting. Under an H regime, firms will only disclose 
the value/cost of the net assets (assets and liabilities) at initiation (at 𝑡𝑜). However, under the 
F regime, the firm will revalue its net assets on a continuous basis (at 𝑡0 and 𝑡1 in our model).  
We have a multi-period model, whereby information about the firms’ asset values is revealed 
in stages (different points in time). Some events are determined at initiation(𝑡0), however, 
some events will only be determined at 𝑡1. This suggests the following classification of 
events: for each 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1. 
ℑ𝑡 = {𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠}                                                       (1) 
The finite sequence (ℑ𝑡)0≤𝑡≤𝑡1 is a filtration of the space Ω of market scenarios. Where ℑ𝑡is 
indexed by the time parameter t. The expectation of 𝑥 in our multi-period model depends on 
the market scenarios, but evolve in such a way that their value at any time t, does not depend 
on the unobservable post-t futures of the scenarios. 
We further assume that prior to time 𝑡1, L’s expectation of 𝑥, is influenced by the accounting 
information supplied by E. In particular, we assume that the expectation will vary between 
the two accounting regimes (H or F). L will frame the expectation of 𝑥, based on the 
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accounting information concerning the value of assets 𝑅, and that due to the differences in 
frequency in updating the value of the assets under the two accounting regimes, the 
expectation will differ between the two regimes. At time t1, the state of the world will be 
revealed to everyone and both L and E will know whether the State is either Good or Bad. 
However, only E will know the true realisation of 𝑥 at t0. 
Under the H regime, information is only disclosed at time 𝑡0 and is not further revealed post 
𝑡0, which leads to the following filtration of the information set for the H type firm: 
ℑ𝑡
𝐻 = {𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡0}                                                                                  (2) 
While for the F type firm, the filtration follows equation (1) above. 
We have: 
𝔼𝐹0[𝑥 | ℑ𝑡0
𝐹 ] ≥ 𝑥 and 𝔼𝐹0[𝑥 | ℑ𝑡0
𝐹 ] ≥ 𝔼𝐹1[𝑥 | ℑ𝑡1
𝐹 ]  with [𝑥 | ℑ𝑡
𝐹] ~ 𝐹0, 𝐹1                              (3) 
and  
𝔼𝐻0[𝑥 | ℑ𝑡0
𝐻 ] ≥ 𝑥 and 𝔼𝐻0[𝑥 | ℑ𝑡0
𝐻 ] ≡ 𝔼𝐻1[𝑥 | ℑ𝑡0
𝐻 ]  with [𝑥 | ℑ𝑡0
𝐻 ] ~ 𝐻0   ,                             (4) 
where [𝑥 | ℑ𝑡
𝑗] for 𝑗 = 𝐹, 𝐻 relates to the estimated conditional loss (expectation of 𝑥 ) for 
each type of regime. Under F, there are two distributions, one associated with 𝑡0(𝐹0) and one 
associated with 𝑡1(𝐹1). Under our earlier assumptions, the estimated loss under F will be 
lower as new information is incorporated into the information set, this leads to equation 4, 
which states that under F, the 𝑡1estimate of the estimated loss will be equal to the true 
realisation of  𝑥 , which may be equal to or lower than the 𝑡0estimate. The 𝑡0 estimate will 
be the same under both H and F, 𝔼𝐹0[𝑥 | ℑ𝑡0
𝐹 ] = 𝔼𝐻[𝑥 | ℑ𝑡0
𝐻 ]. 
We have: 
ℑ0
𝐻 = ℑ𝑡1
𝐻   and ℑ0
𝐹 < ℑ𝑡1
𝐹    .                                                                                                              (5) 
That is, the information set under H is static, while under F, the information set increases 
with time. Equation (3) and (4) arise due to our earlier assumption that F incorporates 
information post 𝑡0. Under the H regime, there will be no update of information as time 
progresses, however, under F, the information set will be refined and the expectation of 𝑥 
will be updated at 𝑡1. Under the F regime, the filtration will allow L to obtain the true 
realisation of 𝑥 at 𝑡1. 
For simplicity, we use the following notation: 
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𝑥t
j
≡  𝔼[𝑥 | ℑ𝑖
𝑗]   ,                                                                                                                    (6) 
where 𝑥t
j
, are the expectations of 𝑥 under the H (𝑗 = 𝐻) and F (𝑗 = 𝐹) accounting regimes 
respectively at time t. Note that 𝑥t
j
 is a decreasing function of the information set, that is, 
with improved and increased information about the assets of the company, the lender’s 
conditional expectation of the loss (𝑥) decreases. Hence, given our assumption that F 
increases and improves the information set for the lender: 
𝑥t
H  ≥  𝑥t
F   ∀𝑡     and       𝑥 = 𝑥t1
F ≤ 𝑥t0
F    ∀ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1          .                                                      (7) 
At 𝑡0, we have 𝑥t0
H =  𝑥t0
F , that is, both set of accounting standards will give the same 
expectation of 𝑥 at 𝑡0. Thereafter, due to the difference in the level of public information 
available under the two accounting regimes, 𝑥t
j
 will change for the F regime firm at 𝑡1 but 
remain constant for the H regime firm.  
The market value of debt: 
𝐵𝑡
𝑗 = 𝐷 − 𝑥𝑡
𝑗    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 𝐻, 𝐹       and therefore   𝐵𝑡
𝐹  ≥  𝐵𝑡
𝐻                                                   (8)                                 
The equity holders face a cost of preparing the financial statements, and for simplicity we 
assume that the cost of preparing is higher under F: 
𝐾 > 0                                                                                                                                       (9) 
And there is no cost for H regime firms.                                                                                 
We posit that for F regime firms, the cost associated with preparing the financial statements 
should be more onerous given our earlier assumption of continuous updating of asset prices 
under this accounting regime. Hence, the incremental cost of preparing the financial 
statements under F is higher compared to H. Since at t1, all information is revealed to L, we 
do not model preparation costs after t1. 
The debt holders also face a cost associated with acquiring and verifying the private 
information held by E,17 and transferred to L via the financial statements. We assume that 
the verification cost for the debt holders is greater under the H regime, due to the staleness 
                                                             
17 The verification costs can be costs such as due diligence, audit of managerial accounts, conference calls, 
etc. 
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of information contained in the financial statements compared to the F regime. That is, L 
pays a lump sum 𝐶 18 in the H regime at 𝑡1: 
𝐶 ≥  0                                                                                                                                    (10) 
L can obtain the true value of 𝑥, if he pays 𝐶 at time 𝑡1 for the H regime firms. Failing to do 
so, he will have the expectations 𝑥 and 𝑥t0
H  , under F and H respectively at 𝑡1. For the F 
regime firm, at 𝑡1, the expectation is 𝑥𝑡1
𝐹 = 𝑥.  
At t1, the state of the world is revealed to L, however, L only knows the true realisation of 
𝑥 under the F regime, while under the H regime L only knows which state of the world they 
are in.19 However, under the H regime, L is able to decide whether it is optimal for it to pay 
𝐶 to acquire information about the true realisation of 𝑥, and engage in renegotiation if 
needed. Rationally, L will only pay 𝐶 and acquire the true realisation of 𝑥 if there are any 
benefits from renegotiation.  
For simplicity, we assume that 𝐾 = 𝐶, that is, the marginal cost of preparing under the F 
regime is equal to the marginal cost of obtaining information for the Lender under the H 
regime.  
If L finds itself in states (E,B) or (L,G), then it will enter the renegotiation process and pay 
an amount 𝐶 for the H regime firm, which will allow it to acquire the true realisation of 𝑥. 
As a result, in these two states, the Market value of debt for H firms is the same as for a firm 
using F: 
𝐵𝑡1
𝐻 = 𝐵𝑡1
𝐹 = 𝐷 − 𝑥                                                                                                                (11) 
For simplicity we assume that in renegotiation, L makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to E. We 
also assume that there is a cost associated with renegotiation (𝑁 > 0) that is fully borne by 
L. In our model, we assume that the renegotiation costs are the same under both accounting 
regimes. We assume that the renegotiation costs are borne by L only because we have 
endowed him with all the ex post bargaining power and he realizes all the bilateral gains 
from such a renegotiation. The presence of the non-zero renegotiation costs gives an 
incentive to both parties to write an initial contract at 𝑡0 that minimizes the probability of 
renegotiation ex ante. 
                                                             
18 We assume that C is constant, that is, the cost is not time varying and L will pay the same amount either at 
𝑡1or at any other time. 
19 Prior to time 1, L only knows of the distribution that 𝑥 can take. Post state revelation, L obtains the true 
realisation of 𝑥 under F but has the expectation of 𝑡0 under H. 
 86 
 
At time 𝑡2, all returns are realized and the payoffs are made. We assume that R is sufficient 
enough so that D (which is determined in equilibrium) is less than or equal to R, even after 
any renegotiations. In Tables 1 and 2 below, we show the time 𝑡2 payoffs to E and L 
conditional on the state of the world and the action taken. The tables show the payoffs when 
E has the decision right, so there is no renegotiation involved.  
Table V-1: Payoffs at 𝑡2 to (E,L) under an accounting regime based on FVA 
State A NA Probability 
G (R − 𝐾 −[𝐷 −
𝑥] + 𝑦 ,  [𝐷 − 𝑥] ) 
(R – 𝐾 −𝐷, 
𝐷) 
𝑝 
B (R − 𝐾 −[𝐷 −
𝑥] , [𝐷 − 𝑥] – 𝑦) 
(R – 𝐾 − 𝐷 , 
𝐷) 
1 − 𝑝 
 
Table V-1 above shows the period 𝑡2 payoffs obtained under a F based accounting regime, 
where R is the realisation of the cash flows from the firm, K is the cost of preparing the 
financial statements, D is the face value of the debt as set out in the contract for both regimes 
of firms, 𝑥 is the true realisation of the expected loss due from the ‘risk shifting’ from the 
firm, and 𝑦 is the additional value/loss realised from undertaking the new project. 
In State (G,A), the net social benefit is 𝑅 − 𝐾 + 𝑦, while in State (G,NA), the net benefit is 
𝑅 − 𝐾. In State (B,A), the net benefit is 𝑅 − 𝐾 − 𝑦, while in State (B,NA), the net benefit is 
𝑅 − 𝐾.  
Table V-2 below shows the period 𝑡2 payoffs under the H regime, the variables that are 
different from table 1 are 𝐾 and 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ,  𝐾 is omitted in Table 2 due to our assumption that F 
costs more than H to prepare, while 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻  is the expectation of 𝑥 under the H regime at 𝑡0.  
In State (G,A), the net social benefit is 𝑅 + (𝑥 − 𝑥t0
H ) + 𝑦, while in State (G,NA), the net 
benefit is 𝑅. In State (B,A), the net benefit is 𝑅 + (𝑥 − 𝑥t0
H ) − 𝑦, while in State (B,NA), the 
net benefit is 𝑅.  
Table V-2: Payoffs to (E,L) under a HCA regime at 𝑡2. 
State A NA Probability 
G (𝑅 −  [𝐷 − 𝑥] 
+ 𝑦 , [𝐷 − 𝑥t0
H ]) 
(𝑅 – 𝐷, 𝐷) 𝑝 
B (𝑅 − [𝐷 − 𝑥] 
,  [𝐷 − 𝑥t0
H ] − 𝑦) 
(𝑅 − 𝐷, 𝐷) 1 − 𝑝 
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According to both Table V-1 and Table V-2 above; when NA (No additional project) is 
chosen, the payoffs are insensitive to both the state and to private information concerning 𝑥. 
In the context of debt covenants, NA can be interpreted as a decision that is independent of 
E’s private information. Further, absent any costs of renegotiation, L would always prefer 
NA to A, while E would prefer A to NA. However, the socially optimal decision (given by 
the sum of E’s and L’s payoffs) would be to accept the investment (A) in the Good state G 
and to reject the investment (NA) in the Bad state B. Finally, the constant R in the model is 
required to ensure that the payments by E are feasible under the interpretation of an ex ante 
wealth constrained entrepreneur. 
4. Equilibrium and Analysis 
Our starting point is the benchmark case introduced by Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009), in 
which there is no asymmetric information present.   
Proposition 1. If the two parties are symmetrically informed about 𝑥 at time 0, then L 
receives control rights whenever 𝑝 <  
1
2
,  while E receives control rights whenever 𝑝 >  
1
2
, 
with the two parties being indifferent between the two types of contracts when p = 
1
2
 .  
The proposition above arises from observing that under symmetric information E simply 
offers the break-even contract to L that leads to the minimum future renegotiation costs. 
When both parties know the true realisation of 𝑥 at time 0, then 𝑥𝑡0
𝑗 = 𝑥 for both regimes of 
firms and there is no need for L to acquire information at t1for C for an H regime firm.  
 When CR = L, that is, when the firm offers the lender debt covenants, costly renegotiation 
is averted in the bad state, whereas when CR = E, that is, the firm does not offer the lender 
debt covenants, renegotiation costs are averted in the good state. When the bad state is more 
likely than the good state, than the expected costs will be the smallest when CR = L, and 
vice versa.  
As per the Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009) model, we use a Pure-Strategy Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibria (PSPBE). In order to ensure that the ex post renegotiation ensues when the 
inefficient action would otherwise be taken, we assume that  𝑁 < 𝑦 and 𝐶 +  𝑁 < 𝑦 under 
the F and H regimes respectively. That is, we assume the efficiency gains from renegotiating, 
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including the gains from renegotiating the debt, exceed the total cost of information 
acquisition and renegotiation for the F and H regime firm.20 
Table V-3: Net Payoffs before renegotiation to (E,L) under a FVA regime. 
State CR=E CR=L  Probability 
G (𝑅 − 𝐾 − [𝐷 −
𝑥]  +𝑦 ,  𝐷 − 𝑥) 
(𝑅 − 𝐾 − 𝐷, 
𝐷) 
𝑝 
B (R − 𝐾 − 
[𝐷 − 𝑥] , 𝐷 − 𝑥 − 𝑦) 
(R  − 𝐾 −  𝐷 , 
𝐷) 
1 − 𝑝 
 
Table V-4: Net Payoffs after renegotiation to (E,L) under a FVA regime. 
State CR=E CR=L  Probability 
G (𝑅 − 𝐾 − [𝐷 −
𝑥]  +𝑦 ,  𝐷 − 𝑥) 
(𝑅 − 𝐾 − 𝐷, 
𝐷 + 𝑦 − 𝑁) 
𝑝 
B (R − 𝐾 − 
[𝐷 − 𝑥] , 𝐷 − 𝑥 − 𝑁) 
(R  − 𝐾 −  𝐷 , 
𝐷) 
1 − 𝑝 
 
Table V-5: Net Payoffs before renegotiation to (E,L) under a HCA regime. 
State CR=E CR=L Probability 
G (𝑅 − [𝐷 −
𝑥] + 𝑦  , [𝐷 − 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 ]) 
(𝑅 −  𝐷 , 𝐷 ) P 
B (𝑅 − [𝐷 − 𝑥] , 
𝐷 − 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 − 𝑦) 
(𝑅 − 𝐷, 𝐷) 1 – p 
 
Table V-6: Net Payoffs after renegotiation to (E,L) under a HCA regime. 
State CR=E CR=L Probability 
G (𝑅 − [𝐷 −
𝑥] + 𝑦  , [𝐷 − 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 ]) 
(𝑅 −  𝐷 , 𝐷 +  
𝑦 − 𝑁 ) 
P 
B (𝑅 − [𝐷 − 𝑥] ,   
𝐷 − 𝑥 − 𝐶 − 𝑁) 
(𝑅 − 𝐷, 𝐷) 1 – p 
 
Table V-3 and Table V-5 show the payoffs in the four states at 𝑡2 if no renegotiation or 
information acquisition is carried out under the F and H regimes respectively. Under both 
                                                             
20 If the assumption holds for H firms, by definition it must hold for F regime firms as well. 
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regimes, E knows the true realisation of 𝑥 at 𝑡0, however, L only has the  true realisation of 
𝑥 under F, while under H he only has the expectation of  𝑥 formed at 𝑡0.  
Table V-4 and Table V-6 show the payoffs in the four states at 𝑡2 if L enters renegotiation 
and information acquisition is carried out under the F and H regimes respectively. In States 
(E,G) and (L,B) under both accounting regimes, L has no incentive to renegotiate, and 
subsequently acquire information, given that he would not benefit from this action. However, 
in states (E,B) and (L,G), there is room for renegotiation and to acquire information. 
Therefore, under both regimes, in (E,B) and (L,G) L will renegotiate the contract and acquire 
the true realisation of 𝑥 in state (E,B). 
We start the analysis by examining the payoffs in time 𝑡2, assuming that L will acquire 
information and learn the true realisation of 𝑥 prior to 𝑡2, if it is beneficial for L to acquire 
information. We will define the ‘state’ at this time by a pair (CR,s), where the first element 
CR ϵ (E,L) indicates who possess the decision right, and the second element s ϵ (G,B) 
indicates whether the investment state is good or bad (which is known by both parties at time 
𝑡2). 
There are four states to consider. In two of the states, (E,G) and (L,B), there is no scope for 
renegotiation, as the owner of the right already prefers the optimal decision. 
In State (E,G), the net payoffs at t2, to E and L under the F regime are  (𝑅 − 𝐾 − [𝐷 − 𝑥]  
+𝑦)  and (𝐷 − 𝑥). While under the H regime, it is given by (𝑅 − (𝐷 − 𝑥) + 𝑦) and [𝐷 − 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 ]) 
for E and L respectively.  
In State (L,B), the net payoffs at t2, to E and L under the F regime are  (𝑅 − 𝐾 − 𝐷)  and 
(𝐷). While under the H regime, it is given by (𝑅 − 𝐷) and(𝐷) for E and L respectively.  
Note that if L is not informed prior to time t2 in one of these two states under the H regime, 
then there is no need for him to become informed, that is, he should not pay 𝐶 at t2, given 
that such information will yield no additional benefit. This implies that the acquisition of 
information may be unnecessary in certain states of the world. In this model, information 
acquisition becomes unnecessary in states (E,G) and (L,B) under both type of accounting 
regimes given that the control rights already exist with the appropriate party and there will 
be no additional benefit that L can obtain from acquiring information in these two states. 
If instead the state is (L,G), or (E,B), renegotiation is needed. In (E,B) under the F regime, 
absent the possibility of a renegotiation, E would choose the inefficient action A, given that 
such an action would yield him 𝑅 − 𝐾 − (𝐷 − 𝑥) > 𝑅 − 𝐾 − 𝐷, despite a ‘Social Welfare’ 
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payoff (the sum of E’s and L’s payoffs) that is less than he would achieve under no action 
scenario, that is, 𝑅 − 𝐾 − 𝑦 < 𝑅 − 𝐾. Given this, L will offer an additional payment 𝑥  to E 
in exchange for not taking any action. As a result, the final net payoffs including the cost of 
preparing the financial statements and acquiring information are (𝑅 − 𝐾 − (𝐷 + 𝑥)) and (𝐷 −
𝑥 − 𝑁) for E and L respectively.  
Under the H regime, in the state (E,B), E would prefer A, absent renegotiation, given that 
such a decision would yield him 𝑅 − (𝐷 + 𝑥) > 𝑅 − 𝐷, that gives a combined payoff that is 
more than he would achieve if no action is taken. Given this, L will need to offer an 
additional payment 𝑥 to E in exchange for her to take any action. As a result, the final net 
payoffs including the cost of acquiring information are(𝑅 − 𝐷 + 𝑥) and (𝐷 − 𝑥 − 𝐶 − 𝑁). 
In a similar manner, for the state (L,G) under the F regime, absent renegotiation, L would 
choose NA; thus L will ask for E’s entire incremental return from the project (𝑦), in 
exchange for taking decision A instead of NA. Such an action results in payoffs of (𝑅 − 𝐾 −
𝐷) and (𝐷 + 𝑦 − 𝑁) for E and L respectively. Under the H regime, the payoffs would be 
(𝑅 − 𝐷) and (𝐷 + 𝑦 − 𝑁) for E and L respectively. The final net payoffs in the four states 
are shown in Panels B Tables 3 and 4 above. Note that Table V-3,Table V-4,Table V-5, and 
Table V-6 differ from Table V-1and Table V-2 in the sense that in the ‘inefficient states’, 
that is, states (L,G) and (E,B), renegotiation yields in additional benefits of 𝑦 and[𝑥t0
H − 𝑥]21, 
which are shared between L and E. These efficiency gains are obtained by acquiring 
information by paying C and renegotiating the debt contract (N). 
Moving to the 𝑡0 contract, in any pure strategy equilibrium, there can be at most one contract 
that is associated with each choice of the decision right CR. That is, if a contract {CR,D} is 
accepted in equilibrium, no type of E would offer the contract {CR,D’}, D’ > D. As a result, 
there are at most two contracts offered in equilibrium, one with CR = E and one with CR = 
L. Let SE ⊆ [a,b] denote the set of firms who offer a contract with CR = E, in equilibrium. 
In the case where L may acquire information before time t2, if renegotiation occurs; due to 
ex ante competition between lenders, L must break even for the equilibrium contract. 
Equilibrium contracts will incorporate correctly that renegotiation will occur in states (E,B) 
and (L,G) and not in states (E,G) and (L,B), and therefore, the contract will correctly 
incorporate the additional costs of renegotiation and information acquisition borne in states 
(E,B) and (L,G). Given the net payoffs in Table V-4 and Table V-6 above, D is determined 
                                                             
 
 
 91 
 
by the ex-ante indifference conditions for L. These conditions, for contracts with CR = E 
and CR = L, respectively, are22  
𝐼 = 𝐷 − 𝑝𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 − (1 − 𝑝)𝑥 − (1 − 𝑝)(𝐶 + 𝑁)                                                                       (12) 
and 
𝐼 = 𝐷 + 𝑝 ( 𝑦 − 𝑁)                                                                                                                (13) 
For the firm producing its financial information under the H regime, and: 
𝐼 = 𝐷 − 𝑥 − (1 − 𝑝)(𝑁)                                                                                                        (14) 
and 
𝐼 = 𝐷 + 𝑝 ( 𝑦 − 𝑁)                                                                                                                (15) 
For the firm producing its financial information under the F regime. We assume that 𝑁 is 
independent of the accounting policy being followed by the firm, and as a result it is assumed 
to be constant. Given our earlier assumptions concerning the influence of accounting policy 
on the expectation of 𝑥, the model assumes that the Lender observes the following ranking 
with regards to the expectation of 𝑥, 𝑥𝑡1
𝐹 < 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 . That is, the expected loss is assumed to be 
lower under the F regime, and higher under the H regime. With D satisfying these conditions, 
the final payoff (Utility) to E for the contracts with CR = E and CR =L are in turn 
respectively, 
𝑈𝐶𝑅=𝐸
𝐸 = 𝑅 − 𝐼 + 𝑝𝑥 − 𝑝𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 − (1 − 𝑝)(𝐶 + 𝑁) + 𝑝𝑦                                                        (16)                                                                                                
and 
𝑈𝐶𝑅=𝐿
𝐸 = 𝑅 − 𝐼 + 𝑝𝑦 − 𝑝𝑁                                                                                                   (17) 
For the firm using the H regime, and: 
𝑈𝐶𝑅=𝐸
𝐸 = 𝑅 − 𝐼 − (1 − 𝑝)𝑁 + 𝑝𝑦 + 𝐾                                                                                          (18)  
and 
UCR=L
E = 𝑅 − 𝐼 + 𝑝𝑦 − 𝑝𝑁                                                                                                              (19) 
For the firm preparing its financial information under the F regime. 
                                                             
22 The cost of preparing the financial statements under the two different accounting regimes does not factor 
into the indifference curves for L. The cost will have a bearing on the net profit of E and is assumed to be not 
built into the creation of D.  
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As in Garleanu and Zweibel (2009), E’s payoff increases with 𝑥  when CR = E and is 
independent of 𝑥  when CR = L. As a result, if firm 𝑥′ weakly prefers {E,D} to {L,D’}, then 
all higher firms 𝑥′ > 𝑥  would strictly prefer the {E,D} contract. Also, if firm 𝑥 weakly 
prefers {L,D’} to {E,D}, then all lower firms 𝑥′ < 𝑥 would strictly prefer the {L,D’} 
contract. These conditions arise because when we have 𝑥′ > 𝑥, all firms above 𝑥 would 
prefer the {E,D} contract as it would provide E with the greater payoff, while if we have 
𝑥′ < 𝑥 then all  firms below 𝑥 would prefer the {L,D’} contract as it would provide E with 
the greater payoff.  
As a result, in any PBPSE there will be a cut-off level ?̅? where all firms below ?̅?  pool 
together by offering the same contract with CR = L, and all firms above ?̅?  pool on a single 
contract with CR = E. As a result, the set SEis of the form [?̅? , b]. 
We define G (u) as follows: 
𝐺 (𝑢)  ≡ 𝐸[𝑥| 𝑥 𝑆𝐸 ∩ ℑ𝑡0
𝐻 ≥ 𝑢] − 𝑢                                                                                     (20) 
Where, G (𝑥𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) shows the difference between the average firm in the pool [?̅?, b] of firms 
above ?̅?, and the lowest firm ?̅? in the pool for the H regime. 
We define G (u) as follows: 
𝐺 (𝑢)  ≡ 𝐸[𝑥| 𝑥 𝑆𝐸 ∩ ℑ𝑡0
𝐹 ≥ 𝑢] − 𝑢                                                                                      (21) 
Where, G (𝑥𝐹̅̅ ̅) shows the difference between the average firm in the pool [?̅?, b] of firms 
above ?̅?, and the lowest firm ?̅? in the pool for the F regime. 
In equilibrium, the cut-off firm ?̅? must be indifferent between keeping and giving up the 
decision right. Equating the above expressions (16), (17) for the H regime and the 
expressions (18) and (19) for the F regimes respectively, then implies that G (𝑥𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) is given 
by  
G (𝑥𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) = 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁                                                                   (22) 
For the firm that prepares its financial information under the H regime, and 
G (𝑥𝐹̅̅ ̅) = −(1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 + 𝐾                                                                                                   (23) 
Equation (23) implies the G (𝑥𝐹̅̅ ̅) under the F regime. Which leads us to our Propositions 2 
and 3 below. 
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Proposition 2. In the H regime world, assume that L pays 𝐶 and learns 𝑥 at time t1 if there 
is scope for renegotiation. Then, a PSPBE always exists, and takes the following form: 
i. If G (𝑥𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) > 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 for all ?̅? ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏], then all 
firms offer CR = L. The promised payment is  𝐷 = 𝐼 − 𝑝 (𝑦 −  𝐶 − 𝑁). 
ii. If  G (𝑥𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) < 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁  for all ?̅? ∈ [a, b],  then 
all firms offer CR = E. The promised payment is 𝐷 = 𝐼 + 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 + (1 − 𝑝)(𝐶 +
𝑁).  
iii. If there exists ?̅? ∈ [a, b]such that G(𝑥𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) = 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 −
(1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 , then firms 𝑥 ≥ ?̅? offers CR = E, while firms 𝑥 ≤  ?̅? offer CR = 
L. The promised payments are 𝐷 = 𝐼 + 𝐸[𝑥 | {𝑥 ≥  ?̅?}𝑆𝐸 ∩  𝔍𝑡0
𝐻  ] + (1 −
𝑝)(𝐶 + 𝑁)  when CR = E and 𝐷 = 𝐼 − 𝑝 (𝑦 − 𝐶 − 𝑁 ) when CR = L. 
Proposition 3. In the F regime world, assume that L learns 𝑥 at time t1 if there is scope for 
renegotiation. Then, a PSPBE always exists, and takes the following form: 
i. If G (𝑥𝐹̅̅ ̅) > −(1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 + 𝐾 for all ?̅? ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏], then all firms offer CR = L. 
The promised payment is  𝐷 = 𝐼 − 𝑝 (𝑦 − 𝑁). 
ii. If  G (𝑥𝐹̅̅ ̅) < −(1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 + 𝐾  for all  ?̅? ∈ [a, b],  then all firms offer CR = 
E. The promised payment is 𝐷 = 𝐼 + 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑁.  
iii. If there exists ?̅? ∈ [a, b]such that G (𝑥𝐹̅̅ ̅) = −(1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 + 𝐾  , then firms 
𝑥 ≥   ?̅? offers CR = E, while firms 𝑥 ≤  ?̅? offer CR = L. The promised 
payments are 𝐷 = 𝐼 + 𝐸[𝑥 | {𝑥 ≥   ?̅?}𝑆𝐸 ∩ 𝔍𝑡0
𝐹  ] + (1 − 𝑝)(𝑁)  when CR = 
E and 𝐷 = 𝐼 − 𝑝 (𝑦 − 𝑁 ) when CR = L. 
Since J is atom-less and G is continuous, the condition for case (iii) will be satisfied if we 
are not in case (i) or in case (ii), and therefore, the three cases in Propositions 2 and 3 give 
the complete space of parameters for the H and F regime worlds respectively. 
The interpretation of propositions 2 and 3 is as follows; the term 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) measures the 
influence of the information set concerning the expectation of 𝑥 under the H regime, that 
occurs at t0 and which influences the renegotiation process and the initial allocation of rights. 
The term 𝑥 for both the H and F regimes refers to the true realisation of 𝑥  which is known 
by E at t0, the terms 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻  and 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐹  refer to the expectation of 𝑥 formed by L at t0. The term 
𝑝𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻  relates to the expectation of 𝑥 at t0 under the H regime, when the state is (E,G) and 
there is no room for renegotiation.  
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 The terms (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁, and (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 + 𝐾, measure the additional 
renegotiation and information acquisition costs that must be undertaken when CR = L instead 
of CR = E under the H and F regimes respectively. This cost is given by  𝑝(𝑁) −
(1 − 𝑝)(𝐶 + 𝑁) =   (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 and by 𝑝(𝑁 + 𝐾) − (1 − 𝑝)(𝑁 + 𝐾) =   (1 −
2𝑝)𝑁 + 𝐾 for the H and F regimes respectively.  
This total expression is negative if  𝑝 <
1
2
 , which implies lower renegotiation costs under 
CR = L compared to CR = E when 𝑝 <
1
2
. 
Moving on to  G (𝑥𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) and G (𝑥𝐹̅̅ ̅), suppose that firms [u,b] retain the decision right; then, L 
would expect asset-substitution given by [ 𝑥 | 𝑥 𝑆𝐸 ∩ ℑ𝑡0
𝐻  ≥ 𝑢 ]  and [ 𝑥 |𝑥  𝑆𝐸 ∩ ℑ𝑡0
𝐹  ≥ 𝑢 ]  
respectively for H and F when CR = E, for which L must be reimbursed ex ante. The intuition 
behind this is that absent renegotiation, E would always choose A if she had the decision 
right, and L would always choose NA.  
The lowest firm choosing CR = E (firm u), would only benefit from the asset substitution 
activity by the amount u. The difference, [ 𝑥 | 𝑥 𝑆𝐸 ∩ ℑ𝑡1
𝐻  ≥ 𝑢] − u = G (𝑥𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ )  and 
[ 𝑥 |𝑥  𝑆𝐸 ∩ ℑ𝑡1
𝐹  ≥ 𝑢] − u = G (𝑥𝐹̅̅ ̅), measures the adverse selection opportunity costs 
borne by the lowest firm u choosing CR = E under the H and F regimes respectively.  
In equilibrium, all firms must compare the adverse selection cost from choosing CR = E with 
the excess renegotiation costs from choosing CR = L. The adverse selection cost is greatest 
for the lowest firm choosing CR = E, and this is always positive. The excess renegotiation 
cost is only positive if 𝑝 ≥
1
2
. However, in the case of 𝑝 <
1
2
, the renegotiation costs will be 
less for CR = L than for CR = E, and as a result, there will be no equilibrium with some 
firms choosing CR = E; the lowest firm choosing CR = E would always benefit by instead 
choosing CR = L. As a result, in case (i) of Proposition 2 and 3, all types will choose CR = 
L. This result corresponds to the symmetric information benchmark shown in proposition 1 
above. The promised payment being 𝐷 = 𝐼 − 𝑝 (𝑦 −  𝐶 − 𝑁) for the H regime firm, and 
𝐷 = 𝐼 − 𝑝 (𝑦 − 𝑁) for the F regime firm. The contracted face value of debt will be lower in 
this case for the F regime firm due to the absence of the information acquisition costs 
incorporated in the debt.  
If however, we have the case that as in case G (𝑥𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) < 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁  
and G (𝑥𝐹̅̅ ̅) < −(1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 + 𝐾 for Propositions 2 and 3 (ii), then for all such firms, the 
decision right will be given to E (CR = E). And the promised payment will be 𝐷 = 𝐼 + 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 +
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(1 − 𝑝)(𝐶 + 𝑁) and 𝐷 = 𝐼 + 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹 + (1 − 𝑝)(𝑁) under the H and F regimes respectively. 
Again, the contracted face value of debt will be lower in this case for the F regime compared 
to the H regime due to the absence of the information acquisition cost incorporated in the 
debt. In this scenario, all such firms will retain the decision rights, that is, no debt covenants 
(CR = E) will be included in the debt.  
As long as 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 − 2𝑝𝑦 does not exceed 𝐺𝐽 ≡
 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥G(𝑥𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ), case (iii) is obtained in proposition 2, and  −(1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 − 2𝑝𝑦 + 𝐾 does not 
exceed 𝐺𝐽 ≡  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥G(𝑥𝐹̅̅ ̅) we have the case (iii) that is obtained in proposition3. In these 
cases, such lower firms will prefer to give the right to L (CR = L) despite the inefficiency in 
renegotiation and information acquisition costs. This result arises due to the additional 
renegotiation and information acquisition costs that must be borne when CR = L instead of 
CR = E are less for some lower firms than the adverse selection costs they would incur by 
retaining the right together with all the high types who choose to do so. In equilibrium, the 
lowest firm choosing CR = E is indifferent; that is, he must face adverse selection costs equal 
to the information and renegotiation inefficiency costs of instead choosing CR = L, that is, 
the cut off firm is given by G(𝑥𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) = 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 − 2𝑝𝑦  and 
G(𝑥𝐹̅̅ ̅) = −(1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 − 2𝑝𝑦 + 𝐾 for the H and F regime firms respectively. From this 
result, it follows that the H firm will offer a debt contract with 𝐷 = 𝐼 + 𝐸[𝑥 | {𝑥 ≥  ?̅?}𝑆𝐸 ∩
 𝔍𝑡0
𝐻  ] + (1 − 𝑝)(𝐶 + 𝑁) when it retains the right (CR = E) and a contract with a contracted 
amount of  𝐷 = 𝐼 − 𝑝 (𝑦 − 𝐶 − 𝑁), when it gives the Lender the decision right (CR = L). 
 In the F firm case, she will offer a debt contract with 𝐷 = 𝐼 + 𝐸[𝑥 | {𝑥 ≥   ?̅?}𝑆𝐸 ∩ 𝔍𝑡0
𝐹  ] +
(1 − 𝑝)(𝑁) when she retains the right (CR = E) and a contract with a contracted amount of  
𝐷 = 𝐼 − 𝑝 (𝑦 − 𝑁), when she gives the Lender the decision right (CR = L). 
In proposition 2 above, we assume that under the H regime, if L is uniformed concerning the 
true realisation of 𝑥 going into 𝑡1, then he will prefer to acquire information in only two 
states, namely (E,B) and (L,G), that is, only in the states where there is a benefit from debt 
renegotiation. Proposition 4 below states that the decision to acquire information in the two 
states is influenced by two factors: the level of 𝐶 and the change in the expected value of  
(𝑥𝑡1
𝐻 − 𝑥). If the losses to L from bargaining with asymmetric information is strictly higher 
than 0, then information acquisition will be preferred if the cost of so doing is small and the 
additional information concerning the change in 𝑥 is sufficient to justify the cost of acquiring 
information. In the H regime case, if L does not acquire information prior to 𝑡1, there is a 
𝐶̅ > 0, such that for 𝐶 <  𝐶̅,  L acquires information at 𝑡1 in states (E,B) and (L,G), and 
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where (𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 − 𝑥) ≥ 𝐶̅. That is, the cost to acquire information is less than the estimated 
benefit from obtaining the true realisation of 𝑥. 
In the F regime, the information set will incorporate the new information arising at 𝑡1, and 
therefore, L acquires the true realisation of 𝑥 at 𝑡1. As a result, L will not face the same cost 
benefit exercise as done under the H regime.    
Proposition 4. Assume that L does not know the true realisation of 𝑥 at 𝑡1. Then for 
situations where 𝐶 < 𝐶̅  exists, then L will acquire information at t1 in both states (E,B) and 
(L,G) for the H regime. However, if 𝐶̅ < 𝐶 occurs, then L will not acquire information at 𝑡1 
for the H regime in states (E,B) and (L,G).  
L may have an incentive to acquire Information earlier under the H regime than 𝑡1, if the 
resulting break-even contract results in a higher expected profits for him, given that he will 
be competing ex ante against other lenders for the debt contract.  
If L acquires information at time 𝑡, then he will need to pay C at time t under the H regime, 
while the expected renegotiation cost is 𝑝𝑁 and (1 − 𝑝)𝑁. If we assume that information 
can be acquired by L either at time 𝑡 or at time 𝑡1, the time t action will only be efficient if 
there are no gains from renegotiation. If there are any potential gains from negotiation then, 
the time 𝑡1 action will be efficient. Given our assumption of risk neutral players, the debt 
contract that will maximize E’s utility subject to L breaking even will be the contract that 
will minimize the sum of the expected information acquisition costs, the expected 
renegotiation costs and incorporate any benefits from renegotiating the debt contract. As a 
result, the choice between acquiring information at time 𝑡 or acquiring information at time 
𝑡1 will be determined by simply comparing these factors as per Proposition 5 below. 
Proposition 5. If 𝐶 is small enough so that L would acquire information at time 𝑡1 when 
there are gains from renegotiation if he had not already acquired information at time 𝑡. Then, 
L acquires information at time 𝑡 if and only if: 
𝐶 + 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝, 1 − 𝑝) 𝑁[𝑝𝐽(𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 ) + (1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝐽(𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 )]) ≤ (𝐶 + 𝑁)[𝑝𝐽(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑝)(1 −
𝐽(𝑥))]                                                                                                                                     (24) 
Not acquiring information in time 𝑡1 under the H regime may result in inefficiency if the 
true realisation of 𝑥 is different from the initial expectation of 𝑥 at 𝑡0and can be acquired 
only once the state of the world is revealed at 𝑡1 . Under the H regime, the financial 
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statements will not incorporate the fair values of the assets as at time 𝑡1; and hence the 
expectation of 𝑥 will be that formed in 𝑡0 unless L pays C to acquire the true value of 𝑥.  
The Lender will only acquire information at time 𝑡1  and not earlier, if the ‘Savings’ are less 
than the cost of acquiring information at 𝑡1. This statement would hold as long as the net 
gain from acquiring the information (net of acquisition costs) is positive. 
Information acquisition at time 𝑡1 leads to savings of 𝑆𝐻 and 𝑆𝐹, when compared to acquiring 
information early. Where 𝑆𝐻 =  𝐶 − 𝐶(𝑝𝐽(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝐽(𝑥)) being the cost savings 
for H regime and 𝑆𝐹 =  0 − 0(𝑝𝐽(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝐽(𝑥)), and where we have 𝑆𝐻 > 𝑆𝐹, 
given our earlier assumption that 𝐶 > 0. The term (𝑝𝐻(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝐻(𝑥)) relates to 
L acquiring the true realisation of 𝑥 (Benefit from information acquisition), while the C terms 
relate to the cost saving and the cost incurred. 
However, information acquisition is able to reduce the expected renegotiation costs by 
minimising the probability of renegotiation, which provides a reduction in cost of 
𝑁 (𝑚𝑎𝑥[(1 − 2𝑝), 0] − (1 − 2𝑝)𝐽(𝑥𝑡0
?̂? ). Whether earlier information acquisition is 
preferred by L compared to later information acquisition will depend on the degree to which 
the additional information costs net of the additional information, compares to the saved 
renegotiation costs.  
 If 𝑆𝐻 <  𝑁(𝑚𝑎𝑥[(1 − 2𝑝), 0] − (1 − 2𝑝)𝐻(𝑥𝑡0
?̂? ), then L will acquire information earlier 
(at time t) for the H regime firm. If however, we have the case where 0 <
 𝑁(𝑚𝑎𝑥[(1 − 2𝑝), 0] − (1 − 2𝑝)𝐻(𝑥𝑡0
?̂? ) < 𝑆𝐻, then L will delay information acquisition 
for the H regime firm. 
Propositions 4 and 5 can be interpreted as the propensity of debt renegotiations under each 
accounting regime. The model suggests that under the F type regime, there is a higher 
probability of debt renegotiation as the cut-of level for obtaining information for L is 
expected to be lower than for an identical firm using H. 
5. Extensions to the Base Model 
 
In this section, we introduce two extensions to the base model: (1) we allow for the HCA 
firm to voluntarily adopt FVA prior to time T (Proposition 6), and (2) we allow for the FVA 
type firms to have different levels of information quality sets (Proposition 7), which are 
meant to proxy for the different FVA levels. 
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For brevity, we only show the incremental differences due to the extensions to our base 
model, and the resulting implications. 
Allowing the HCA firm to switch to FVA prior to renegotiation: 
In this section, we examine the possibility of a HCA type firm to move to FVA23 (HF) prior 
to the renegotiation date. Following on from equations (2) to (5), the information set for the 
HF firm will become: 
ℑ𝑡1
𝐻𝐹 = {𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡1}                                                                             (25) 
And  
ℑ𝑡1
𝐻𝐹 = ℑ𝑡1
𝐹  and   ℑ𝑡1
𝐻 < ℑ𝑡1
𝐻𝐹                                                                                                            (26) 
We assume that this will cause the information set to be the same under both the HCA and 
FVA scenarios at 𝑡1.  
And 
𝑥t
H  ≥  𝑥t
F = 𝑥t
HF  ∀𝑡     and       𝑥 = 𝑥t1
F = 𝑥t1
HF ≤ 𝑥t0
F    ∀ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1                                        (27) 
If E finds itself in states (E,B) or (L,G), then it has the incentive to switch from H to F and 
to enter the renegotiation process and incur 𝐾 additional resources in preparing the financial 
information. This will allow the L to acquire the true realisation of 𝑥 without the need to pay 
𝐶, as in the F case. 
Table V-7: Net Payoffs before renegotiation to (E,L) under a HCA regime at 𝑡2regime at 𝑡2 
State CR=E CR=L Probability 
G (𝑅 − [𝐷 −
𝑥] + 𝑦  , [𝐷 − 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 ]) 
(𝑅 −  𝐷 , 𝐷 ) P 
B (𝑅 − [𝐷 − 𝑥] , 
𝐷 − 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 − 𝑦) 
(𝑅 − 𝐷, 𝐷) 1 – p 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
23 In the case of the extension, we assume that a switch by the HCA firm can either be via a switch to FVA 
prior to renegotiation, or a ‘revaluation’ by the HCA type firm. In either case, we model the switch in an 
identical manner and assume that it would influence costs and information flow in an identical manner. 
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Table V-8: Net Payoffs after renegotiation to (E,L) under a HCA regime at 𝑡2. 
State CR=E CR=L Probability 
G (𝑅 − [𝐷 −
𝑥] + 𝑦  , [𝐷 − 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 ]) 
(𝑅 −  𝐷 , 𝐷 +  
𝑦 − 𝑁 ) 
P 
B (𝑅 − 𝐾 − [𝐷 −
𝑥] ,   𝐷 − 𝑥 − 𝑁) 
(𝑅 − 𝐷, 𝐷) 1 – p 
 
Table V-7 show the payoffs in the four states at 𝑡2 if no renegotiation or information 
acquisition is carried out under the H regime  
Table V-8 show the payoffs in the four states at 𝑡2 if L enters renegotiation and information 
acquisition is carried out under HF regime.  
The conditions, for contracts with CR = E and CR = L, respectively, are24  
𝐼 = 𝐷 − 𝑝𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 − (1 − 𝑝)(𝑥 + 𝑁)                                                                                              (28) 
and 
𝐼 = 𝐷 + 𝑝 ( 𝑦 − 𝑁)                                                                                                              (29) 
With D satisfying these conditions, the final payoff (Utility) to E for the contracts with CR 
= E and CR =L are in turn respectively, 
𝑈𝐶𝑅=𝐸
𝐸 = 𝑅 − 𝐼 + 𝑝𝑥 − 𝑝𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 − (1 − 𝑝)(𝑁) + 𝑝𝑦 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐾                                           (30) 
and 
𝑈𝐶𝑅=𝐿
𝐸 = 𝑅 − 𝐼 + 𝑝𝑦 − 𝑝𝑁                                                                                                  (31) 
Equating the expressions (30) and (31) for the HF regime implies that G (𝑥𝐻𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) is given by: 
G (𝑥𝐻𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) = 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐾                                                             (32) 
Where G (𝑥𝐻𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) shows the difference between the average firm in the pool [?̅?, b] of firms 
above ?̅?, and the lowest firm ?̅? in the pool for the HF regime. 
Proposition 6. In the HF regime world, assume that L learns 𝑥 at time t1 if there is scope for 
renegotiation. Then, a PSPBE always exists, and takes the following form: 
                                                             
24 The cost of preparing the financial statements under the two different accounting regimes does not factor 
into the indifference curves for L. The cost will have a bearing on the net profit of E and is assumed to be not 
built into the creation of D.  
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i. If G (𝑥𝐻𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) > 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐾 for all ?̅? ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏], then 
all firms offer CR = L. The promised payment is  𝐷 = 𝐼 − 𝑝 (𝑦 − 𝑁). 
ii. If  G (𝑥𝐻𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) < 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐾 for all ?̅? ∈ [a, b],  then 
all firms offer CR = E. The promised payment is 𝐷 = 𝐼 + 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 + (1 − 𝑝)(𝑥 +
𝑁).  
iii. If there exists ?̅? ∈ [a, b]such that G(𝑥𝐻𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) = 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 +
(1 − 𝑝)𝐾 then firms 𝑥 ≥ ?̅? offers CR = E, while firms 𝑥 ≤  ?̅? offer CR = L. 
The promised payments are 𝐷 = 𝐼 + 𝐸[𝑥 | {𝑥 ≥  ?̅?}𝑆𝐸 ∩  𝔍𝑡0
𝐻  ] + (1 −
𝑝)(𝑥 + 𝑁)  when CR = E and 𝐷 = 𝐼 − 𝑝 (𝑦 − 𝑁 ) when CR = L. 
Since J is atom-less and G is continuous, the condition for case (iii) will be satisfied if we 
are not in case (i) or in case (ii), and therefore, the three cases in Proposition 6 give the 
complete space of parameters for the HF regime. 
The interpretation of proposition 6 is as follows; the term 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) measures the influence 
of the information set concerning the expectation of 𝑥 under the H regime, that occurs at t0 
and which influences the renegotiation process and the initial allocation of rights.  
The terms (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐾, measure the additional renegotiation and information 
acquisition costs that must be undertaken when CR = L instead of CR = E. This total 
expression is negative if  𝑝 <
1
2
 , which implies lower renegotiation costs under CR = L 
compared to CR = E when 𝑝 <
1
2
. 
Similar to Propositions 2 and 3 above, in case (i) of Proposition 6, all types will choose CR 
= L. The promised payment will be 𝐷 = 𝐼 − 𝑝 (𝑦 −  𝑁). The contracted face value of debt 
will be lower in this case for the HF firm compared to the H firm and similar to the F regime 
firm due to the absence of the information acquisition costs incorporated in the debt.  
For Proposition 6 (ii), the decision right will be given to E (CR = E). And the promised 
payment will be 𝐷 = 𝐼 + 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 + (1 − 𝑝)(𝑥 + 𝑁). Again, the contracted face value of debt will 
be lower in this case for the HF regime compared to the H regime due to the absence of the 
information acquisition cost incorporated in the debt. In this scenario, all such firms will 
retain the decision rights, that is, no debt covenants (CR = E) will be included in the debt.  
As long as 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐾 does not exceed 𝐺𝐽 ≡  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥G(𝑥𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ), case 
(iii) is obtained in proposition 6. In these cases, such lower firms will prefer to give the right 
to L (CR = L) as in Proposition 2 and 3 above.  The cut off firm is given by G(𝑥𝐻𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) =
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𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐾. As a consequence,  the HF firm will offer a debt 
contract with 𝐷 = 𝐼 + 𝐸[𝑥 | {𝑥 ≥  ?̅?}𝑆𝐸 ∩ 𝔍𝑡0
𝐻  ] + (1 − 𝑝)(𝑥 + 𝑁) when it retains the right 
(CR = E) and a contract with a contracted amount of  𝐷 = 𝐼 − 𝑝 (𝑦 − 𝑁), when it gives the 
Lender the decision right (CR = L). 
In proposition 6 above, we assume that under the H regime, if L is uniformed concerning the 
true realisation of 𝑥 going into 𝑡1, then the E will switch to the F (HF) regime in order to 
inform the L with the true realisation of 𝑥 prior to the renegotiation. We find that E will only 
have an incentive to switch to F prior to renegotiation in only two states of the world, namely 
(E,B) and (L,G), that is, only in the states where there is a benefit from debt renegotiation.  
The extension’s predictions are in line with academic research that finds that the timely 
recognition of losses (Conservatism) by the firm leads to improvement in the contracting 
ability of financial statement information (Nikoalaev 2010, Watts 2003a, 2003b, Lafond and 
Roychowdhury 2008). 
Allowing the different information sets under FVA in line with the FVA 
classifications: 
In our main model, we assume that the use of FVA (F regime) leads to an improvement in 
the information set over the H type regime. However, Platin et al (2008), Demerjian et al 
(2014), Benson (2008) amongst others, have raised the prospect that not all FVA 
classifications are the same. In particular, these authors raise the serious possibility that the 
Level 2 and the Level 3 classifications could be easily manipulated and are not easy to verify 
compared to the Level 1 classification.  
As a result, in this section we will expand the base model and incorporate the possibility that 
the information set for the F type firm may include ’noise’. For the purpose of simplicity, 
we will compare and contrast only the F type and the FN (Fair Value Noisy) type firms in 
this section. 
Following on from equations (2) to (5), the information set for the FN firm will become: 
ℑ𝑡1
𝐹𝑁 = {𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡}                                                                                (33) 
And  
ℑ𝑡1
𝐹𝑁 ≤ ℑ𝑡1
𝐹  and   𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1                                                                                                                     (34) 
That is, we model the ‘noisy’ FVA regime as one in which the information set does not 
completely incorporate all the relevant information at time 𝑡1, whereas in the base FVA 
 102 
 
regime, which can be thought of as the FVA Level 1 case, the information set at 𝑡1 contains 
all the relevant information.  
And 
𝑥t
FN ≥ 𝑥t
F  ∀𝑡  and   𝑥 = 𝑥t1
F ≤ 𝑥t1
FN ≤ 𝑥t0
F =𝑥t0
FN   ∀ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1                                                    (35) 
For simplicity we assume that the cost of preparing is equal for the FN and the F type firm 
(𝐾). 
For simplicity we assume that L can obtain the true value of 𝑥 under the FN regime, if he 
pays 𝐶 at time 𝑡1, whereas we assume that he does not need to pay 𝐶 under the F type firms. 
Failing to do so, he will have the expectations 𝑥 and 𝑥t1
FN , under the F and FN, and regimes 
respectively at 𝑡1.  
As in the base model, if L finds itself in states (E,B) or (L,G), then it has the incentive to 
acquire information at 𝑡1 and obtain the true realisation of 𝑥.  
Table V-9: Net Payoffs before renegotiation to (E,L) under a FVA at 𝑡2regime at 𝑡2. 
State CR=E CR=L Probability 
G (𝑅 − 𝐾 −
[𝐷 − 𝑥]  +𝑦 ,  𝐷 −
𝑥𝑡1
𝐹𝑁) 
(𝑅 − 𝐾 − 𝐷, 
𝐷) 
P 
B (R − 𝐾 − 
[𝐷 − 𝑥] , 𝐷 − 𝑥𝑡1
𝐹𝑁 − 𝑦) 
(R  − 𝐾 −  𝐷 , 
𝐷) 
1 – p 
 
Table V-10: Net Payoffs after renegotiation to (E,L) under a FVA regime at 𝑡2. 
State CR=E CR=L Probability 
G (𝑅 − 𝐾 − [𝐷 −
𝑥] + 𝑦  , [𝐷 − 𝑥𝑡1
𝐹𝑁]) 
(𝑅 − 𝐾 −  𝐷 , 
𝐷 +  𝑦 − 𝑁 ) 
P 
B (𝑅 − 𝐾 − [𝐷 −
𝑥] ,   𝐷 − 𝑥 − 𝐶 − 𝑁) 
(𝑅 − 𝐾 − 𝐷, 
𝐷) 
1 – p 
 
Table V-9 show the payoffs in the four states at 𝑡2 if no renegotiation or information 
acquisition is carried out under the FN regime.  
Table V-10 show the payoffs in the four states at 𝑡2 if L enters renegotiation and information 
a is carried out under FN regime.  
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As in the base model, the conditions, for contracts with CR = E and CR = L, respectively, 
are25  
𝐼 = 𝐷 − 𝑝𝑥𝑡1
𝐹𝑁 − (1 − 𝑝)𝑥 − (1 − 𝑝)(𝐶 + 𝑁)                                                                       (36) 
and 
𝐼 = 𝐷 + 𝑝 ( 𝑦 − 𝑁)                                                                                                                (37) 
The final payoff (Utility) to E for the contracts with CR = E and CR =L are: 
𝑈𝐶𝑅=𝐸
𝐸 = 𝑅 − 𝐼 + 𝑝𝑥 − 𝑝𝑥𝑡1
𝐹𝑁 − (1 − 𝑝)(𝐶 + 𝑁) + 𝑝𝑦 + 𝐾                                            (38) 
and 
𝑈𝐶𝑅=𝐿
𝐸 = 𝑅 − 𝐼 + 𝑝𝑦 − 𝑝𝑁                                                                                                (39) 
Equating the expressions (38) and (39) for the FN regime implies that G (𝑥𝐹𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) is given by: 
G (𝑥𝐹𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) = 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡1
𝐹𝑁) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 + 𝐾                                                    (40) 
Where G (𝑥𝐹𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) shows the difference between the average firm in the pool [?̅?, b] of firms 
above ?̅?, and the lowest firm ?̅? in the pool for the HF regime. 
Proposition 7. In the FN regime world, assume that L learns 𝑥 at time t1 if there is scope for 
renegotiation. Then, a PSPBE always exists, and takes the following form: 
i. If G (𝑥𝐹𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) > 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡1
𝐹𝑁) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 + 𝐾 for all ?̅? ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏], 
then all firms offer CR = L. The promised payment is  𝐷 = 𝐼 − 𝑝 (𝑦 − 𝐶 −
𝑁). 
ii. If  G (𝑥𝐹𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) < 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡1
𝐹𝑁) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 + 𝐾 for all ?̅? ∈ [a, b],  
then all firms offer CR = E. The promised payment is 𝐷 = 𝐼 + 𝑥𝑡1
𝐹𝑁 +
(1 − 𝑝)(𝑥 + 𝐶 + 𝑁).  
iii. If there exists ?̅? ∈ [a, b]such that G(𝑥𝐹𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) = 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡1
𝐹𝑁) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 −
(1 − 𝑝)𝐶 + 𝐾 then firms 𝑥 ≥ ?̅? offers CR = E, while firms 𝑥 ≤  ?̅? offer CR 
= L. The promised payments are 𝐷 = 𝐼 + 𝐸[𝑥 | {𝑥 ≥  ?̅?}𝑆𝐸 ∩ 𝔍𝑡1
𝐹𝑁 ] + (1 −
𝑝)(𝑥 + 𝐶 + 𝑁)  when CR = E and 𝐷 = 𝐼 − 𝑝 (𝑦 − 𝐶 − 𝑁 ) when CR = L. 
                                                             
25 The cost of preparing the financial statements under the two different accounting regimes does not factor 
into the indifference curves for L. The cost will have a bearing on the net profit of E and is assumed to be not 
built into the creation of D.  
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Since J is atom-less and G is continuous, the condition for case (iii) will be satisfied if we 
are not in case (i) or in case (ii), and therefore, the three cases in Proposition 7 give the 
complete space of parameters for the FN regime. 
The interpretation of proposition 7 is as follows; the term 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡1
𝐹𝑁) measures the influence 
of the information set concerning the expectation of 𝑥 under the FN regime, that occurs at t1 
and which influences the renegotiation process and the initial allocation of rights.  
The terms (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 + 𝐾, measure the additional renegotiation and 
information acquisition costs that must be undertaken when CR = L instead of CR = E. This 
total expression is negative if  𝑝 <
1
2
 , which implies lower renegotiation costs under CR = 
L compared to CR = E when 𝑝 <
1
2
. 
As in Propositions 2 and 3, in case (i) of Proposition 7, all types will choose CR = L. The 
promised payment being 𝐷 = 𝐼 − 𝑝 (𝑦 − 𝐶 −  𝑁). The contracted face value of debt will be 
higher in this case for the FN firm compared to the F firm and similar to the H regime firm 
due to the requirement on the part of the L to recover the information acquisition costs from 
the debt.  
For Proposition 7 (ii), the decision right will be given to E (CR = E). And the promised 
payment will be is 𝐷 = 𝐼 + 𝑥𝑡1
𝐹𝑁 + (1 − 𝑝)(𝑥 + 𝐶 + 𝑁). Again, the contracted face value of 
debt will be higher in this case for the FN regime compared to the F regime due to the need 
to recover the information acquisition cost incorporated in the debt. In this scenario, all such 
firms will retain the decision rights, that is, no debt covenants (CR = E) will be included in 
the debt.  
As long as 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡1
𝐹𝑁) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 + 𝐾 does not exceed 𝐺𝐽 ≡
 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥G(𝑥𝐹𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅), case (iii) is obtained in proposition 7. In these cases, such lower firms will 
prefer to give the right to L (CR = L), and the cut off firm is given by G(𝑥𝐹𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) =
𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡1
𝐹𝑁) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 + 𝐾. In such a scenario, the FN firm will offer a debt 
contract with 𝐷 = 𝐼 + 𝐸[𝑥 | {𝑥 ≥  ?̅?}𝑆𝐸 ∩ 𝔍𝑡1
𝐹𝑁 ] + (1 − 𝑝)(𝑥 + 𝐶 + 𝑁) when it retains the 
right (CR = E) and a contract with a contracted amount of  𝐷 = 𝐼 − 𝑝 (𝑦 − 𝐶 − 𝑁), when it 
gives the Lender the decision right (CR = L). 
Proposition 7 shows that the FN type firms are more likely to observe a higher cost of debt, 
when compared to our hypothetical F type firm, which is meant to be a firm that uses FVA 
in a manner in which the information is constantly updated with no noise and incorporates 
all relevant information.  
 105 
 
The extension’s predictions are in line with prior academic research that finds that the Level 
2 and Level 3 FVA classifications are more likely to observe noise and are more easily 
manipulated and include estimates and judgements that are difficult to verify against the 
market (Platin et al 2008, Demerjian et al 2014, Benson 2008). 
6. Empirical Predictions 
Our model provides a number of testable implications for debt contracts, most of which are 
in line with prior literature in this field. In this section, we briefly discuss the testable 
empirical predictions. In the next chapter, we test these predictions in a sample of private 
US loans obtained from LPC/Dealscan. 
Accounting Regime and Debt covenants: Our first empirical prediction examines the role 
that the accounting regime plays on the occurrence of debt covenants in contracts. The model 
looks at two distinct accounting regimes against a backdrop of asymmetric information faced 
by the Lender. Under the HCA regime, the information set remains static unless the lender 
pays to acquire information in order to update his information set. Under the FVA regime, 
the information set is continuously updated and the lender does not need to pay to acquire 
information. However, the firm bears the full cost of providing the lender with an updated 
information set.  
In deciding on the ex-ante division of the Control rights (presence of the covenants), the 
Lender looks at the potential costs associated with acquiring the information, as well as the 
potential renegotiation costs if the contract needs to be amended in the future.   
The base model implies that the firm under the FVA regime bears the full cost of providing 
information to the lender, while the Lender bears no cost but benefits from the improvement 
in the information set, therefore, the firm is able benefit from a lower amount of covenants 
compared to an identical firm under HCA. 
Our prediction is in line with Liao et al (2013), who suggest that the number of balance sheet 
covenants should decrease in line with the additional improvement in the information set 
provided by the borrower. 
Covenant Strictness and Accounting Choice: The model implies that the number of the 
covenants will vary between the two different types of accounting regimes, with FVA firms 
being offered a lower number of ex ante covenants.  
The model implies that the accounting regime choice will lead to different number of 
covenants issued ex ante. In particular, the model implies that under a FVA regime, the ex-
ante probability of receiving a covenant is lower than in the HCA regime. Therefore, all else 
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equal, there is a higher likelihood of the covenant strictness, as measured by the number of 
covenants to be lower under FVA. 
Loan renegotiations and Accounting Choice: Roberts and Sufi (2009) find that the accrual 
of new information concerning the credit quality, investment opportunities, and collateral of 
the borrower, as well as macroeconomic fluctuations in credit and equity market conditions, 
are the primary determinants of renegotiation and its outcomes. Over 90% of long term debt 
contracts are renegotiated prior to their stated maturity, and are rarely a consequence of 
distress or default.  
Our model (Propositions 4 and 5) suggests that the trade-off in the costs associated with 
information acquisition faced by the lender under the two accounting regimes would cause 
him to be more likely to acquire information earlier (renegotiate) under the FVA compared 
to the HCA regime.  
Debt Yield and Accounting Choice: The model implies that the yield on debt would differ 
between the two accounting regimes. In our model, the firm bears the full cost of preparing 
the financial statements under the FVA regime, and the Lender benefits by obtaining the 
information set on a continuous basis at no cost. 
The firm therefore benefits from this improvement in the information set by being able to 
issue debt at a lower yield compared to an equivalent HCA firm. In the latter case, the lender 
has a stale information set and needs to spend money in order to obtain updated information. 
Under the HCA regime, the Lender needs to be compensated ex ante for the information 
acquisition cost, and this results in a higher yield.  
The prediction is in line with Bharath et al (2008), who examine the relationship between 
interest spreads charged on loans and measures of accounting quality before entering into 
the loan agreement, and find that accounting quality is associated with lower spreads. We 
predict that FVA should place a similar role as played by audit on the cost of debt. 
Fair Value Classifications and contract design: In the extension to our model, we assume 
that unlike the FVA regime considered in our base case model, the different FVA 
classifications may in fact have different effect on the loan’s contract design. In the case of 
the Level 1 classification, the borrower discloses timely information that is easier to verify 
and confirm against readily available market data (Liao et al, 2013, Ryan 2008), whereas the 
level 2 and 3 classifications introduce estimates and judgements which make it more difficult 
to verify the information against observable market data (Demerjian et al, 2014). 
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Therefore, in our extension, we find that if we consider the level 2 or level 3 classifications, 
the increased ‘noise’ in the accounting information would influence the design of the loan 
contract. In particular, we predict that for the Level 2 and 3 classifications, the ex post 
number of loan contracts should be higher, and the loan yield should be higher. 
Historical cost revaluation and contract design: Basu (1997) and Watts (2003a, 2003b) 
find that losses reported by management are informative even if they cannot be verified by 
external parties due to management incentive to prevent disclosure of bad news while gains 
reported by management are deemed less informative due to management’s incentive to 
report good news. Further, Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) argue that financial reporting 
conservatism is one potential mechanism to address agency problems between owners and 
managers. 
Authors also found that timely loss recognition is able to increase reliance of accounting 
information in debt contracts (Nikolaev ,2010) and to reduce the bid-ask spread on traded 
debt (Wittenberg-Moerman ,2008).  
In our model extension, we allow the HCA firm to engage in ‘revaluation’ ex post and to be 
in a position to share more up to date information with the lender prior to renegotiation. 
Under our extension, we show that compared to the HCA firm in our base model, a firm that 
can revalue is able to observe a lower likelihood of covenants and also a lower cost of debt. 
These predictions are in line with those found and referenced above. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper examines the design and renegotiation of covenants in debt contracts under 
asymmetric information. In particular, we examine the influence of two distinct accounting 
regimes on the design and renegotiation of covenants. The model has a setting wherein future 
firm investments are efficient in some states but also result in a transfer from the Lender to 
the firm. We model symmetric information concerning the efficiency of the investments, 
however, the firm is better informed about any potential transfers compared to the lender. 
Information acquisition differs under the two different accounting regimes. Under the FVA 
regime, the Lender obtains the true realisation of the transfer value prior to the investment 
being made. However, under the HCA regime, the lender has to acquire this information at 
a cost.  
Given the above setting, we show that the presence of asymmetric information between the 
firm and the lender, and between the two different accounting regimes leads to the allocation 
of a greater amount of decision rights (covenants) ex ante to the more uniformed party, which 
is the lender facing a HCA regime, then would be the case under symmetric information.  
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The model also suggests that firms that use FVA should be rewarded ex ante by the lender 
via requiring a lower yield on the debt contracts. Finally, the model suggests that the trade-
off between the potential cost savings from delaying information and the potential benefits 
from acquiring information earlier, results in the lender being more likely to renegotiate 
under the FVA regime. 
We extend the base model and allow for the HCA firm to revalue prior to renegotiation and 
to share the information with the lender. We show that under this scenario, unlike the HCA 
firm in the base model, the firm that revalues is able to observe a less ex-ante covenants, and 
a lower cost of debt. 
We also extend our base model and allow for the FVA regime to produce information with 
noise, which we assume is a proxy for the Level 2 and Level 3 classifications. We are able 
to show that under the base model, in our extension, the firm will observe a higher number 
of loan covenants and a higher cost of debt. 
Our paper compliments existing literature by incorporating the influence of accounting 
choice on contract design and renegotiation. In particular, the paper is the first of its type 
that examines the influence of FVA on debt covenants, initial yield, covenant strictness and 
renegotiations. 
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Appendix: Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1: Proposition 1 is the proposition concerning symmetric information 
and under symmetric information, we have 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 = 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹 = 𝑥. 
If 𝑝 <
1
2
, then L should receive the control rights given that the payoff to L would be greater 
under the CR=L scenario, 𝐷 − 𝑥 − 𝑦 ≤ 𝐷, where the first term refers to the payoff to L in 
the case CR=E and the second term refers to the payoff when CR=L. If 𝑝 <
1
2
, then the bad 
state is more likely than the good state, as a result, the expected payoff will be greater when 
CR=L. If  
If 𝑝 >
1
2
, then E should receive the control rights given that the payoff to E would be greater 
under the CR=E scenario, 𝑅 − (𝐷 − 𝑥) + 𝑦 ≥ 𝑅 − 𝐷, where the first term refers to the 
payoff to E in the case CR=E and the second term refers to the payoff when CR=L.  
If 𝑝 =
1
2
, then the two parties should be indifferent between assigning control rights given 
that both the good and bad state are equally likely. Therefore, costly renegotiation can not 
be avoided in the Good state by E, nor by L in the Bad State. 
Proof of Proposition 2: For Historical Cost firms, if we compare Equations (16) and (17), 
we can see that if the Lender (L) expects firm types 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻  ≥  𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  to choose CR = E, then a 
firm of type 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻  chooses CR = E if and only if we have the following  
𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 −  𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝐺(𝑥𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) ≥  𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁                                             (A1) 
If we assume that 𝐺(𝑥𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) > 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 for all 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏]. Then 
𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑏 is an equilibrium, since equation (A1) is never satisfied. If however, 𝐺(𝑥𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) <
𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 for all  𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏], then equation (A1) is satisfied for 
all  𝑥𝑡0
𝐻  when 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  is set equal to   𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑎. As a result, CR = E for all types is an equilibrium. 
If, for any 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  for which 𝐺(𝑥𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) = 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁, the equation (A1) 
becomes 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻  ≥  𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ , which implies that types 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻  ≥  𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  choose CR = E and types 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻  <
 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  choose CR = L, which are consistent with the expectation of L.  
Proof of Proposition 3: For Fair Value firms, if we compare Equations (18) and (19), we 
can see that if the Lender (L) expects firm types 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹  ≥  𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅  to choose CR = E, then a firm 
of type 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹  chooses CR = E if and only if we have the following  
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𝑥𝑡0
𝐹 −  𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝐺(𝑥𝐹̅̅ ̅) ≥  −(1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 − 𝐾                                                                             (A2) 
If we assume that 𝐺(𝑥𝐹̅̅ ̅) > −(1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 − 𝐾 for all 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏]. Then 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑏 is an 
equilibrium, since equation (A2) is never satisfied. If however, 𝐺(𝑥𝐹̅̅ ̅) < −(1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 − 𝐾 
for all  𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏], then equation (A2) is satisfied for all  𝑥𝑡0
𝐹  when 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅  is set equal to   𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ =
𝑎. As a result, CR = E for all types is an equilibrium. 
If, for any 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅  for which 𝐺(𝑥𝐹̅̅ ̅) = −(1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 − 𝐾, the equation (A2) becomes 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹  ≥  𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ , 
which implies that types 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹  ≥  𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅  choose CR = E and types 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹  <  𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅  choose CR = L, 
which are consistent with the expectation of L.  
Proof of Proposition 4: If we let 𝐽𝐿(𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  ) be the gain to L from renegotiating the debt 
contract under the Historical Cost regime when CR = L in the good state (state G) with 
asymmetric information, given that the equilibrium cut-off point is 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ . We can also define 
𝐽𝐸(𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) as the gain to L from renegotiating the debt contract when CR = E.  
With full information, L extracts all the surplus from the renegotiation, 𝑦, from which, for 
any 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅   ∈ [𝑥𝑡1
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  ,𝑥𝑡2
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  ], L makes a net gain from acquiring information that is bounded away 
from zero. That is, by letting 
𝑔(𝑥𝑡1
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  ,𝑥𝑡2
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) = 𝑦 − max (𝑠𝑢𝑝
𝑥𝑡
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  ∈[𝑥𝑡1
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ,𝑥𝑡2
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ̅]
𝐽𝐿(𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ), 𝑠𝑢𝑝
𝑥𝑡
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  ∈[𝑥𝑡1
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ,𝑥𝑡2
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ̅]
𝐽𝐸(𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ))  
It holds that (𝑥𝑡1
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  ,𝑥𝑡2
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) > 0. 
Now if we consider the equilibrium given by  𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ , that obtains with 𝐶 = 0. If we have 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ∈
(𝑎, 𝑏) then, by continuity, there must exist 𝑥𝑡1
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝑥𝑡2
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  with 𝑎 < 𝑥𝑡1
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ <  𝑥𝑡2
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ < 𝑏 such that an 
equilibrium for 𝐶 small enough is given by 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  ∈ [𝑥𝑡1
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ,𝑥𝑡2
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ]. Also, if 𝐶 is small enough, that 
is, if 𝐶 ≤  𝑔([𝑥𝑡1
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  ,𝑥𝑡2
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ] ), then 𝐶 is worth being paid to acquire information by L. If however, 
we have the case whereby 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑎 when 𝐶 = 0, then 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑎 for positive 𝐶 as well, and the 
only condition we require is that 𝐶 < 𝑦 −  𝐽𝐸(𝑎). Or, if 0 = 𝐺(𝑏) ≥ (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁, then we 
only need that   𝐶 < 𝑦 −  𝐽𝐿(𝑏). 
Finally, when bargaining takes the form of a take-it-or-leave-it offer by L, both 𝐽𝐹 and 𝐽𝐿are 
strictly smaller than 𝑦 on (𝑎, 𝑏], respectively on [𝑎, 𝑏), and continuous. For this to occur, we 
need to identify the conditions that define L’s offer.  
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If we consider the state (L,G), L will ask a further payment 𝑢 from E in return for the right 
to take the investment decision. Since E will accept the offer if an only if we have 𝑢 ≤ 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ +
𝑦, the expected gain to L is 𝐽𝐿(𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) =  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑢 𝐽𝐿(𝑢, 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ), with 
𝐽𝐿(𝑢, 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) = 𝐸 [(𝑢 − 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ )1
(𝑢≤𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ̅+𝑦)
| 𝑥 < 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ]                                                                       (A3) 
We can see that 𝐽𝐿(𝑢, 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) is strictly less than 𝑦 for every 𝑢 ∈ [𝑎, 𝑦 +  𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ], and is weakly 
negative for 𝑢 outside [𝑎, 𝑦 +  𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ]. We can also see that 𝐽𝐿(𝑢, 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) is continuous in 𝑢 and 
𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ , whereby its maximal value 𝐽𝐿(𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) is strictly lower than 𝑦 and continuous in 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ . 
In the case of state (E,B), L offers a payment 𝑣 to E in return for the control right (CR = L), 
and E accepts the offer if and only if 𝑣 ≥ 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ]. Then, we have  𝐽𝐸(𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑢 𝐽𝐸(𝑣, 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ), 
with 
𝐽𝐹(𝑣, 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ) = 𝐸 [−(𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 + 𝑦)1(𝑣<𝑥𝑡0𝐻 ) − 𝑣1(𝑣≥𝑥𝑡0𝐻 )|  𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 >  𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ] + [𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 + 𝑦|𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 > 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ].                    
(A4) 
The rest of the proof for 𝐽𝐸  is similar to the proof for 𝐽𝐿above. 
Given that we assume that 𝑥𝑡
𝐹 < 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹  and that 𝐶 = 0, it follows that when the results hold for 
Historical cost accounting, they must also hold for Fair value accounting as well. If we have 
𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ∈ (𝑎, 𝑏) then, by continuity, there must exist 𝑥𝑡+1
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and𝑥𝑡+2
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  with 𝑎 < 𝑥𝑡+1
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ <  𝑥𝑡+2
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ < 𝑏 
such that an equilibrium for 𝐶 = 0 is given by 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅  ∈ [𝑥𝑡+1
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ,𝑥𝑡+2
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ].  This implies that the  𝑥𝑡1
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅  
under fair value based accounting is lower and as a result, L will have a greater likelihood 
of negotiating as long as we have 0 ≤  𝑔(𝑥𝑡+1
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ,𝑥𝑡+2
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ). If however, we have the case whereby 
𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑎 when 𝐶 = 0, then the only condition we require is that 0 < 𝑦 −  𝐽𝐸(𝑎). Or, if 0 =
𝐺(𝑏) ≥ (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁, then we only need that  0 < 𝑦 − 𝐽𝐿(𝑏) 
Proof of Proposition 5: In proposition 5, the left hand side of the equations represent the 
costs savings from delaying acquiring information at time t for a Historical accounting firm, 
while the right hand side represents the gains from renegotiating early. L will only acquire 
information at time t, if the cost saving of acquiring is lower than the gain.  
𝐶 + 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝, 1 − 𝑝) 𝑁[𝑝𝐽(𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 ) + (1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝐽(𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 )]) ≤ (𝐶 + 𝑁)[𝑝𝐽(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑝)(1 −
𝐽(𝑥))]                                                                                                                                       (A5) 
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(𝐶 + 𝑁)[𝑝𝐽(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝐽(𝑥))] − (𝐶 + 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝, 1 − 𝑝) 𝑁[𝑝𝐽(𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 ) + (1 − 𝑝)(1 −
𝐽(𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 )])) ≥ 0                                                                                                                           (A6) 
Proof of Proposition 6: For Historical Cost firms, if we compare Equations (30) and (31), 
we can see that if the Lender (L) expects firm types 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻  ≥  𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  to choose CR = E, then a 
firm of type 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻𝐹  chooses CR = E if and only if we have the following  
𝑥𝑡0
𝐻 −  𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝐺(𝑥𝐻𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) ≥ 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐾                                            (A7) 
If we assume that 𝐺(𝑥𝐻𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) > 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐾 for all 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏]. Then 
𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑏 is an equilibrium, since equation (A1) is never satisfied. If however, 𝐺(𝑥𝐻𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) <
𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐾 for all  𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏], then equation (A1) is satisfied for 
all  𝑥𝑡0
𝐻  when 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  is set equal to   𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑎. As a result, CR = E for all types is an equilibrium. 
If, for any 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  for which 𝐺(𝑥𝐻𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) = 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐻 ) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐾, the equation (A7) 
becomes 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻  ≥  𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ , which implies that types 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻  ≥  𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  choose CR = E and types 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻  <
 𝑥𝑡0
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  choose CR = L, which are consistent with the expectation of L.  
Proof of Proposition 7: For Fair Value firms, if we compare Equations (38) and (39), we 
can see that if the Lender (L) expects firm types 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹  ≥  𝑥𝑡𝑜
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅  to choose CR = E, then a firm 
of type 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹  chooses CR = E if and only if we have the following  
𝑥𝑡0
𝐹 −  𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝐺(𝑥𝐹𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) ≥  𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡1
𝐹𝑁) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 + 𝐾                                 (A8) 
If we assume that 𝐺(𝑥𝐹𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) > 𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡1
𝐹𝑁) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 + 𝐾 for all 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏]. 
Then 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑏 is an equilibrium, since equation (A2) is never satisfied. If however, 
𝐺(𝑥𝐹𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑡1
𝐹𝑁) − (1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 + 𝐾for all  𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏], then equation (A2) 
is satisfied for all  𝑥𝑡0
𝐹  when 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅  is set equal to   𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑎. As a result, CR = E for all types is 
an equilibrium. 
If, for any 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅  for which 𝐺(𝑥𝐹𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) = −(1 − 2𝑝)𝑁 − (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 + 𝐾, the equation (A8) 
becomes 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹  ≥  𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ , which implies that types 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹  ≥  𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅  choose CR = E and types 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹  <
 𝑥𝑡0
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅  choose CR = L, which are consistent with the expectation of L.  
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VI. Paper 3: ‘Debt design and Fair Value Accounting: Covenant 
occurrence, covenant intensity, loan amendments, and cost of 
debt’ 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines the changes in the use of covenants, the cost of debt, the strictness of 
loan covenants, and the number of ex-post loan amendments in US private loan contracts 
surrounding the implementation of SFAS 159. Prior to the adoption of SFAS 159, under US 
GAAP, firms were allowed to report some assets using Fair Value Accounting (FVA). The 
passage of SFAS 159 allowed firms to expand the use of fair value estimates, particularly 
for non-financial firms. Since lenders usually write covenants in debt contracts using 
accounting based information, the expansion of FVA poses important questions. In 
particular, do the new standards related to FVA, change the usefulness of accounting 
information for debt contracting purposes? If that is the case, how do lenders behave to the 
adoption of FVA disclosure by the borrower? 
The traditional view on debt covenants as stated in Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggests 
that covenants are meant to control agency problems by restricting managerial activities that 
may expropriate wealth from debt holders. In practise, covenants are constructed in a variety 
of accounting ratios (Leftwich, 1983, Dichev and Skinner, 2002). However, little theoretical 
or empirical work exists on the influence of FVA on the construction of debt covenants, the 
cost of debt, the strictness of the covenants, and the number of ex-post loan amendments. 
In our theoretical paper, we introduce and extend the Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009) model 
and incorporate the possibility that FVA may be used by the firm. We motivate the use of 
FVA as a mechanism that the borrower can use to mitigate the asymmetric information faced 
by the lender. We show that compared to a firm that uses Historical Cost accounting (HCA), 
a firm that uses FVA, should observe a lower number of covenants included in the loan 
contract and that the cost associated with the loan for the FVA firm should be lower. It should 
be noted that in our theoretical model, we assume that FVA behaves in the manner that the 
FVA Level 1 classification is expected to behave in, and in subsequent extensions, we relax 
this assumption to allow noise to enter into the information set. 
In this paper, we use the predictions developed from the model in our theoretical paper and 
examine the influence of the recently introduced FVA standards on a sample of US based 
private loan contracts and the influence of the change in accounting policy on loan 
covenants, the cost of the loan, loan contract strictness (as measured by the Covenant 
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Intensity Index) and the number of ex-post loan amendments. The paper contributes to the 
literature on creditor control rights, debt contract design, and accounting policy effect. 
We approach the influence of fair value accounting from the Costly Contracting Hypothesis 
(CCH) framework of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and treat the introduction of FVA as a 
change in the information set available to the lender. In particular, we argue that FVA 
improves the information set available to the lender, when compared to non-FVA firms. The 
FVA standards once adopted, force the firm to periodically revalue its applicable assets and 
liabilities to observable market metrics and prices, and to disclose the information to 
outsiders. As a result, FVA should reduce the flexibility available to managers to pursue 
accounting strategies or policies that would create ‘noise’ in financial statements, and 
therefore improve the contracting ability of covenants written on these financial statements. 
Based on the projected reduction in the information asymmetry resulting from FVA, our first 
prediction is that the Level 1 FVA classification should observe a lower number of Balance 
sheet covenants, and that it should have no influence on the number of Income Statement 
and Non-financial covenants. We predict that the Level 3 classification should observe a 
lower number of Income statement covenants. Our second prediction builds on the first 
prediction and argues that the improvement in the information set and verification of values 
in the financial statements should result in a decrease in the cost of debt (yield spread and 
loan fees) for the Level 1 classification. Our third prediction builds on the first prediction 
and argues that the reduction in the occurrence and number of covenants, added to the 
improvement in the information set under the FVA regime should lead to a decrease in the 
covenant intensity index. Our last hypothesis builds on our earlier hypothesis and argues that 
if the Level 1 classification leads to an improvement in the information set for the lender, it 
should result in an increase in the number of ex-post loan amendments.  
We test our predictions on a sample of US private loan contracts obtained from 
LPC/Dealscan, and we find mixed results that support some of our predictions. Overall, our 
results are consistent with evidence found by other papers. For example, Demerjian et al 
(2014) argue that FVA may result in a reduction in the contracting ability of the financial 
information, especially, the level 2 and 3 classifications, which they and Liao et al(2013) 
argue is more ‘noisy’ and may include more ‘biased judgements’ compared to the Level 1 
classifications. Our results suggest that the Level 1 classification results in a reduction in the 
number of Balance sheet covenants and an associated reduction in the Cost of debt, whereas 
the Level 3 classification results in a reduction in the number of Income Statement 
covenants, but with no associated reduction in the Cost of debt We also find that the Level 
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2 classification observes a reduction in the ex-post number of amendments, which in 
accordance with Roberts and Sufi (2009), may imply a reduced accrual of new, relevant 
information. Therefore, our results are generally consistent with those found earlier, that is, 
we find that the Level 1 classification is deemed to be more ‘value relevant’ to lenders 
compared to the Level 3 classification. 
We partition our dataset into two groups according to the median initial loan maturity and 
find some support for Platin et al’s (2008) suggestion that FVA leads to the greatest potential 
damage when claims are long lived, though we argue that this may be less related to the 
Level 1 classification.  
We also conduct a number of robustness tests on our data and the results provide strong 
support for (H1), but mixed support for the hypothesis associated with cost of debt (H2), the 
covenant intensity index (H3), and the number of ex-post loan amendments (H4). 
Section 2 presents the related literature that underpins and develops our empirical 
predictions. Section 3 presents our methodology and data. Section 4 describes our univariate 
analysis and main empirical results. Section 5 presents our robustness analysis. Section 6 
summarizes our main results and concludes. 
2. Related literature and Hypothesis development 
The Costly Contracting Hypothesis (CCH), as articulated by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
views the firm as a centre of contracts made between the firm and its various stakeholders. 
Under the CCH theory, managers/insiders will, at times, pursue strategies that benefit 
themselves at the expense of outsiders. Outside investors will anticipate the potential for 
wealth expropriation and will ‘price-protect’ themselves by offering a lower price for a given 
ownership claim. Insiders bear these costs and therefore have an incentive to mitigate these 
costs. Insiders are able to mitigate these costs by entering into monitoring and bonding 
agreements and providing timely information to outsiders. Smith and Warner (1979) argue 
that if the CCH is correct, then we should observe restrictions (covenants) written into debt 
contracts. 
Besides covenants authors have found several other mechanisms that can be employed to 
protect bondholders. Prior studies have examined State anti-takeover laws (Francis et al. 
2010), the influence of political and legal institutions (Qi et al ,2010), the use of audit as a 
monitoring mechanism (Minnis ,2011), and Board independence and board structure 
(Anderson et al, 2004), amongst others.  
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Accounting can have two roles in debt contracting: an information role and a direct 
contracting role. In the informational role, the lender uses accounting information in the 
initial contracting of the loan. The accounting information allows the lender to determine the 
likelihood of default and the potential loss given default (Amiram, 2011), and the associated 
loan price. The Accounting information will also allow the lender to engage in loan 
renegotiation (Roberts and Sufi, 2009). 
Debt covenants written on accounting ratios allocate control rights to the lender in the event 
of poor financial performance (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). Other provisions sometimes 
written on accounting variables include dividend restrictions (Kalay, 1982; Li et al, 2013), 
performance pricing provisions (Asquith et al, 2005), and cash flow sweeps. 
The direct contracting role of accounting relates to contract provisions written explicitly on 
accounting values. Covenants written on accounting ratios allocate control rights to the 
lender in the event of poor financial performance (Aghion and Bolton, 1992, Leftwich ,1983, 
Dichev and Skinner ,2002).  
Information asymmetry between the borrower and lender makes it difficult for the lender to 
assess the profitability of the firm’s investment opportunities. If the lender cannot adequately 
asses the firm’s profitability, it will under-price the firm’s projected profitability and over-
price firms with low profitability, which may potentially lead to market failure. This is the 
“lemons problem” introduced by Akerlof (1970), and it leads to incentives for borrowers to 
disclose additional information to the lender in order to mitigate the potential ‘lemons 
problem’.  
In order to mitigate the information asymmetry being faced by lenders, borrowers may 
attempt to use Conservatism. 26 Basu (1997) and Watts (2003a, 2003b) find that losses 
reported by management are informative even if they cannot be verified by external parties 
due to management incentive to prevent disclosure of bad news while gains reported by 
management are deemed less informative due to management’s incentive to report good 
news. Further, Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) argue that financial reporting 
conservatism is one potential mechanism to address agency problems between owners and 
managers.  
                                                             
26 “Conservatism” occurs when a higher degree of verification is required for gains compared to losses, that 
is, firms recognise losses in a timely manner, but delay the recognition of gains. 
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However, Gigler et al (2009) and Gow (2008) suggest that conservatism may reduce the 
efficiency of debt contracts due to debt contracts being designed differently in accordance 
with the conservatism of the accounting system.  
Moving away from conservatism, authors find that timely loss recognition is able to increase 
reliance of accounting information in debt contracts (Nikolaev 2010) and to reduce the bid-
ask spread on traded debt (Wittenberg-Moerman 2008).  
FVA, also referred to as “Marked-to-market”, is an accounting regime wherein the firm is 
required to periodically revalue its assets and liabilities to match the securities to their 
observable market values (Level 1), or to use observable market values of a similar type of 
security (Level 2), or to provide observable valuation inputs for securities that do not have 
verifiable market values (Level 3).  Under a FVA regime, the firm will be required to revalue 
its assets and liabilities on each reporting date, and therefore, disclose any gains or losses 
due to the revaluation in the financial statements.27 
In terms of the use of FVA, Barth (1994) finds that FVA estimates are relevant to investors, 
but that the change in FVA is less relevant, compared to the HCA method. Fiechter (2011) 
finds that the FVA option is able to reduce the volatility of bank’s earnings. Further, Laux 
and Leuz (2009) argue that though there are legitimate concerns surrounding marking to 
market in times of financial crises, it is less clear that these problems apply to FVA as 
stipulated under either US GAAP or IFRS. They further argue that HCA is not a remedy and 
that there are a number of concerns surrounding HCA and that these problems could be 
larger than those associated with FVA.  
Authors have also raised concerns about the potential damage done by FVA when assets are 
illiquid or long lived, (Platin et al,2008, Demerjian et al, 2014, Benson, 2008). The argument 
mainly stems from a concern that fair values not based on actual market prices will be costly 
to apply, and that fair values levels 2 and 3 could be easily manipulated and are not easily 
verifiable. 
Further, research shows that FVA disclosures may only provide a limited incremental 
information value relevance role (Eccher et al, 1996), that debt contracts may be less likely 
to include financial covenants affects by FVA (Demerjian ,2011, Ball et al ,2013).  
The main alternative to FVA is “historical Cost” accounting (HCA), where assets are 
recorded at historical cost, which normally equals the fair value when the assets were 
                                                             
27 The exact disclosure of the gain/loss will differ depending on whether the security is classified as “Trading 
securities”, “Available for Sale”, or “Held-to-Maturity”. 
 121 
 
originally bought. Thereafter, historical cost is adjusted for amortization and impairments, 
but any asset value increases are only recorded if the asset is sold. When asset values decline 
and impairment is not restricted, FVA and HCA should provide the same value. However, 
in practise, the impairment test differs across assets. Furthermore, whether or not the value 
of an impaired asset is written down and the loss is recognised in the income statement 
depends on the asset in question and whether the impairment is deemed as being not 
‘temporary’ (Laux and Leuz, 2010). 
If FVA under SFAS 159 makes accounting information more (less) useful in the direct 
contracting role, lenders could increase (decrease) their use of financial covenants in debt 
contracts (Ball et al, 2013; Demerjian, 2011). Alternatively, lenders could modify contract 
definitions of financial covenants to adjust for the effects of SFAS 159 (Leftwich, 1983; Li, 
2010, Demerjian et al, 2014). Furthermore, market values may capture information that is 
uninformative for debt contracting, such as temporary shocks unrelated to the borrower’s 
future cash flows (Shivakumar, 2013). Kothari et al (2010) and Benson (2008) argue that the 
use of FVA also grants managers increased reporting discretion, particularly for Level 2 and 
Level 3 assets, and that this increase discretion could lead to reporting opportunism. 
However, Liao and Beatty (2014) find that the three level hierarchy under SFAS 157 
provides investors with useful information.   
Our hypothesis are derived from our theoretical paper, wherein we examine the design and 
renegotiation of covenants in debt contracts under asymmetric information. In particular, we 
examine the influence of two distinct accounting regimes on the design and renegotiation of 
covenants. Our model has a setting wherein future firm investments are efficient in certain 
states but also result in a transfer from the lender to the firm. The model has symmetric 
information concerning the efficiency of the investments, however, the firm is better 
informed about any potential transfers compared to the lender. Under the FVA regime, we 
assume that the lender obtains the true realisation of the potential wealth transfer value prior 
to the investment being made. However, under a HCA regime, the lender has to acquire this 
information at a cost. 
Given the above setting, we are able to show that the presence of asymmetric information 
between the firm and the lender, and between the two distinct accounting regimes leads to 
the allocation of a greater number of control rights (covenants) ex ante to the more uniformed 
party, which is the lender facing a HCA regime, then would be the case under symmetric 
information. The model also suggests that firms that use FVA should be rewarded ex ante 
by the lender via requiring a lower yield on the debt contracts. In the extension to our model, 
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we also show that the expected influence of FVA should differ depending on the FVA level 
classification, with Level 1 expected to reduce information asymmetry, while Level 3 is 
expected to introduce noise for the lender. 
Dichev (2008) discusses two alternative approaches to financial statement reporting. The 
“balance sheet approach” uses the valuation of assets and liabilities as the main focal point 
of financial reporting. Under the balance sheet approach, income statements are a function 
of the changes in the relevant balance sheet accounts and therefore, are determined on a 
secondary basis. Under the “income statement approach”, the determination of income and 
expenses are the primary goal of the financial reporting. Under this method, the balance 
sheet accounts are determined by the income statement accounts. 
‘A major standard-setting initiative related to the balance sheet approach is the use of fair 
value accounting’.28 Demerjian (2011) finds that the use of balance sheet covenants has 
decreased over time, while he finds that the inclusion of income statement based covenants 
has remained constant. He argues that this phenomena has arisen due to the increased use of 
FVA and the inclusion of estimated assets and liability values, which he argues has reduced 
the use of balance sheet covenants.    
Unlike Demerjian (2011) and Ball et al (2013), we assume that if FVA is able to reduce the 
amount of information asymmetry faced by the lender, then the lender should offer the 
borrower a contract with a lower number of Balance Sheet covenants. While Demerjian 
(2011) and Ball et al (2013), take the opposite view, that if an accounting information set is 
able to reduce information asymmetry, then the lender should offer the borrower with more 
or atleast the same number of covenants written on that accounting set, a reduction would 
imply that the information set actually increases the degree of information asymmetry being 
faced by the lender under Demerjian (2011) and Ball et al (2013). 
Our assumption is derived from the Costly Contracting Hypothesis (CCH) (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)). Under this theory, outside investors will anticipate the potential for wealth 
expropriation and will ‘price-protect’ themselves by offering a lower price for a given 
ownership claim. Insiders are able to mitigate these costs by entering into monitoring and 
bonding agreements and providing timely information to outsiders. Therefore, in our 
theoretical model, we assume that the borrower mitigates the costs by using FVA and thereby 
providing more timely information to outsiders. Accordingly, the use of FVA will be 
                                                             
28 Page 181, Demerjian (2011). 
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rewarded by the lender in the form of a lower need for balance sheet covenants and a lower 
yield spread.  
This argument is also supported by Denis and Wang (2014) who find that debt contract 
renegotiations represent an important vehicle by which creditors exercise control rights in a 
state contingent manner, and that creditors exercise these control rights in a flexible manner, 
often providing more slack to borrowers to allow them to implement their preferred 
operating policies. 
Our argument is also supported by Nikolaev (2010), who examines the relationship between 
conservative financial reporting and the extent of covenant use in public debt. He argues that 
covenants and the degree of timely loss recognition act as complementary mechanisms for 
reducing agency costs. Bharath et al (2008) argue that lender’s restrictions on the borrower’s 
actions through covenants can act as substitutes for high quality accounting information.  
Our model therefore predicts that the use of FVA should result in a lower number of balance 
sheet covenants if, as expected in our model, that FVA use leads to an improvement in the 
information set. Our expectation concerning the influence of FVA on Balance Sheet 
covenants is supported by Laux and Leuz (2009), who say ‘FVA is a way to measure assets 
and liabilities that appear on a company’s balance sheet’ (p 827). Our expectation is further 
supported by Liao et al (2013), who find that the degree of information asymmetry for bank’s 
net assets is an increasing function of fair value estimate level; that is, information 
asymmetry is highest for the level 3 classification and lowest for the level 1 classification. 
Similar to Demerjian (2011), we do not expect the inclusion of Income Statement covenants 
to be affected by the use of FVA (as a whole). Our expectation regarding the lack of influence 
of FVA is based on the determination of FVA as being part of the ‘balance sheet approach’ 
(Demerjian, 2011). We do not expect a reduction in Non-financial covenants arising from 
the use of FVA.  Non-financial covenants are normally not written on financial statement 
information, and therefore, are not expected to be directly influenced by the choice of 
accounting standards being followed.  
However, we do not expect the influence of FVA on covenants to be uniform, rather, we 
expect the Level 1 classification to have the strongest (most beneficial) influence on 
covenants, followed by the Level 2 and the Level 3 classifications. Our predictions are based 
on our theoretical model and support from Liao et al (2013), which suggests that the number 
of balance sheet covenants should decrease in line with the additional improvement in the 
information set provided by the borrower. In the case of the Level 1 classification, the 
borrower discloses timely information that is easier to verify and confirm against readily 
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available market data (Liao et al, 2013, Ryan 2008, Beaver and Venkatachalam, 2003), 
whereas the level 2 and 3 classifications introduce estimates and judgements which make it 
more difficult to verify the information against observable market data (Demerjian et al, 
2014). Under our null hypothesis, we would expect the FVA loan observations, especially 
loans with Level 1 assets to observe a lower number and occurrence of balance sheet loan 
covenants, followed by the Level 2 and Level 3 classifications.  
We further predict that if the Level 3 classification introduces ‘noise’ and ‘biased 
judgements’ as argued by Liao et al (2013), and Demerjian et al (2014), then it may result in 
a reduction in the contracting ability of the financial information and therefore, result in a 
lower number of Income Statement covenants. While we expect the Level 1 classification to 
reduce the number of Balance sheet covenants, and the Level 3 classification to reduce the 
number of Income statement covenants, the expected reason is not the same for the lender. 
With Level 1, the lender is predicted to find the information relevant and therefore, agrees 
to reduce the number of Balance sheet covenants. Whereas, in the Level 3 scenario, the 
lender reduces the number of Income statement covenants because he is less able to use the 
information for contracting purposes. If this prediction concerning the lender’s approach 
between the Level 1 and the Level 3 classifications is true, we would expect the lender to 
reward the Level 1 classification with a lower cost of debt, and to ask for a higher cost of 
debt for the Level 3 classification. 
However, it is also possible that the use of FVA may result in a reduction in the usefulness 
of accounting information and that the lender would respond to this by writing a lower 
amount of loans covenants. Demerjian (2011) finds a decline in covenants written on balance 
sheet values which he attributes to a decline in the contracting usefulness of the balance sheet 
due to changing accounting standards. Under the alternative hypothesis, if the use of FVA 
leads to a reduction in the contracting ability of accounting information, then, firms that use 
FVA should observe a lower number of Balance sheet covenants. Under our null hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: The occurrence and number of Balance Sheet covenants is negatively 
related to the use of Fair Value accounting. 
Hypothesis 1b: The Level 1 Fair Value classification should result in a reduction in the 
occurrence and number of Balance Sheet covenants, while the Level 3 classification is 
expected to have no effect on the number and occurrence of Balance sheet covenants. 
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Hypothesis 1c: The Level 1 Fair Value classification should have no impact on the 
occurrence and number of Income Statement covenants, while the Level 3 classification 
is expected to reduce the number and occurrence of Income Statement covenants 
Hypothesis 1d: The occurrence and number of Non-financial covenants is unaffected 
by the use of Fair Value accounting. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), under the CCH, covenants are incorporated in 
debt contracts as a means to protect lenders from wealth expropriation activities undertaken 
by the insiders. These activities could include unauthorised distributions to insiders, claim 
dilution, asset substitution (‘over-investment’), or ‘under-investment’ amongst other 
possible actions. 
Smith and Warner (1979) argue that under certain circumstances, a set of covenants that are 
meant to curtail potential wealth expropriation by insiders, would reduce the promised yield 
to lenders. Bradley and Roberts (2003, 2004) find a negative relation between the promised 
yield on corporate debt and the presence of covenants.  
Bharath et al (2008) examine the relationship between interest spreads charged on loans and 
measures of accounting quality before entering into the loan agreement, and find that 
accounting quality is associated with lower spreads. They also find that accounting quality 
has a relatively larger effect on interest rates in public rather than private markets, which 
they argue is in line with either private market lender’s access to the additional information 
beyond publicly available information, or their ability to more cost effectively monitor the 
borrower and place restrictions on the borrower’s actions.  
According to our theoretical paper, we hypothesis that the use of FVA will result in the 
reduction of the level of information asymmetry faced by the lender. The lender therefore 
requires a cost of debt (where cost relates to both the yield spread on the loan, and any ‘fees’ 
associated with the loan) on the loan compared to a similar loan that does not use FVA. 
Furthermore, we assume that the level 1 classification will provide the lender with the 
highest marginal improvement in the informational asymmetry he faces, therefore, the level 
1 classification will observe the highest reduction in the cost of debt followed by the level 2 
and 3 classifications.   
However, if FVA reduces the efficiency of debt contracting (Demerjian, 2011; Ball et al 
(2013), then FVA usage should result in an increase in the yield spread. This argument is 
based on the CCH, which suggests that if the lender is not able to write contracts (covenants) 
in the loan that are efficient due to the reduction in the contractibility of accounting 
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information under FVA, he will price-protect himself by asking for a higher cost of debt 
compared to an identical firm that does not use FVA. 
Hypothesis 2a: The promised cost of debt on a loan contract is expected to be negatively 
influenced by the use of Fair Value accounting.  
Hypothesis 2b: The Level 1 Fair Value classification should be negatively related to the 
promised cost of debt.  
Smith and Warner (1979) argue that ‘there is a unique optimal set of financial contracts 
which maximise the value of the firm’, therefore, covenant choice is attributed to the 
particular features of the given project. Berlin and Mester (1992), Billet et al (2007), Rauh 
and Sufi (2010), and Demiroglu and James (2010) argue that on average, riskier firms receive 
contracts with stricter covenants.  
Berlin and Loeys (1988) find that debt contracts with covenants based on noisy indicators of 
the firm's financial condition tend to be either too harsh or too lenient. They argue that the 
firm’s choice reflects the optimal trade-off between the agency costs associated with hiring 
a delegated monitor and the inefficiency of inadequate bond covenants.  
Dichev and Skinner (2002) find that private lenders set debt covenants tightly and use them 
as ‘trip wires’ for borrowers, and that technical violations occur relatively often, but that 
violations are not necessarily associated with financial distress.  
According to our preceding hypothesis concerning the effect of FVA on covenants, we 
predict that the number of covenants would decrease for a FVA firm. Therefore, if we 
measure loan contract strictness using the number of covenants as an input, then this measure 
should show a decrease for a firm using FVA. Secondly, if we assume that contract strictness 
is a mechanism used by lenders to mitigate the possibility of wealth expropriation by the 
borrower and is set in order to reduce the flexibility allowed to the borrower to engage in 
activities that may transfer wealth, given our preceding arguments on FVA being used as a 
mechanism to reduce the information asymmetry faced by the lender, we would expect that 
the lender would offer a lower level of loan contract strictness to the firm (measured by the 
number of covenants issued in the loan), if the firm uses FVA. We further predict that the 
Level 1 classification should have the greater influence on the magnitude of the effect on 
loan contract strictness, given our preceding arguments concerning the higher marginal 
benefit the level 1 classifications gives to the lender compared to the level 2 and 3 
classifications. 
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Hypothesis 3a: Loan contract strictness is negatively influenced by the use of Fair 
Value accounting.  
Hypothesis 3b: The Level 1 Fair Value classification should have a greater reduction 
on the level of loan contract strictness.  
Roberts and Sufi (2009) find that the accrual of new information concerning the credit 
quality, investment opportunities, and collateral of the borrower, as well as macroeconomic 
fluctuations in credit and equity market conditions, are the primary determinants of 
renegotiation and its outcomes. Over 90% of long term debt contracts are renegotiated prior 
to their stated maturity, and are rarely a consequence of distress or default. 
The transfer of control rights and lender monitoring through covenants that act as trip wires 
is closely linked to contract renegotiations (Berlin and Mester, 1992; Garleanu and Zwiebel, 
2009). However, the alignment of shareholder and lender’s interest should reduce the 
requirement for future contract renegotiations (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). 
Under a FVA regime, information concerning the values of assets and liabilities is constantly 
updated, this would allow the lender to be in a better position to obtain information 
concerning the credit quality, investment opportunities, macroeconomic factors, and any 
other factors compared to a HC regime. Therefore, Loan contract renegotiations are expected 
to be positively influenced by the degree of timeliness of accounting information, in 
particular, contract renegotiations are expected to be positively influenced by the degree of 
timeliness of the accounting information set in terms of the recognition of gains and losses. 
In terms of FVA classification, we expect the Level 1 classification to have a positive 
influence on the number of loan renegotiations. We base our prediction on the expectation 
that the level 1 classification will offer the lender new information concerning the valuation 
inputs used to value the level 1 securities; information that the lender is be able to verify 
against the market. Therefore, if the level 1 classification does contain new, relevant 
information concerning the loan contract that the lender may find useful, then the level 1 
classification should observe a positive relationship with the number of loan amendments. 
We predict that the Level 3 classification would have the opposite effect to that of Level 1, 
this prediction arises from the managerial judgements and estimates used in valuing the 
Level 3 securities by the firm which may be difficult to reconcile to observable market data. 
This may introduce managerial bias in the information, which the lender may discount 
similar to his incorporation of information from HCA. 
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Hypothesis 4a: Loan contract renegotiations are positively related to the use of Fair 
Value accounting. 
Hypothesis 4b: The Level 3 Fair Value classification should have a negative impact on 
the number of loan contract renegotiations. 
3. Methodology and Data 
i. Measurement 
A. Fair Value  
The focus of this paper is to examine the influence of FVA on the occurrence and number 
of covenants in private debt contracts, the strictness of those covenants, the number of ex-
post loan amendments, and the cost of debt. As a result, the starting point of our methodology 
is to identify whether a loan observation is either FVA or HCA based. 
For the purpose of our research, we use Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No 
157 and 159 (SFAS 157 and 159) as the fair value standards in our paper.  These standards 
became effective for all fiscal years beginning November 2007 and it set the definition of 
fair value, fair value measurement, disclosure policy and hierarchy of assets and liabilities 
(level 1, 2 and 3). Fair value standards existed prior to this standard, for example SFAS 115 
for marketable securities, SFAS 122 for mortgage servicing rights, SFAS 133 for hedging 
transactions, to name a few. However, SFAS 157 and 159 were introduced to provide clear 
guidance for the consistent application of fair value across a broad range of assets and 
liabilities.  
The FASB states ‘Prior to this Statement, there were different definitions of fair value and 
limited guidance for applying those definitions in GAAP. Moreover, that guidance was 
dispersed among the many accounting pronouncements that require fair value 
measurements. Differences in that guidance created inconsistencies that added to the 
complexity in applying GAAP’29 
With the introduction of SFAS 157 and 159, firms that made use of FVA, were required to 
disclose in their financial statements the use of the standards and to recognise gains and 
losses from applying fair value and to separately disclose the gains and losses. Prior to SFAS 
157 and 159, any gain or loss would not be disclosed separately in the financial statements 
and would form part of the Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income (AOCI), therefore, 
making it practically impossible to determine whether a firm was using FVA prior to SFAS 
157 and 159, and what if any, the resulting fair value gain or loss was. As a result, we exclude 
                                                             
29 Summary of Statement No.157, Reason for Issuing this Statement. www.fasb.org  
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all observations prior to the first quarter of 2008 due to the inability to determine whether 
the firm was using some form of FVA prior to this date.  
Under a FVA regime, gains or losses arising from Marking-to-market assets and liabilities, 
will be incorporated either on the face of the Income Statement, the Balance sheet, or the 
Statement of Comprehensive Income. We use COMPUSTAT/CRSP to identify whether a 
given loan observation exhibits any transactions associated with FVA. The three data items 
associated with FVA from the COMPUSTAT/CRSP dataset are: Assets Level 1 (AQPL1), 
Assets level 2 (AQL2), and Assets Level 3 (AUL3). Level 1 assets relate to a firm’s assets 
that have a quoted market value. Level 2 assets relate to a firm’s assets for which there is an 
observable market value for similar instrument types. Level 3 assets relate to a firm’s assets 
for which there is no observable market value, nor are there observable market values for 
similar types of instruments. 
Next, we code Level 1, 2 and 3 fraction of assets as follows: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 1 % =
(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 1 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 2 % =
(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 2 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 3 % =
(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 3 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)
 
The numerator is the respective asset amount for each FVA classification, while the 
denominator is the total asset position of the firm for the period. 
Table VI-1: Fair Value classifications and percentages: Sample compared to Population 
  N Mean Median 10% 25% 75% 90% 
Pop FVA1%      58,297  0.1244 0.0377 0.0001 0.0046 0.1546 0.3779 
Sample FVA1%        1,993  0.0558 0.0158 0.0010 0.0035 0.06936 0.1499 
Pop FVA2%      56,805  0.1408 0.0489 0.0001 0.0036 0.2043 0.4302 
Sample FVA2%         2,043  0.0349 0.0058 0.0000 0.0012 0.0258 0.0908 
Pop FVA3%      25,957  0.0629 0.0074 0.0004 0.0017 0.0318 0.1255 
Sample FVA3%        790  0.5759 0.0187 0.0039 0.0002 0.0134 0.0386 
Table VI-1 above shows the percentage of total assets represented by the FVA classifications. The population rows relate 
to the corresponding ratios calculated using all non-financial firm quarter observations for US firms using data from 
COMPUSTAT/CRSP from Q1 2008 to Q4 2013. The sample percentages correspond to the corresponding ratios calculated 
using the financial data applying to the sample being used. 
Our hypothesis rely on FVA having an effect on covenant design and loan contract issuance, 
therefore, we require that our classification for FVA should reflect the ‘materiality’ of using 
FVA (Demerjian et al, 2014). That is, we need to ensure that we code those firms as being 
FVA users, which have a higher proportion of assets affected by the new regulation. 
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Therefore, we use the median value of the corresponding population ratio for each 
classification as the cut-off value for coding each classification. That is, we will code an 
observation as using level 1,2, or 3, if it is above the population median.  
We use the population median as the classification methodology because our sample is a 
sub-sample that is constructed by using the Chava and Roberts (2008) linking file. The 
linking file allows us to link the Dealscan loan data to the financial statement data in 
COMPUSTAT/ CRSP, however, the link is not complete and it only allows us to link less 
than a fifth of all Dealscan data.30 Therefore, to avoid using a sample median as the cut-off 
mechanism, which may be biased due to the limitations in collating the data, we use the 
population median. 
Table VI-2: Loan observations by Accounting Type 
Quarter Total HC FV FV1 FV2 FV3 
2008q1 174 173 1 1 0 0 
2008q2 181 158 23 15 8 13 
2008q3 181 157 24 14 8 9 
2008q4 136 98 38 18 14 19 
2009q1 118 85 33 19 12 10 
2009q2 134 91 43 23 17 23 
2009q3 109 87 22 15 8 8 
2009q4 151 109 42 33 6 19 
2010q1 121 86 35 23 8 11 
2010q2 176 125 51 35 14 12 
2010q3 162 123 39 31 9 9 
2010q4 231 174 57 41 18 14 
2011q1 197 146 51 36 18 6 
2011q2 291 227 64 48 18 13 
2011q3 245 179 66 52 23 10 
2011q4 265 202 63 46 21 11 
2012q1 170 123 47 37 16 11 
2012q2 204 156 48 35 14 7 
2012q3 149 113 36 26 14 8 
2012q4 203 158 45 30 18 8 
2013q1 155 118 37 32 15 3 
2013q2 229 177 52 31 25 8 
2013q3 285 152 33 26 12 7 
2013q4 195 154 41 35 14 5 
Total 4,362 3,371 991 702 330 244 
Table VI-2 above shows the number of loan contract observations by quarter, split according to whether they have been 
coded as using HCA or FVA. The observations are further broken down between Level 1 (FVA1), Level 2 (FVA2), and 
Level 3 (FVA3) classifications. 
                                                             
30 There are 29,501 loan observations for the 2008q1 to 2013q4 period, of which only 4,362 have been 
collated with the linking file (14.7%). 
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Next we examine the relationship between the use of FVA, including the various FVA 
classifications. We run the following regression. 
𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽7𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽9𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 + 𝜀𝑖 
Where Occurrence is a binominal variable that takes the form 1 if the loan quarter 
observation has a FVA, or Level 1,2, or 3 observation or 0 otherwise. We run a Logit 
regression with year fixed effects and clustered by Firm. The results from the regression are 
shown in Table VI-3 below. 
Table VI-3: Fair Value Accounting use, Firm and Loan characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FV_ occurrence FV1_ occurrence FV2_ occurrence FV3_ occurrence 
     
WMAT 0.027 0.250 -0.228 -0.151 
 (0.210) (1.570) (-1.245) (-0.637) 
WLEV -0.807** -0.974** -1.380** -1.378** 
 (-2.148) (-2.145) (-2.018) (-2.343) 
WSIZE 0.326*** 0.327*** 0.434*** 0.257*** 
 (7.352) (6.339) (5.656) (3.546) 
WAMOUNT -0.167*** -0.238*** -0.116 -0.077 
 (-4.150) (-4.996) (-1.633) (-1.052) 
SECURED 0.132 0.098 0.065 0.135 
 (1.325) (0.852) (0.370) (0.842) 
Switching 1.051*** 0.692*** 0.539* 0.933*** 
 (4.951) (2.865) (1.775) (3.126) 
WZScore 0.022 0.015 0.037 -0.093** 
 (1.092) (0.650) (1.238) (-2.141) 
LOSS 0.588*** 0.338** 0.813*** 0.285 
 (4.076) (2.022) (3.355) (1.180) 
Rating -0.275** -0.277* -0.348 -0.325 
 (-2.022) (-1.874) (-1.637) (-1.185) 
Constant -2.566*** -2.719*** -4.325*** -4.019*** 
 (-6.487) (-5.891) (-6.590) (-5.709) 
Observations 4,362 4,362 4,362 4,362 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.0565 0.0540 0.0762 0.0531 
 
Table VI-3 above shows the relationship between the occurrence of FVA observations shown in (1). The occurrence of 
Level 1 classification (2). The occurrence of the Level 2 classification (3). Finally, (4) shows the occurrence of the Level 
3 classification. WMAT is the natural log of maturity at the time of issuance. WLEV is the ratio of total long term debt 
(dlttq) to total assets (atq). Size is the natural log of market value (mkvalq). Amount is the natural log of the deal amount. 
Secured is a binomial variable equal to 1 if the loan quarter states that the loan is secured, 0 otherwise. Switching is a 
binomial variable equal to 1 if the firm switched to Fair Value accounting in the prior period, 0 otherwise. Zscore is the 
bankruptcy measure constructed using Altman’s (1968) measure. Loss is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm reported 
negative operating earnings (oiadpy<0), 0 otherwise. Rating is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm had a credit rating 
(obtained from S&P), 0 otherwise. The control variables Maturity, Leverage, Size, Amount, and Zscore have been 
winsorized at the 0.005 level. Robust z-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As can be seen from  
Table VI-3 above, the occurrence of FVA is negatively related to the level of firm leverage, 
which suggests that firms are less likely to use FVA if they have a higher proportion of debt 
to total assets. The Size of the firm has a positive impact on occurrence, suggesting that 
larger firms are more likely to use FVA. Amount is negatively related to FVA use, 
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suggesting that larger deal sizes are less likely to be associated with the use of FVA. 
Switching is positively associated with FVA, suggesting that if a firm had used FVA in the 
prior period, that it would be more likely to use FVA in the subsequent period. The ZScore 
is negatively related to the use of the level 3 classification. Loss is positively associated with 
the use of FVA, suggesting that firms that experience a loss in the current period are more 
likely to use FVA, expect for the use of the level 3 classification. Finally, the Rating 
classification has a negative relationship with FVA and the level 1 classification, suggesting 
that the presence of an existing firm level rating reduces the occurrence of the level 1 and 
FVA. The Maturity and Secured variables were not found to be significant.  
Overall, the logit regression suggests that FVA use is less likely to occur if the firm is already 
highly levered and is issuing a large loan amount. However, it is more likely to use FVA if 
it is a larger firm.  
B. Covenant 
Our first hypothesis examines the influence of FVA on covenant occurrence. LPC/Dealscan 
provides data on financial covenants, which are provisions within the debt contract whereby 
the borrower must maintain a prescribed threshold amount of an accounting based measure. 
If the borrower is unable to maintain the prescribed threshold in a given period, the loan will 
enter into technical default and the lender will receive the option to take remedial action, 
such as the termination of the loan via immediate repayment, a renegotiation of the loan’s 
maturity or interest rate, or the payment of a penalty amount to the lender. Transactions are 
reported at the Package and Facility level in DealScan/LPC, where packages are collections 
of facilities with linked documentation. Covenants are only reported at the package level, 
therefore, this is the relevant unit of observation for a contract (Murfin 2012). We examine 
three types of covenants: 
Balance Sheet covenants include: 
 Current ratio is the ratio of current (short term) assets to current liabilities. 
 Quick ratio is the ratio of current assets less inventory to current liabilities. 
 Debt to tangible assets is the ratio of total debt to total tangible assets. 
 Leverage ratio is the ratio of total debt to total share-holders equity. 
 Max CAPEX is the maximum amount of capital expenditure allowed in a given period. 
 Tangible Net Worth is the minimum amount of tangible assets less liabilities allowed in 
a given period. 
 Net Worth is the minimum amount of total assets less total liabilities allowed in a given 
period. 
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Income Statement covenants include: 
 Interest coverage is the ratio of earnings to interest expense. 
 Fixed charge coverage is the ratio of earnings to fixed expenses including interest, 
principal payments, and others. 
 Debt to EBITDA is the ratio of total debt to earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, 
and amortisation. 
 Debt coverage is the ratio of the current portion of debt to earnings. 
 Senior debt to EBITDA is the ratio of senior debt to earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation, and amortisation. 
 EBITDA is the minimum amount of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and 
amortisation allowed in a given period. 
 Non-Financial covenants include: 
 Asset Sweep is a restriction on the sale and/or the use of proceeds from the sale of certain 
assets. 
 Debt Sweep is a restriction on the issuance of new debt or the use of proceeds from the 
issuance of new debt. 
 Equity Sweep is a restriction on the issuance of new equity or the use of proceeds from 
the issuance of new equity.  
 Dividend Sweep is a restriction on the issuance of dividends. 
 Insurance Sweep is a restriction on the proceeds from insurance claims. 
Table VI-4 below shows the summary statistics of the type of covenant and the loan quarter 
observations obtained from the dataset. We do not make predictions on the inclusion or 
exclusion of individual covenant types, rather, we focus on whether FVA leads to a 
significant difference in the inclusion or exclusion of Balance Sheet, Income Statement and 
Non-Financial covenants. 
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Table VI-4: Summary of covenants by type 
Type of covenant Firm year observation 
Balance Sheet 1,502 
Income Statement 3,791 
Non-Financial Covenant 4,075 
  
Individual covenant observations   
Max Capex 477 
Min EBITDA 166 
Max Debt to EBITDA 1,605 
Max Debt to Equity 5 
Max Debt to Tangible Net Worth 57 
Max Leverage Ratio 407 
Max Loan to Value 1 
Max Net Debt to Assets 0 
Max Senior Debt to EBITDA 179 
Max Senior Leverage 1 
Min Cash Interest Coverage 19 
Min Current Ratio 164 
Min Debt Service Coverage 66 
Min Equity to Asset 3 
Min Fixed Charge Coverage 841 
Min Interest Coverage 1,000 
Min Net Worth to Total Assets 0 
Min Quick Ratio 24 
Min Net Worth 144 
Min Tangible Net Worth 134 
Asset Sweep 797 
Debt Sweep 634 
Equity Sweep 382 
Dividend Sweep 1,640 
Insurance Sweep 622 
Table VI-4 above shows the number of loan covenants, split according to whether they are classified as being either Balance 
Sheet, Income Statement, or Non-financial in nature. The loan covenants are then further broken down according to the 
individual loan definition. 
For hypothesis 1, we use two different tests in order to examine the influence of FVA on 
covenant inclusion in loan contracts. We first examine whether FVA use leads to a difference 
in the occurrence of covenants in the loan contract. Secondly, we examine whether the use 
of FVA results in a difference in the number of covenants included in a particular loan. We 
cluster by Firm and include Year Fixed Effects, whereby the dependent variables are the 
occurrence of Balance Sheet, Income Statement, or Non-Financial covenants, or the number 
of Balance Sheet, Income Statement, or Non-Financial covenants: 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑁𝐴𝑁𝑇𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑉𝐴 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑
+ 𝛽7𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽8𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖 
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The dependent variable, COVENANT corresponds to one of two measures. It is either a 
binomial variable equal to 1 if the observation has Balance Sheet, Income Statement, or Non-
Financial covenants, or 0 otherwise (Test 1). Or, it is the number of Balance Sheet, Income 
Statement, or Non-Financial covenants per loan contract (Test 2). The FVA variable is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the loan observation has been coded determined as being a FVA 
observation (see above). In subsequent regressions this variable is replaced by the Level 1, 
Level 2, and Level 3 observations.  
The figures below show HCA observations with square markers, total observations with a 
triangle markers, and FVA observations with a straight line. For the purpose of the graphs, 
we show the sample into two groups based on whether the firm uses FVA or uses HCA.  
Figure VI-1: Balance Sheet Covenants Occurrence 2008-2013. 
 
Figure VI-1 above shows the occurrence of Balance Sheet covenants in loan contracts during 
the period 2008-2013. As can be seen from the above figure, the occurrence of Balance Sheet 
covenants has steadily decreased over the period. As can also be seen from Figure VI-1, 
FVA observations have generally exhibited a lower occurrence of Balance Sheet covenants 
during the period compared to HCA.  
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Figure VI-2: Income Statement Covenants Occurrence 2008-2013 
  
Figure VI-2 above shows the occurrence of Income Statement covenants in loan contracts 
during the period 2008-2013. As can be seen from the above figure, the occurrence of 
Income Statement covenants has steadily decreased over the period. As can be seen from 
Figure VI-2, FVA observations have generally exhibited a similar occurrence of Income 
Statement covenants compared to HCA observations over the period. 
Figure VI-3: Non-Financial Covenants Occurrence 2008-2013 
  
Figure VI-3 above shows the occurrence of Non-Financial covenants in loan contracts during 
the period 2008-2013. As can be seen from the above figure, the occurrence of Non-Financial 
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covenants has steadily decreased over the period. As can be seen from Figure VI-3, FVA 
observations have generally exhibited a similar occurrence of Non-Financial covenants 
compared to HCA observations over the period. 
Figure VI-4: Number of Balance Sheet covenants per loan contract 2008-2013 
 
Figure VI-4 above shows the number of Balance Sheet covenants per loan contract during 
the period 2008-2013. As can be seen from the above figure, the number of Balance Sheet 
covenants has steadily decreased over the period. As can be seen from Figure VI-4, FVA 
observations have generally exhibited a lower number of Balance Sheet covenants compared 
to HCA observations over the period. 
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Figure VI-5: Number of Income Statement covenants per loan contract 2008-2013 
  
Figure VI-5 above shows the number of Income Statement covenants per loan contract 
during the period 2008-2013. As can be seen from the above figure, the number of Income 
Statement covenants has steadily decreased over the period. As can be seen from Figure 
VI-5, FVA observations have generally exhibited a similar number of Income Statement 
covenants compared to HCA observations over the period. 
Figure VI-6: Number of Non-Financial covenants per loan contract 2008-2013 
  
Figure VI-6 above shows the number of Non-Financial covenants per loan contract during 
the period 2008-2013. As can be seen from the above figure, the number of Non-Financial 
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covenants has steadily decreased over the period. As can be seen from Figure VI-6, FVA 
observations have generally exhibited a lower number of Non-Financial covenants compared 
to HCA observations over the period. 
C. Cost of debt 
The second hypothesis examines whether the Cost of debt is influenced by the use of FVA. 
The cost of debt is obtained from the Current Pricing dataset from LPC/Dealscan. This 
dataset gives details about the pricing of each of the Packages, including the respective 
benchmark rate and the associated spread over the benchmark, from which we can construct 
the Yield Spread, and any respective upfront fees charged on the issuance of the loan. We 
run separate regressions on the Yield Spread and any fees of the loan as follows:  
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑉𝐴 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑
+ 𝛽7𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽8𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑂𝑉_𝐵𝑆 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑂𝑉_𝐼𝑆
+ 𝛽13𝐶𝑂𝑉_𝑁𝐹 + 𝜀𝑖 
𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐹𝑉𝐴 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽8𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑂𝑉_𝐵𝑆 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑂𝑉_𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽13𝐶𝑂𝑉_𝑁𝐹 + 𝜀𝑖 
Figure VI-7: Yield Spread 2008-2013 
 
Figure VI-7 above shows the Yield spread during the period 2008-2013, where the y-axis 
shows the average Yield spread in basis points (bps). As can be seen from the figure, the 
average spread has steadily increased during the period 2008-2013, after a large fall between 
2008q3 and 2009q1. As can be seen from Figure VI-7, FVA observations have generally 
exhibited a similar Yield Spread compared to HCA observations over the period. 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
2008q1 2009q1 2010q1 2011q1 2012q1 2013q1
Yield_Spread_Sample Yield_Spread_FVA Yield_Spread_HCA
 140 
 
Figure VI-8: FEES 2008-2013 
 
Figure VI-8 above shows the Loan fees during the period 2008-2013, where the y-axis shows 
the average loan fee in basis points (bps). As can be seen from the figure, the average spread 
has been very volatile during the period 2008-2013. As can be seen from Figure VI-8, FVA 
observations have generally exhibited a lower fee trend compared to the HCA observations 
during the 2009-13 period. 
D. Covenant Intensity Index 
We conduct our analysis of the degree of covenant strictness by using the Covenant Intensity 
Index introduced by Bradley and Roberts (2004). The index has been designed in order to 
measure the degree to which a particular loan restricts the actions of a firm’s management. 
Similar to Bradley and Roberts (2004), we assume that more covenants place greater 
restrictions on the management of the borrowing firm. We follow Bradley and Roberts 
(2004), and approximate the covenant intensity of each issue by the number of covenants 
included in the debt contract. The index is constructed using six specific covenants, which 
fall into four groups: prepayment, financial, dividend and secured.  
The prepayment group includes covenants that require the earlier repayment of the loan 
conditional on an event, such as the issue of further debt or equity. These covenants are 
referred to as ‘sweeps’ in the Dealscan dataset and consist of three distinct types: asset, 
equity, and debt. Sweeps are normally stated as a percentage, which refer to the amount of 
the loan that must be repaid earlier in the case of a covenant violation.  
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Financial covenants have already mentioned above and consists of the sum of the Balance 
Sheet and Income Statement covenants mentioned above. Dividend covenants are meant to 
restrict the ability of management to distribute cash to its equity-holders if certain events 
occur. Dividend covenants are shown in Dealscan in a binary code, with 1 implying that a 
dividend covenant exists, while 0 implies that the debt contract does not contain a dividend 
covenant. Finally, Secured covenants exist in order to restrict the ability of management to 
distribute the collateral against which the debt has been secured. Secured covenants are 
shown in the Dealscan dataset as a binary variable. 
We construct the covenant intensity index by following the methodology introduced by 
Bradley and Roberts (2004). We code the Asset, Debt and Equity Sweeps, Secured, and 
Dividend covenants as 1 if the debt contract has any of these covenants in place. We code 
the Financial covenant element as 1 if the debt contract has two or more financial covenants 
in the debt contract.  
This results in a covenant index that ranges in value from 0 to 6 for individual loan contracts, 
where a value of 0 implies that the debt contract has a lower amount of restriction, while a 
value of 6 implies that the debt contract has a higher amount of restriction in place. 
We follow Bradley and Roberts (2004) and argue that even though the covenant intensity 
benchmark implicitly assumes that the impact of different covenants is the same, this 
construction is transparent and is easy to replicate. Further, the benchmark also allows us to 
avoid any judgement regarding the efficiency or likely wealth effects of any of the covenants.    
We run the following regression: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
=  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐹𝑉 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑
+ 𝛽7𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽8𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖 
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Figure VI-9: Covenant Intensity Index 2008-2013 
 
Figure VI-9 above, shows the performance of covenant intensity index during the 2008-2013 
period. The y-axis shows the Covenant Intensity benchmark value constructed using Bradley 
and Roberts (2004). As can be seen from Figure VI-9, the Covenant Intensity Index has 
generally decreased over the period 2008-2013. As can be seen from Figure VI-9, FVA 
observations have generally exhibited a lower magnitude for the Covenant Intensity Index 
compared to HCA observations over the period. 
Murfin (2012) states that any measure for covenant strictness should have four desirable 
properties. First, the measure should take into account the number of covenants included in 
a contract. Second, the measure should be able to capture the initial covenant slack.31 Third, 
the measure should be able to incorporate the scale of the contracted slack. Finally, the 
measure should be able to incorporate the covariance between the covenants.  
As a consequence, the Covenant Intensity Index of Bradley and Roberts (2004) could be said 
to suffer from a weakness due to its reliance on only the first desirable property mentioned 
by Murfin (2012), while ignoring the other three desirable properties. Therefore, the measure 
that we use for covenant strictness has flaws which should be kept in mind when reviewing 
the analysis. However, the strengths of the Bradley and Roberts (2004) measure is its ease 
of construction and replication, the avoidance of any weight placed on particular types of 
covenants,  and the use of both financial and non-financial covenants in its construction. The 
                                                             
31 Slack is defined as the distance between the borrower’s accounting numbers at the time the contract is 
written and what is allowed under the loan covenants. 
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Bradley and Roberts (2004) measure has been used in existing literature including Nikolaev 
(2010), and Christensen and Nikolaev (2012), amongst others. 
E. Loan Contract Amendments 
Our final hypothesis examines whether the number of amendments in a loan contract is 
influenced by the use of FVA. The number of loan amendments is obtained from the Deal 
Amendments dataset from LPC/Dealscan. This dataset gives details about any amendments 
that have taken place for each loan, including any change in maturity, loan amount or a 
change in the cost of debt. We run the following basic regression: 
𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑉𝐴 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑
+ 𝛽7𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽8𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖 
Where the dependent variable is the number of ex-post loan amendments on a given loan. 
As mentioned previously, our hypothesis is that FVA should have a positive impact on the 
number of loan amendments. 
Figure VI-10: Number of loan Amendments 2008-2013 
 
Figure VI-10 above shows the average number of ex-post amendments made to a loan 
contract during the period 2008-2013. The y-axis shows the number of loan amendments, 
where a higher number suggests that a loan contract had a higher number of ex-post loan 
amendments and a lower number implies that the contract has a lower number of ex-post 
loan amendments. As can be seen from the figure, the number of loan amendments appear 
to be decreasing during the period, with the ex-post number of amendments for FVA based 
loans being generally lower than those for HCA loans during the period. 
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Table VI-5 below shows the summary statistics for the dependent variables mentioned 
above. 
Table VI-5 : Summary statistics of dependent variables 
 Variable N Mean Median 10% 25% 75% 90% 
COV_BS_IND         4,362  0.2914 0 0 0 1 1 
COV_IS_IND         4,362  0.5039 1 0 0 1 1 
COV_NF_IND         4,362  0.4104 0 0 0 1 1 
COV_BS         4,362  0.3443 0 0 0 1 1 
COV_IS         4,362  0.8691 1 0 0 2 2 
COV_NF         4,362  0.9342 0 0 0 1 4 
Yield Spread         4,362  152.439 62 10 25 243 461 
Fees         4,362 21.367 0 0 0 12.5 65 
Total Debt cost         4,362 173.807 89 15 35 283 505.95 
Covenant Intensity Index          4,362  1.5608 1 0 0 3 5 
Amendments         4,362  0.2362 0 0 0 0 1 
Table VI-5 : Summary statistics of dependent variables: above shows the dependent variables used in the paper. 
COV_BS_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has a Balance sheet covenant. COV_IS_IND is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has an Income statement covenant. COV_NF_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the loan contract has a non-financial covenant. COV_BS is the number of Balance sheet covenants in a loan contract. 
COV_IS is the number of Income statement covenants in a loan contract. COV_NF is the number of non-financial 
covenants in a loan contract. Yield_Spread is the additional yield offered on the loan contract compared to a corresponding 
Treasury security. Fees is the upfront loan costs asked in originating a loan. Total Debt cost is the addition of the Yield 
Spread and the Fees on loan issuance. Covenant Intensity Index is the benchmark created by Bradley and Roberts (2004) 
and is a variable that takes a value between 0 and 6. Amendments is the number of ex-post loan amendments in a loan 
contract. 
ii. Data 
The financial covenant and loan data consists of 4,362 private debt agreements made to 
publicly traded, non-financial borrowers obtained from the LPC/Dealscan database. 
Dealscan reports loan details from syndicated and bilateral loans collected from lead 
arrangers and SEC filings from 1984 to 2014. Included in the loan details are covenant levels, 
details about the borrower, loan amendments, and terms of the loans including pricing and 
maturity. Our sample covers the period 2008 to 2013. Quarterly financial statement data is 
obtained from COMPUSTAT/CRSP. Loan data is matched to COMPUSTAT data by using 
a link file provided by Michael Roberts and Sudheer Chava (which is also used in Chava 
and Roberts (2008)). 
Transactions are reported at the package and facility level in Dealscan, where packages are 
collections of facilities with linked documents. Given that covenants are only reported at the 
package level, this is the relevant measure used for a contract. We consolidate the loan 
amount at the package level and only include one observation per package level.  
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Table VI-6: Control variables descriptive statistics. 
  N Mean Median 10% 25% 75% 90% 
WMAT         4,362  1.5454 1.791759 0.693147 1.386294 1.791759 1.791759 
WLEV         4,362  0.2473 0.221452 0 0.089841 0.345943 0.641723 
WSIZE         4,362  7.2440 7.297283 4.816848 5.964327 8.512518 9.773352 
WAMOUNT         4,362  6.0750 6.050117 4.174387 5.010635 7.078763 8.006368 
SECURED         4,362  0.3466 0 0 0 1 1 
Switching         4,362  0.0250 0 0 0 0 0 
WZScore         4,362  2.5615 2.044501 0.366783 1.022254 3.352394 5.403108 
LOSS         4,362  0.1199 0 0 0 0 1 
Rating         4,362  0.5759 1 0 0 1 1 
Table VI-6 above shows the Control variables used in the paper. WMAT is the winsorized natural log of initial maturity in 
months. WLEV is the winsorized ratio of total debt to total assets. WSIZE is the winsorized natural log of the market value 
of equity (mkvaltq). WAMOUNT is the winsorized is the natural log of the initial loan amount. SECURED is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has a secured provision. Switching is equal to 1 if the firm had adopted Fair Value 
in the prior quarter. WZScore32 is the winsored measure of bankruptcy introduced by Altman (1968). LOSS is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the firm observed a loss in the prior quarter. Rating is equal to 1 if the firm has an existing credit 
rating from S&P. The control variables are winsorized at the 0.5% level (1% winsorisation). 
Table VI-7: Control variables correlation matrix. 
  WMAT WLEV WSIZE 
WAMOUN
T SECURED Switching WZScore LOSS Rating 
WMAT 1                 
WLEV 0.1184* 1               
WSIZE 0.0068 0.021 1             
WAMOUNT 0.1473* 0.1579* 0.6388* 1           
SECURED 0.0572* -0.0458* -0.3786*  -0.2376*  1          
Switching -0.0120  0.0099  0.0542*  0.0422*  -0.0117  1        
WZScore 0.0269  -0.4547*  0.1519*  -0.0748*  -0.0169  -0.0098  1      
LOSS  -0.1317* -0.0621*  -0.3773*  -0.2566*  0.1227*  -0.0003  -0.1909*  1    
Rating  0.0378* 0.3704*   0.5077*  0.4960* -0.1849*  0.0393*  -0.2490*  -0.1959  1  
Table VI-7 above shows the correlation matrix for the Control variables used in the paper. WMAT is the winsorized natural 
log of initial maturity in months. WLEV is the winsorized ratio of total debt to total assets. WSIZE is the winsorized natural 
log of the market value of equity (mkvaltq). WAMOUNT is the winsorized is the natural log of the initial loan amount. 
SECURED is a binary variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has a secured provision. Switching is equal to 1 if the firm 
had adopted Fair Value in the prior quarter. WZScore is the winsored measure of bankruptcy introduced by Altman (1968). 
LOSS is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm observed a loss in the prior quarter. Rating is equal to 1 if the firm has an 
existing credit rating from S&P. The control variables are winsorized at the 0.5% level (1% winsorisation). * p<0.05 
4. Empirical tests and results 
We begin this section with presenting the univariate tests, followed by the multivariate 
results of our hypothesis tests, and conclude with tests conducted on a sub sample of loan 
contracts by maturity.  
B. Univariate Tests 
We begin our analysis by conducting univariate tests on the dependent variables. From our 
hypotheses, we expect that the use of FVA should result in a reduction in the occurrence and 
                                                             
32 The ZScore is calculated as:  ZScore = 1.2 * (Working capital/ Total assets) + 1.4*(Retained earnings/Total assets) + 
3.3* (Earnings before interest and taxes / Total assets) + 0.6 * (Market value of equity / Total liabilities) + 0.999 * (Net 
sales/ Total assets). The relevant compustat/crsp data is as follows: (ZScore = (1.2 * ((actq - lctq )/atq)) + (1.4 * (req / atq)) 
+ (3.3 * (oiadpy/atq)) + (0.6 * (mkvaltq / ltq)) + (0.999 * (revty / atq)) ) 
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number of Balance Sheet covenants, and have no effect on the occurrence and number of 
Income Statement and Non-financial covenants. (Hypothesis 1a,b,c,d). We further predict a 
reduction in the cost of debt (Hypothesis 2a,b), a reduction in loan contract strictness 
(Hypothesis 3a,b), and an increase in the number of loan amendments (Hypothesis 4a,b). 
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Table VI-8: Univariate Analysis 
 Panel A: Regression 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Group 
Dependent 
Variable 
BS_COV 
IND 
BS_COV 
IND 
BS_COV 
IND 
BS_COV 
IND 
IS_COV 
IND 
IS_COV 
IND 
IS_COV 
IND 
IS_COV 
IND 
NF_COV 
IND 
NF_COV 
IND 
NF_COV 
IND 
NF_COV 
IND  
HCA Mean (1) 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.41 
HCA Observations 3,371 3,360 4,032 4,118 3,371 3,660 4,032 4,118 3,371 3,360 4,032 4,118 
FVA Mean (2) 0.27    0.48    0.37    
FVA Observations 991    991    991    
FVA1 Mean (2)  0.24    0.48    0.36   
FVA1 Observations  702    702    702   
FVA2 Mean (2)   0.24    0.44    0.31 0.37 
FVA2 Observations   330    330    330 244 
FVA3 Mean (2)    0.35    0.44     
FVA3 Observations    244    244     
Difference (1) - (2) 0.03** 0.06*** 0.06** -0.06** 0.03 0.02 0.07** 0.07** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.11*** 0.04 
    (1.81) (3.23) (2.29) (-1.87) (1.47) (1.13) (2.32) (2.10) (3.28) (3.11) (3.78) (1.22) 
  Panel B: Regression 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Group 
Dependent 
Variable 
BS_COV 
number 
BS_COV 
number 
BS_COV 
number 
BS_COV 
number 
IS_COV 
number 
IS_COV 
number 
IS_COV 
number 
IS_COV 
number 
NF_COV 
number 
NF_COV 
number 
NF_COV 
number 
NF_COV 
number 
HCA Mean (1) 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.94 
HCA Observations 3,371 3,360 4,032 4,118 3,371 3,660 4,032 4,118 3,371 3,660 4,032 4,118 
FVA Mean (2) 0.31    0.82    0.77    
FVA Observations 991    991    991    
FVA1 Mean (2)  0.29    0.83    0.76   
FVA1 Observations  702    702    702   
FVA2 Mean (2)   0.27    0.76    0.58  
FVA2 Observations   330    330    330  
FVA3 Mean (2)    0.39    0.71    0.82 
FVA3 Observations    244    244    244 
Difference (1) - (2) 0.04** 0.07*** 0.08** -0.04 0.07** 0.05 0.12** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.38*** 0.13 
    (1.77) (2.75) (2.27) (-1.10) (1.88) (1.24) (2.18) (2.59) (3.95) (3.42) (4.47) (1.28) 
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Table 8: Univariate Analysis (continued) 
 Panel C: Regression 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Group 
Dependent 
Variable 
Yield 
Spread 
Yield 
Spread 
Yield 
Spread 
Yield 
Spread 
Fees Fees Fees Fees 
Covenant 
Intensity 
Index 
Covenant 
Intensity 
Index 
Covenant 
Intensity 
Index 
Covenant 
Intensity 
Index 
HCA Mean (1) 164.39 164.67 152.11 153.25 21.87 22.07 21.31 21.55 1.62 1.60 1.60 1.57 
HCA Observations 3,371 3,660 4,032 4,118 3,371 3,660 4,032 4,118 3,371 3,660 4,032 4,118 
FVA Mean (2) 148.78    19.67    1.37    
FVA Observations 991    991    991    
FVA1 Mean (2)  138.95    17.69    1.35   
FVA1 Observations  702    702    702   
FVA2 Mean (2)   156.48    22.06    1.13  
FVA2 Observations   330    330    330  
FVA3 Mean (2)    138.69    18.23    1.41 
FVA3 Observations    244    244    244 
Difference (1) - (2) 20.61*** 32.60*** -4.38 14.56 2.19 4.38 -0.75 3.32 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.47*** 0.16 
    (2.69) (3.75) (-0.36) (1.05) (0.89) (1.57) (-0.19) (0.75) (3.60) (3.23) (4.39) (1.27) 
  Panel D: Regression 1 2 3 4         
Group 
Dependent 
Variable 
Amendments  Amendments Amendments Amendments  
       
HCA Mean (1) 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.24         
HCA Observations 3,371 3,360 4,032 4,118         
FVA Mean (2) 0.16            
FVA Observations 991            
FVA1 Mean (2)  0.16           
FVA1 Observations  702           
FVA2 Mean (2)   0.10          
FVA2 Observations   330          
FVA3 Mean (2)    0.18         
FVA3 Observations    244         
Difference (1) - (2) 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.15*** 0.06         
    (4.08) (3.22) (3.76) (1.37)         
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Table VI-8 above shows the univariate test conducted on the difference in the means of the sub groups. The FVA group 
relates to those loan observations that have been identified as using FVA. FVA1 relates to those loan observations that have 
been identified as using the Level 1 of FVA. FVA2 relates to those loan observations that have been identified as using the 
Level 2 of the FVA. FVA3 relates to those loan observations that have been identified as using the Level 3 of the FVA. 
The HCA group is equal to 1 when the FVA groups are 0 by design. The dependent variables are those that have already 
been identified previously.  Where *,**,*** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
We begin our univariate analysis by examining Panel A of Table 8 above. Panel A shows 
the results from the tests conducted on the Balance Sheet, Income Statement, and Non-
Financial covenant occurrence. Regression A shows the difference between the mean of 
Balance sheet covenant occurrence between HCA and FVA and is in line with our prediction 
that FVA use should result in a lower occurrence of Balance sheet covenants.  
Regression 1-4 in Panel A show the analysis conducted on the occurrence of Balance Sheet 
covenants. As can be seen from equations 1-4, the analysis shows that the HCA group has a 
higher occurrence of Balance sheet covenants compared to the FVA group as a whole, the 
Level 1 and Level 2 groups, but a lower level of occurrence against the Level 3 group. The 
results for Level 1 and Level 2 are in accordance with our prediction that the use of FVA 
should result in a decrease in the occurrence of Balance Sheet covenants. The Level 3 results 
are also in line with our prediction that level 3 should have an adverse effect on Balance 
sheet occurrence, that is, lead to an increase (H1a,b).  
Regressions 5-8 in Panel A show the analysis conducted on the occurrence of Income 
Statement covenants. The analysis shows that the HCA group has a higher occurrence of 
Income Statement covenants compared to the Level 2 and Level 3 groups but the difference 
is not significant for the FVA group as a whole, and for the Level 1 group. This is in line 
with our expectation that the Level 1 classification should not affect the occurrence of 
Income Statement covenants for the Level 1 classification (H1c). 
Regressions 9-12 in Panel A show the analysis conducted on the occurrence of Non-financial 
covenants. The analysis shows that the HCA group has a higher occurrence of Non-financial 
covenants compared to the FVA group as a whole, the Level 1 and Level 2 groups but the 
difference is not significant for the Level 3 group. This is not in line with our expectation 
that the Level 1 classification should not influence the occurrence of Non-financial 
covenants (H1d). 
Panel B above shows the analysis conducted on the number of covenants included in a loan. 
Regressions 1-4 in Panel B examine the influence of FVA on the number of Balance Sheet 
covenants. The result is in line with our hypothesis that FVA should result in a decrease in 
the number of Balance Sheet covenants, and that the Level 1 classification should be affected 
more than the Level 3 classification (H1a,b). 
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Panel B above shows the analysis conducted on the number of covenants included in a loan. 
Regressions 1-4 in Panel B examine the influence of FVA on the number of Balance Sheet 
covenants. The result is in line with our hypothesis that FVA should result in a decrease in 
the number of Balance Sheet covenants, and that the Level 1 classification should be affected 
more than the Level 3 classification (H1a,b). 
Regressions 5-8 in Panel B examine the influence of FVA on the number of Income 
Statement covenants. The results appear to suggest that compared to the HCA group, loan 
contracts in the FVA group as a whole, the Level 2 and Level 3 classification tend to exhibit 
a lower number of Income Statement covenants. This result is in line with our expectation 
for the Level 1 classification, where we predict that the Level 1 classification should not lead 
to a decrease in the number of Income Statement based loan covenants, while we expect the 
Level 2 and the Level 3 classifications to lead to a decrease in the number of Income 
Statement covenants. 
Regressions 9-12 in Panel B examine the influence of FVA on the number of Non-financial 
covenants. The results suggest that compared to loan contracts in the HCA group, loan 
contracts in the FVA group as a whole, the Level 1 and the Level 2 classification appear to 
result in a lower number of Non-financial covenants. This is not in line with our hypothesis, 
where we predict that the use of FVA should not result in a lower number of Non-financial 
covenants for the Level 1 classification.  
Panel C examines the influence of FVA on the initial Yield Spread on the loan contract, the 
upfront fees on the loan contract, and the level of Covenant Intensity Index. Regressions 1-
4 in Panel C examine the influence of FVA on the initial Yield Spread and the results suggest 
that compared to a loan contract from the HCA group, a loan contract from the Level 1 
classification observes a lower yield spread. The FVA group as a whole was also found to 
exhibit a lower yield spread than the HCA group. However, the Level 2 and the Level 3 
classifications were not found to be significant. The results are in line with our expectation 
that the use of FVA should result in a decrease in the initial yield spread for the FVA group, 
and that the level 1 classification should observe a lower yield spread compared to the Level 
2 and Level 3 classifications. 
Regressions 5-8 in Panel C examines the influence of FVA on the upfront fees charged on 
the loan contract, However, the results suggest that there appears to be no difference between 
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the upfront fees charged to FVA or HCA firms, nor do the results suggest a difference due 
to the FVA level classification. This result is not in line with our expectation that the use of 
FVA should result in a decrease in the upfront loans fees for the FVA group, and that the 
level 1 classification should observe lower fees compared to the Level 2 and Level 3 
classifications. 
Regressions 9-12 in Panel C examine the influence of FVA on the initial Covenant Intensity 
Index as introduced by Bradley and Roberts (2004). The results suggest that compared to a 
loan in the HCA group, loans in the FVA as a group, the Level 1 and the Level 2 
classifications tend to observe a lower Covenant Intensity, which is in line with our 
expectation that the use of FVA should result in a reduction in the Covenant Intensity Index.  
Panel D examines the influence of FVA the number of ex-post loan amendments made to a 
loan contract. The results suggest that HCA firms observe a higher number of loan 
amendments compared to the FVA type, and that the Level 1 and 2 classifications tend to 
observe a lower number of loan amendments compared to HCA firms. This result is not in 
line with our prediction that the use of FVA, especially the use of the Level 1 classification, 
should result in an increase in the number of loan amendments. 
To summarize, the univariate analysis provides strong support to suggest that the use of FVA 
may result in a decrease in the occurrence and number of Balance Sheet covenants for loans 
in the Level 1 classification (H1b), and have no effect on the occurrence and number of 
Income statement based loan covenants for the Level 1 classification (H1c). We also find 
that the Loan covenant Intensity Index is lower for loans that use FVA (H3a, 3b). We also 
find that the use of FVA in general, and the use of the Level 1 classification in particular, 
leads to a reduction in the yield spread (H2a, 2b). However, we do not find any support to 
suggest that the use of FVA results in an increase in the number of loan amendments 
(H4a,4b), nor do we find any support that the use of FVA results in a reduction in loan fees 
(H2a, 2b). We next examine our hypothesis in greater detail in our main results below. 
C. Main Results 
In this section, we make use of empirical models mentioned above in order to determine the 
influence of FVA on the occurrence and number of covenants included in a loan contract 
(hypothesis 1), the cost of debt on the loan (hypothesis 2), the level of the Bradley and 
Roberts (2004) Covenant Intensity Index (hypothesis 3), and the number of loan 
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amendments (hypothesis 4). For all of our main analysis, the dependent variable data is 
obtained from the LPC/Dealscan database. In Table VI-9, the dependent variables are binary 
variables which take the value of 1 if the loan observation has a covenant, or 0 otherwise. 
For Table VI-9, we use a Logit regression, 33 given our dependent is a binary variable. In 
Table VI-10, we examine the number of Balance Sheet, Income Statement, and Non-
financial covenants included in a loan contract. In Table VI-11, we examine the initial yield 
spread offered on the loan contract, the loan fees, the Covenant Intensity Index, and the 
number of ex-post loan amendments.  In line with prior studies (Demerjian 2011, Demerjian 
et al 2014, Ball et al, 2013), we include numerous control variables for both firm and loan 
characteristics. Firm characteristics include leverage (WLEV), size (WSIZE), Rating, Loss, 
Altman’s Z-Score (WZScore), and the firm switching to FVA (Switching). Loan 
characteristics include provisions for security (Secured), Maturity (WMAT), and Amount 
(WAMOUNT). To address cross-sectional and temporal correlation, we cluster by borrower 
and include fixed year (quarter) effects. 
The main variables of interest are those associated with the use of FVA. These include the 
FVA, FVA1, FVA2, and FVA3 variables examined in the tables below. 
  
                                                             
33 We find the results of using the probit version of the regression to be almost identical, as a result, we only 
disclose the results from the logit regressions. 
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Table VI-9: Loan Covenant Occurrence  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES COV_BS_IND COV_BS_IND COV_IS_IND COV_IS_IND COV_NF_IND COV_NF_IND 
       
FVA -0.1165  -0.1170  -0.1756  
 (-1.0691)  (-1.0136)  (-1.4842)  
FVA1  -0.2641**  -0.0397  -0.1433 
  (-2.0423)  (-0.2912)  (-0.9996) 
FVA2  -0.1424  -0.1209  -0.1810 
  (-0.7777)  (-0.6448)  (-0.9444) 
FVA3  0.2019  -0.4853**  -0.3143* 
  (1.0957)  (-2.4351)  (-1.7154) 
WMAT -0.5306*** -0.5246*** 0.7085*** 0.7032*** 0.1953 0.1917 
 (-5.1202) (-5.0821) (5.5255) (5.4667) (1.5375) (1.5147) 
WLEV -0.6072** -0.6115** -0.6999** -0.7216** -0.4505* -0.4721* 
 (-2.5006) (-2.5099) (-2.4095) (-2.4674) (-1.6786) (-1.7585) 
WSIZE 0.0078 0.0127 0.1297*** 0.1349*** -0.0435 -0.0391 
 (0.2284) (0.3715) (3.2952) (3.4050) (-1.2043) (-1.0780) 
WAMOUNT -0.0951** -0.0995*** 0.0345 0.0336 0.0617 0.0607 
 (-2.5367) (-2.6464) (0.9442) (0.9184) (1.5660) (1.5402) 
SECURED 1.4728*** 1.4740*** 3.6907*** 3.7005*** 3.2631*** 3.2676*** 
 (14.5016) (14.5273) (23.6976) (23.6726) (26.5176) (26.5064) 
Switching 0.0722 0.0592 -0.0989 -0.0720 -0.2732 -0.2642 
 (0.3221) (0.2626) (-0.3485) (-0.2522) (-1.0318) (-0.9848) 
WZScore -0.0150 -0.0134 0.0667*** 0.0647*** 0.0183 0.0175 
 (-0.8538) (-0.7543) (2.8528) (2.7485) (0.8742) (0.8322) 
LOSS -0.2965** -0.2947** -0.9374*** -0.9283*** -0.6657*** -0.6621*** 
 (-2.4215) (-2.4011) (-5.2630) (-5.1880) (-4.3640) (-4.3309) 
Rating 0.2828** 0.2771** -0.4625*** -0.4728*** -0.2404* -0.2466* 
 (2.2727) (2.2325) (-3.3339) (-3.4008) (-1.7374) (-1.7816) 
Constant -0.4774 -0.4734 -3.1481*** -3.1523*** -1.8628*** -1.8632*** 
 (-1.4936) (-1.4805) (-8.5851) (-8.5673) (-5.2943) (-5.2795) 
Observations 4,361 4,361 4,361 4,361 4,361 4,361 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm 
Clustering 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COV_BS_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has a Balance sheet covenant. COV_IS_IND is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has an Income statement covenant. COV_NF_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the loan contract has a non-financial covenant. COV_BS is the number of Balance sheet covenants in a loan contract. 
COV_IS is the number of Income statement covenants in a loan contract. COV_NF is the number of non-financial 
covenants in a loan contract. Yield_Spread is the additional yield offered on the loan contract compared to a corresponding 
Treasury security. FEES is the upfront fees charged on originating the loan. Covenant Intensity Index is the benchmark 
created by Bradley and Roberts (2004) and is a variable that takes a value between 0 and 6. Amendments is the number of 
ex-post loan amendments in a loan contract. WMAT is the natural log of maturity at the time of issuance. WLEV is the 
ratio of total long term debt (dlttq) to total assets (atq). Size is the natural log of market value (mkvalq). Amount is the 
natural log of the deal amount. Secured is a binomial variable equal to 1 if the loan quarter states that the loan is secured, 
0 otherwise. Switching is a binomial variable equal to 1 if the firm switched to Fair Value accounting in the prior period, 0 
otherwise. Zscore is the bankruptcy measure constructed using Altman’s (1968) measure. Loss is a binary variable equal 
to 1 if the firm reported negative operating earnings (oiadpy<0), 0 otherwise. Rating is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
firm had a credit rating (obtained from S&P), 0 otherwise. The control variables Maturity, Leverage, Size, Amount, and 
Zscore have been winsorized at the 0.005 level. Robust z-statistics in parentheses:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table VI-9, shows the results from the analysis conducted on the occurrence of Balance 
Sheet, Income Statement and Non-financial loan covenants, where regressions 1 and 2 relate 
to Balance Sheet covenant occurrence, while regressions 3 and 4 relate to Income Statement 
covenant occurrence, and finally, regressions 5 and 6 relate to Non-financial covenant 
occurrence.  
In regression 1 the main variable of interest is FVA which has been previously mentioned in 
section 4 above. The FVA variable was not found to be significant, which is not in line with 
our hypothesis that the use of FVA should lead to a reduction in the occurrence of Balance 
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Sheet covenants. Regression 2 builds on the base line regression and replaces the FVA 
variable with the Level 1 (FVA1), Level 2 (FVA2) and Level 3 (FVA3) variables. Consistent 
with our hypothesis 1b, we find that the Level 1 (FVA1) classification exhibits a negative 
and significant relationship, which suggests that the occurrence of Balance Sheet covenants 
is less likely to occur for the FVA1 classification. The FVA2 and the FVA3 classifications 
are not found to be significant, which is also in line with our expectation that FVA1 should 
have the greater impact on the occurrence of Balance Sheet covenants, followed by the level 
2 and level 3 classifications.  
Regression 3 replaces the dependent variable with the occurrence of Income Statement 
covenants included in the loan contract. Our main variable of interest is the FVA variable, 
which we do not find to be significant. Our results suggests that the occurrence of Income 
Statement covenants is not affected by the use of FVA. This result is in line with our 
hypothesis (1c) concerning the expected influence of FVA on the occurrence of Income 
Statement covenants. Regression 4 replaces the FVA variable with the related variables for 
Level 1, 2 and 3. We do not find FVA1 to be significant and negative, while we find that 
FVA3 is significant and negative, this is in line with our prediction that the level 1 
classification is not expected to influence the occurrence of Income Statement covenants, 
while the level 3 classification should result in a reduction in the occurrence of Income 
Statement covenants (Hypothesis 1c). 
Regressions 5 and 6 examine the influence of FVA on the occurrence of Non-financial 
covenants. In line with our expectations, we do not find FVA to have an influence on the 
occurrence of non-financial covenants, though we do find some evidence that FVA3 causes 
a decrease in the occurrence of non-financial covenants. This result is also in line with our 
hypothesis (H1d) that the use of FVA and FVA1 in particular, should not affect the 
occurrence of Non-financial covenants. 
The control variables behave in a manner consistent with prior studies including Demerjian 
(2011), Christensen and Nikolaev (2012), Nikolaev (2010), and Demerjian et al (2014). We 
find that the Maturity variable is significant and negative for the Balance sheet tests, and 
significant and positive for the Income statement tests, suggesting that longer term loans 
generally tend to see a lower occurrence of BS covenants, but a higher occurrence of IS 
covenants (Nikolaev, 2010, Ball et al, 2013). The Leverage variable is significant and 
negative for all the tests, suggesting that covenant use is lower for firms with a higher ratio 
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of debt to equity (Demerjian, 2011).  The size variable suggests that larger firms are more 
likely to observe IS covenants (Demerjian et al, 2014; Christensen and Nikolaev, 2012). The 
Deal amount variable suggests that larger loans are less likely to observe BS covenants 
(Demerjian et al, 2014). The secured variable suggests that all three types of covennats are 
more likely to occur, if the loan is secured (Christensen and Nikolaev, 2012). The switching 
variable was not found to be significant. The Z-score variable suggests that a higher Z-Score 
suggests a higher occurrence of IS covenants (Christensen and Nikolaev, 2012). The LOSS 
variable suggests a lower number of all three types of covenants occurring ( ). The ratings 
variable suggests that an existing rating from a credit agency is expected to reduce the 
occurrence of IS and NF covenants, but increase the occurrence of BS covenants (Ball et al, 
2013). 
Table VI-10: Loan covenant number 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES COV_BS COV_BS COV_IS COV_IS COV_NF COV_NF 
       
FVA -0.0262  -0.0389  -0.0619  
 (-1.0979)  (-1.1132)  (-1.3202)  
FVA1  -0.0465*  -0.0145  -0.0301 
  (-1.6827)  (-0.3648)  (-0.5530) 
FVA2  -0.0281  -0.0097  -0.0891 
  (-0.7509)  (-0.1725)  (-1.2991) 
FVA3  0.0136  -0.1582***  -0.0756 
  (0.3176)  (-2.6102)  (-0.9361) 
WMAT -0.1049*** -0.1042*** 0.2514*** 0.2496*** 0.0598 0.0577 
 (-4.0005) (-3.9537) (7.3659) (7.3409) (1.1383) (1.0986) 
WLEV -0.1327** -0.1352*** -0.0843 -0.0915 0.1742 0.1687 
 (-2.5576) (-2.5980) (-0.8936) (-0.9637) (1.3904) (1.3473) 
WSIZE -0.0014 -0.0004 0.0220* 0.0229* -0.0925*** -0.0912*** 
 (-0.1867) (-0.0505) (1.8151) (1.8789) (-5.7905) (-5.6752) 
WAMOUNT -0.0311*** -0.0318*** 0.0190* 0.0189* 0.1030*** 0.1030*** 
 (-3.8046) (-3.8868) (1.7062) (1.7032) (5.9420) (5.9376) 
SECURED 0.3656*** 0.3655*** 1.1186*** 1.1191*** 1.8262*** 1.8261*** 
 (14.3866) (14.3905) (33.2791) (33.3404) (29.5848) (29.5686) 
Switching 0.0112 0.0104 -0.0407 -0.0341 -0.0166 -0.0191 
 (0.2418) (0.2250) (-0.4824) (-0.4022) (-0.1500) (-0.1706) 
WZScore 0.0048 0.0050 0.0210*** 0.0202*** -0.0005 -0.0007 
 (0.9571) (1.0037) (3.3398) (3.2091) (-0.0568) (-0.0699) 
LOSS -0.0313 -0.0304 -0.2989*** -0.2988*** -0.3284*** -0.3270*** 
 (-0.9457) (-0.9206) (-6.5951) (-6.6119) (-4.7157) (-4.7010) 
Rating 0.0194 0.0186 -0.2029*** -0.2045*** 0.0370 0.0356 
 (0.7369) (0.7089) (-4.4925) (-4.5061) (0.5855) (0.5627) 
Constant 0.6911*** 0.6898*** 0.0248 0.0367 0.2911** 0.2920** 
 (9.5347) (9.5047) (0.2617) (0.3862) (2.0340) (2.0386) 
Observations 4,361 4,361 4,361 4,361 4,361 4,361 
R-squared 0.1522 0.1529 0.3463 0.3476 0.3863 0.3866 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COV_BS_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has a Balance sheet covenant. COV_IS_IND is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has an Income statement covenant. COV_NF_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the loan contract has a non-financial covenant. COV_BS is the number of Balance sheet covenants in a loan contract. 
COV_IS is the number of Income statement covenants in a loan contract. COV_NF is the number of non-financial 
covenants in a loan contract. Yield_Spread is the additional yield offered on the loan contract compared to a corresponding 
Treasury security. FEES is the upfront fees charged on originating the loan. Covenant Intensity Index is the benchmark 
created by Bradley and Roberts (2004) and is a variable that takes a value between 0 and 6. Amendments is the number of 
ex-post loan amendments in a loan contract. WMAT is the natural log of maturity at the time of issuance. WLEV is the 
ratio of total long term debt (dlttq) to total assets (atq). Size is the natural log of market value (mkvalq). Amount is the 
natural log of the deal amount. Secured is a binomial variable equal to 1 if the loan quarter states that the loan is secured, 
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0 otherwise. Switching is a binomial variable equal to 1 if the firm switched to Fair Value accounting in the prior period, 0 
otherwise. Zscore is the bankruptcy measure constructed using Altman’s (1968) measure. Loss is a binary variable equal 
to 1 if the firm reported negative operating earnings (oiadpy<0), 0 otherwise. Rating is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
firm had a credit rating (obtained from S&P), 0 otherwise. The control variables Maturity, Leverage, Size, Amount, and 
Zscore have been winsorized at the 0.005 level. Robust z-statistics in parentheses:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table VI-10, shows the results from the analysis conducted on the number of Balance Sheet, 
Income Statement and Non-financial loan covenants, where regressions 1 and 2 relate to the 
number of Balance Sheet covenants, while regressions 3 and 4 relate to the number of 
Income Statement covenants, and finally, regressions 5 and 6 relate to the number of Non-
financial covenants.  
In regression 1 the main variable of interest is FVA which has been previously mentioned in 
section 4 above. The FVA variable was not found to be significant, which is not in line with 
our hypothesis that the use of FVA should lead to a reduction in the number of Balance Sheet 
covenants. Regression 2 builds on the base line regression and replaces the FVA variable 
with the Level 1 (FVA1), Level 2 (FVA2) and Level 3 (FVA3) variables. Consistent with 
our hypothesis 1b, we find that the Level 1 (FVA1) classification exhibits a negative and 
significant relationship, which suggests the FVA1 classification is more likely to observe a 
lower number of Balance Sheet covenants. The FVA2 and the FVA3 classifications are not 
found to be significant, which is also in line with our expectation that FVA1 should have the 
greater impact on the number of Balance Sheet covenants, followed by the level 2 and level 
3 classifications.  
Regression 3 replaces the dependent variable with the number of Income Statement 
covenants included in the loan contract. Our main variable of interest is the FVA variable, 
which we do not find to be significant. Our results suggests that the number of Income 
Statement covenants is not affected by the use of FVA. This result is in line with our 
hypothesis (1c) concerning the expected influence of FVA on the number of Income 
Statement covenants. Regression 4 replaces the FV variable with the related variables for 
Level 1, 2 and 3. We find that FVA1 is not significant while FVA3 is significant and 
negative, this is in line with our prediction that the level 3 classification should result in a 
reduction in the number of Income Statement covenants while the level 1 classification 
should have no effect (Hypothesis 1c). 
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Regressions 5 and 6 examine the influence of FVA on the occurrence of Non-financial 
covenants. In line with our expectations, we do not find FVA, nor any of the level 1, 2 or 3 
classifications to have an influence on the number of non-financial covenants (H1d).  
The control variables generally behave in a similar manner to that observed in the occurrence 
regressions. 
Table VI-11: Yield spread, Loan fees, Covenant Intensity, and Number of loan amendments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Yield_Spread Yield_Spread FEES FEES Covenant 
Intensity 
Covenant 
Intensity 
Amendments Amendments 
         
FVA -4.5196  -1.4178  -0.0769*  -0.0361*  
 (-0.6419)  (-0.6700)  (-1.6681)  (-1.6787)  
FVA1  -18.0762**  -3.9760*  -0.0526  0.0032 
  (-2.2881)  (-1.7290)  (-1.0044)  (0.1322) 
FVA2  24.8546**  2.9633  -0.0817  -0.0665** 
  (2.1002)  (0.8588)  (-1.2584)  (-2.2456) 
FVA3  -10.9241  -1.9340  -0.1290*  -0.0453 
  (-0.7927)  (-0.6094)  (-1.7067)  (-1.1956) 
WMAT 11.6703 12.5892 -3.4727 -3.3240 0.1323*** 0.1302** 0.0515 0.0493 
 (1.3059) (1.4073) (-1.0874) (-1.0420) (2.5852) (2.5512) (1.6026) (1.5366) 
WLEV 7.4306 6.7385 -1.0800 -1.2933 0.0361 0.0271 0.3123*** 0.3104*** 
 (0.4179) (0.3808) (-0.2629) (-0.3136) (0.3096) (0.2324) (4.0760) (4.0371) 
WSIZE 1.6115 1.5532 -1.7710 -1.7458 -0.0631*** -0.0611*** -0.0259*** -0.0255*** 
 (0.6507) (0.6273) (-1.5963) (-1.5761) (-3.9291) (-3.7818) (-2.9309) (-2.8739) 
WAMOUNT -0.4204 -0.7166 0.8442 0.7790 0.0835*** 0.0831*** 0.0497*** 0.0502*** 
 (-0.1511) (-0.2569) (0.9104) (0.8403) (4.9924) (4.9674) (4.8898) (4.9123) 
SECURED 2.1599 2.3549 1.3146 1.3701 3.0009*** 3.0011*** 0.1719*** 0.1717*** 
 (0.2270) (0.2481) (0.3528) (0.3683) (53.9137) (53.8701) (6.7243) (6.7110) 
Switching -0.4217 1.3959 -1.2399 -0.9391 -0.0242 -0.0227 -0.0162 -0.0199 
 (-0.0212) (0.0705) (-0.2385) (-0.1813) (-0.2204) (-0.2072) (-0.3180) (-0.3921) 
WZScore 0.3025 0.1894 1.0190 1.0058 0.0128 0.0124 0.0013 0.0013 
 (0.2052) (0.1300) (1.0512) (1.0317) (1.4690) (1.4222) (0.3174) (0.2970) 
LOSS -3.8527 -4.6874 -0.6964 -0.7935 -0.3991*** -0.3976*** 0.0941** 0.0948** 
 (-0.3612) (-0.4407) (-0.2438) (-0.2772) (-6.4143) (-6.3848) (2.2115) (2.2327) 
Rating -0.3813 -0.4830 1.8793 1.8329 -0.1104* -0.1126* -0.0119 -0.0123 
 (-0.0443) (-0.0563) (0.8101) (0.7899) (-1.7628) (-1.7967) (-0.3781) (-0.3938) 
COV_BS 0.8294 0.7056 -1.6447 -1.6862     
 (0.1459) (0.1242) (-0.8632) (-0.8810)     
COV_IS -6.4512* -6.6229* 1.0937 1.0608     
 (-1.6508) (-1.7008) (1.0025) (0.9693)     
COV_RES 1.9131 1.9892 -0.5842 -0.5763     
 (0.6589) (0.6840) (-0.5989) (-0.5904)     
Constant 66.8356*** 69.4409*** 28.3957*** 28.8288*** 0.4503*** 0.4566*** -0.0957 -0.0969 
 (3.1491) (3.2788) (4.0256) (4.1145) (3.3021) (3.3464) (-1.0633) (-1.0762) 
Observations 4,361 4,361 4,361 4,361 4,361 4,361 4,361 4,361 
R-squared 0.1006 0.1021 0.0052 0.0056 0.6376 0.6379 0.0879 0.0883 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm 
Clustering 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COV_BS_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has a Balance sheet covenant. COV_IS_IND is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has an Income statement covenant. COV_NF_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the loan contract has a non-financial covenant. COV_BS is the number of Balance sheet covenants in a loan contract. 
COV_IS is the number of Income statement covenants in a loan contract. COV_NF is the number of non-financial 
covenants in a loan contract. Yield_Spread is the additional yield offered on the loan contract compared to a corresponding 
Treasury security. FEES is the upfront fees charged on originating the loan. Covenant Intensity Index is the benchmark 
created by Bradley and Roberts (2004) and is a variable that takes a value between 0 and 6. Amendments is the number of 
ex-post loan amendments in a loan contract. WMAT is the natural log of maturity at the time of issuance. WLEV is the 
ratio of total long term debt (dlttq) to total assets (atq). Size is the natural log of market value (mkvalq). Amount is the 
natural log of the deal amount. Secured is a binomial variable equal to 1 if the loan quarter states that the loan is secured, 
0 otherwise. Switching is a binomial variable equal to 1 if the firm switched to Fair Value accounting in the prior period, 0 
otherwise. Zscore is the bankruptcy measure constructed using Altman’s (1968) measure. Loss is a binary variable equal 
to 1 if the firm reported negative operating earnings (oiadpy<0), 0 otherwise. Rating is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
firm had a credit rating (obtained from S&P), 0 otherwise. The control variables Maturity, Leverage, Size, Amount, and 
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Zscore have been winsorized at the 0.005 level. Robust z-statistics in parentheses:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table VI-11, shows the results from the analysis conducted on initial Yield Spread, the loan 
fees, the Covenant Intensity Index, and the number of loan amendments. Where regressions 
1 and 2 relate to the initial yield spread, regressions 3 and 4 relate to loan fees, regressions 
5 and 6 relate to the Covenant Intensity Index, and finally, regressions 7 and 8 relate to the 
number of loan amendments.  
In regression 1 the main variable of interest is FVA which has been previously mentioned in 
section 4 above. The FVA variable was not found to be significant, which is not in line with 
our hypothesis (2a) that the use of FVA should lead to a reduction in the initial yield spread 
offered on the loan. Regression 2 builds on the base line regression and replaces the FVA 
variable with the Level 1 (FVA1), Level 2 (FVA2) and Level 3 (FVA3) variables. Consistent 
with our hypothesis 2b, we find that the Level 1 (FVA1) classification exhibits a negative 
and significant relationship, which suggests the FVA1 classification is more likely to observe 
a lower initial yield spread. The FVA2 classification was found to exhibit a significant and 
positive relationship, suggesting that the FVA2 classification leads to an increase in the yield 
spread, while the FVA3 classification was not found to be significant. The results are in line 
with our expectation that FVA1 should have the greater impact on the initial yield spread, 
followed by the level 2 and level 3 classifications.  
In regression 3 the main variable of interest is FVA which has been previously mentioned in 
section 4 above. The FVA variable was not found to be significant, which is not in line with 
our hypothesis (2a) that the use of FVA should lead to a reduction in the loan fees offered 
on the loan. Regression 4 builds on the base line regression and replaces the FVA variable 
with the Level 1 (FVA1), Level 2 (FVA2) and Level 3 (FVA3) variables. Consistent with 
our hypothesis 2b, we find that the Level 1 (FVA1) classification exhibits a negative and 
significant relationship, which suggests the FVA1 classification is more likely to observe a 
lower loan fee. The FVA2 and the FVA3 classifications were not found to be significant. 
The results are in line with our expectation that FVA1 should have the greater impact on the 
loan fees, followed by the level 2 and level 3 classifications.  
Regression 5 replaces the dependent variable with the Bradley and Roberts (2004) Covenant 
Intensity Index implied by the loan contract. Our main variable of interest is the FVA 
variable, which we find to be significant and negative, which suggests that the use of FVA 
results in a decrease in the Covenant Intensity Index. This result is in line with our hypothesis 
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(3a) concerning the expected influence of FVA on the expected Covenant Intensity Index. 
Regression 6 replaces the FV variable with the related variables for Level 1, 2 and 3. We 
find that FVA3 is significant and negative, this is not in line with our prediction that the level 
1 classification (FVA1) should observe a greater reduction in the Covenant Intensity Index 
(3b). The result for the Covenant Intensity Index could be being caused due to the higher 
proportion of Income statement to Balance sheet covenants in the sample, and the negative 
relationship between FVA3 and the number of Income Statement covenants. 
Regressions 7 and 8 examine the influence of FVA on the number of ex-post loan 
amendments. We find the FVA variable to be significant and negative, which suggests that 
the use of FVA leads to a reduction in the number of ex-post loan renegotiations. This result 
is not in line with our prediction that the use of FVA should increase the number of loan 
amendments. In regression 8, we replace the FVA variable with the three FVA level 
classifications, and we find that the level 2 classification (FVA2) is significant and negative, 
while the other two classifications are not significant. This result supports our expectation 
that the level 2 classification is expected to result in a reduction in the number of loan 
amendments compared to the Level 1 classification.  
The control variables behave in a manner consistent with prior studies including Demerjian 
(2011), Christensen and Nikolaev (2012), Nikolaev (2010), and Demerjian et al (2014). We 
find the Maturity variable suggests that loans with longer maturities should have a higher 
covenant intensity index. We find that the number of loan amendments is higher if the firm 
has a higher leverage ratio. The size variable suggests that covenant intensity and the number 
of amendments is lower for larger firms. The amount variable suggests that the covenant 
intensity and the number of amendments is higher for larger loan issues. The secured 
variables suggests that secured debt is more likely to lead to a higher covenant intensity and 
a higher number of loan amendments. The Loss variable suggests a lower covenant intensity, 
but a higher number of loan amendments. Ratings suggest a higher covenant index. 
Financially, COV_IS suggests a lower yield spread if the loan includes these covenants. 
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Table VI-12: Determinants of the Covenant Intensity Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Two FS Covenants SECURED Dividend Sweep Equity Sweep Debt Sweep Asset Sweep 
       
FV1 -0.1317 0.1029 -0.1443 0.0819 -0.1094 -0.0995 
 (-1.0063) (0.8880) (-1.0575) (0.4335) (-0.6695) (-0.6511) 
FV2 -0.0020 -0.0291 -0.0559 -0.9361** -0.2359 -0.5411** 
 (-0.0111) (-0.1629) (-0.2973) (-2.2860) (-0.8734) (-2.1573) 
FV3 -0.3183* 0.1540 -0.3147* -0.3594 -0.2736 0.0339 
 (-1.6736) (0.9776) (-1.7581) (-1.1288) (-1.0062) (0.1472) 
WMAT 0.5549*** 0.8514*** 0.5906*** -0.5982*** -0.0826 0.0123 
 (4.6826) (7.1711) (4.5396) (-2.9995) (-0.4411) (0.0709) 
WLEV -0.4965* -0.4705* -0.4400* -0.0921 0.6933** 0.7072** 
 (-1.7601) (-1.7937) (-1.7640) (-0.2562) (2.3595) (2.5334) 
WSIZE 0.0387 -0.5282*** -0.0065 -0.1875*** -0.1928*** -0.2811*** 
 (1.0705) (-13.6571) (-0.1784) (-3.6381) (-4.3225) (-6.7505) 
WAMOUNT 0.0123 0.0083 -0.0008 0.2203*** 0.2912*** 0.3148*** 
 (0.3362) (0.2360) (-0.0201) (3.8282) (5.8915) (6.7849) 
SECURED 2.4571***  2.8779*** 2.3998*** 2.7863*** 2.9717*** 
 (22.4415)  (26.3436) (15.6440) (20.1685) (21.4074) 
Switching 0.0138 0.0255 -0.1490 0.1154 -0.1216 0.1535 
 (0.0543) (0.1028) (-0.5828) (0.2462) (-0.3132) (0.4606) 
WZScore 0.0672*** 0.0323* 0.0056 -0.0079 -0.0158 0.0138 
 (3.5319) (1.7377) (0.2689) (-0.2628) (-0.5974) (0.6213) 
LOSS -0.8053*** -0.1306 -0.4891*** -0.6331*** -0.4905*** -0.6073*** 
 (-5.3430) (-0.9384) (-3.2967) (-3.0128) (-2.7413) (-3.7226) 
Rating -0.6517*** 0.2536** -0.2099 -0.0992 0.1342 0.1347 
 (-4.8668) (2.1625) (-1.5465) (-0.5141) (0.8183) (0.8738) 
Constant -2.2269*** 1.3949*** -2.6111*** -3.1818*** -3.8480*** -3.3399*** 
 (-6.6166) (4.2451) (-7.2283) (-6.5501) (-8.5841) (-7.9412) 
Observations 4,361 4,361 4,361 4,361 4,361 4,361 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COV_BS_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has a Balance sheet covenant. COV_IS_IND is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has an Income statement covenant. COV_NF_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the loan contract has a non-financial covenant. COV_BS is the number of Balance sheet covenants in a loan contract. 
COV_IS is the number of Income statement covenants in a loan contract. COV_NF is the number of non-financial 
covenants in a loan contract. Yield_Spread is the additional yield offered on the loan contract compared to a corresponding 
Treasury security. FEES is the upfront fees charged on originating the loan. Covenant Intensity Index is the benchmark 
created by Bradley and Roberts (2004) and is a variable that takes a value between 0 and 6. Amendments is the number of 
ex-post loan amendments in a loan contract. WMAT is the natural log of maturity at the time of issuance. WLEV is the 
ratio of total long term debt (dlttq) to total assets (atq). Size is the natural log of market value (mkvalq). Amount is the 
natural log of the deal amount. Secured is a binomial variable equal to 1 if the loan quarter states that the loan is secured, 
0 otherwise. Switching is a binomial variable equal to 1 if the firm switched to Fair Value accounting in the prior period, 0 
otherwise. Zscore is the bankruptcy measure constructed using Altman’s (1968) measure. Loss is a binary variable equal 
to 1 if the firm reported negative operating earnings (oiadpy<0), 0 otherwise. Rating is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
firm had a credit rating (obtained from S&P), 0 otherwise. The control variables Maturity, Leverage, Size, Amount, and 
Zscore have been winsorized at the 0.005 level. Robust z-statistics in parentheses:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table VI-12 above uses a logit regression to decompose the components of the Covenant 
Intensity Index to examine the reason for the observed results being different from our 
observations. Each column relates to each of the six components used in constructing the 
index. As can be observed from the table above, the FVA3 variable exhibits a significant 
and negative relationship for both the Two FS covenants, and the Dividend Sweep elements, 
whereas the FVA1 element does not exhibit any significant relationship with any of the six 
components. The lack of significance for the FVA1 variable for the SECURED, Dividend, 
Equity, Debt, and Asset sweeps is as expected, given our earlier prediction that FVA1 should 
not result in any change in the occurrence or number of Non-Financial covenants. The Two 
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FS covenants insignificance for the FVA1 variable is probably due to the lower degree of 
Balance sheet covenants to total covenants observed in Table VI-4, and the observation that 
FVA1 unlike FVA3, has no effect on the number of Income Statement covenants. 
Overall, our results for the main analysis provides overall support for our hypothesis. We 
find strong support to suggest that the use of Level 1 FVA (FVA1) leads to a reduction in 
the occurrence of Balance Sheet covenants (1b), that the Level 3 FVA classification leads to 
a reduction in the number of Income Statement covenants (1c). That the use of FVA has no 
effect on the number of Non-financial covenants (1d). Further, we find strong support that 
the use of the level 1 FVA classification leads to a reduction in the initial yield spread of the 
loan and the loan fees (2b), which supports the prediction that the Level 1 classification is 
seen as improving contracting ability by improving the information set available to the 
lender. We however, do not find any direct evidence to support our prediction concerning 
the number of loan amendments (3a,b), but do find that the Level 2 classification results in 
a decrease in the number of loan amendments. We do not find any evidence for the influence 
of FVA1 on the Covenant Intensity Index (4b), though we do find some support for FVA 
use resulting in a decrease in the level of the Covenant Intensity Index (4a).  
D. Loan contract maturity 
In this section, we examine whether the influence of Fair Value accounting on loan contracts 
varies according to the maturity of the loan. Plantin et al (2008) suggest that the damage 
done by marking-to-market (Fair Value accounting) is greatest when the claims are (1) long 
lived, (2) illiquid, and (3) senior.  
When we regress the use of FVA on firm and loan characteristics in  
Table VI-3, we do not find loan maturity (WMAT) to be a significant variable. Therefore, in 
this section, we attempt to determine whether FVA does influence loan contracts differently 
depending on the initial maturity of the contract.  
While we do not explicitly model the difference in maturities in our theoretical model, our 
model assumes that FVA is seen as being informative to the degree that it reduces the 
information asymmetry being faced by the lender. In such a setting, we would expect the 
effect of FVA to be stronger in the longer term maturity spectrum, that is, we would expect 
that our predictions for the influence of FVA hold for the longer term maturities compared 
to the shorter term maturities, where information asymmetry issues may be of a lower 
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concern to the lender. Bharath et al (2008) examine the relationship between accounting 
quality and the maturity of private and public debt contracts and find that in private debt 
contracts, firms with higher quality accounting are able to negotiate a longer maturity.  
We bifurcate our sample into two and created a ‘long maturity’ subsample as that which 
contains initial loan maturities of greater than 60 months,34  and the ‘short maturity’ 
subsample as that which contains initial loan maturities of less than 60 months.  
Table VI-13: Long Loan Maturity and the effect of Fair Value (control variables not shown) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES COV_BS_IN
D 
COV_IS_IND COV_NF_IN
D 
COV_BS COV_IS COV_NF Yield_Spread FEES Covenant 
Intensity 
Amendments 
           
FVA1 -0.285 -0.225 -0.218 -0.057* -0.110** -0.131* -12.323 -1.240 -0.162** -0.015 
 (-1.515) (-1.310) (-1.138) (-1.817) (-2.254) (-1.863) (-1.164) (-0.415) (-2.416) (-0.506) 
FVA2 -0.303 -0.042 -0.490 -0.018 0.053 0.006 24.816 6.122 0.002 -0.070* 
 (-0.960) (-0.153) (-1.467) (-0.361) (0.606) (0.064) (1.484) (1.107) (0.025) (-1.868) 
FVA3 0.019 -0.719** -0.381 0.019 -0.190** 0.012 -18.667 -4.760 -0.090 -0.101** 
 (0.065) (-2.085) (-1.375) (0.293) (-2.021) (0.101) (-0.772) (-1.129) (-0.802) (-2.510) 
Constant 2.968** 4.531*** 4.923*** 0.565 1.706*** 0.426 307.684*** 20.027 1.364** -1.848*** 
 (2.001) (2.847) (3.066) (1.513) (4.365) (0.624) (3.807) (0.848) (2.108) (-4.054) 
Observations 2,233 2,233 2,233 2,233 2,233 2,233 2,233 2,233 2,233 2,233 
R-squared 0.075 0.355 0.393 0.077 0.357 0.465 0.100 0.008 0.671 0.115 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm 
Clustering 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COV_BS_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has a Balance sheet covenant. COV_IS_IND is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has an Income statement covenant. COV_NF_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the loan contract has a non-financial covenant. COV_BS is the number of Balance sheet covenants in a loan contract. 
COV_IS is the number of Income statement covenants in a loan contract. COV_NF is the number of non-financial 
covenants in a loan contract. Yield_Spread is the additional yield offered on the loan contract compared to a corresponding 
Treasury security. FEES is the upfront fees charged on originating the loan. Covenant Intensity Index is the benchmark 
created by Bradley and Roberts (2004) and is a variable that takes a value between 0 and 6. Amendments is the number of 
ex-post loan amendments in a loan contract.Control variables have been previously identified in section 5. Robust z-
statistics in parentheses:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table VI-14: Short Loan Maturity and the effect of Fair Value (control variables not shown) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES COV_BS_IN
D 
COV_IS_IND COV_NF_IN
D 
COV_BS COV_IS COV_NF Yield_Spread FEES Covenant 
Intensity 
Amendments 
           
FVA1 -0.196 0.189 -0.014 -0.023 0.100* 0.073 -22.732* -7.928** 0.073 0.014 
 (-1.168) (0.985) (-0.072) (-0.546) (1.738) (0.913) (-1.852) (-2.380) (0.965) (0.363) 
FVA2 -0.117 -0.188 0.066 -0.063 -0.056 -0.143 29.048* 0.424 -0.136 -0.072 
 (-0.507) (-0.864) (0.278) (-1.177) (-0.872) (-1.509) (1.705) (0.095) (-1.569) (-1.573) 
FVA3 0.233 -0.350 -0.277 -0.011 -0.137** -0.123 -4.332 0.890 -0.151 -0.021 
 (1.016) (-1.405) (-1.156) (-0.197) (-2.036) (-1.122) (-0.254) (0.211) (-1.499) (-0.370) 
Constant -0.927** -3.592*** -2.705*** 0.443*** -0.080 0.233 86.138*** 23.853*** 0.242 -0.010 
 (-2.320) (-7.621) (-6.109) (4.743) (-0.669) (1.247) (2.742) (2.658) (1.389) (-0.084) 
Observations 2,128 2,128 2,128 2,128 2,128 2,128 2,128 2,128 2,128 2,128 
R-squared 0.152 0.340 0.335 0.203 0.354 0.317 0.116 0.013 0.608 0.087 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm 
Clustering 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COV_BS_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has a Balance sheet covenant. COV_IS_IND is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has an Income statement covenant. COV_NF_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the loan contract has a non-financial covenant. COV_BS is the number of Balance sheet covenants in a loan contract. 
COV_IS is the number of Income statement covenants in a loan contract. COV_NF is the number of non-financial 
covenants in a loan contract. Yield_Spread is the additional yield offered on the loan contract compared to a corresponding 
Treasury security. FEES is the upfront fees charged on originating the loan. Covenant Intensity Index is the benchmark 
                                                             
34 Our long maturity sample is based on loan observations above the median of 60 months, while the short 
maturity comprises of observations below the median. 
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created by Bradley and Roberts (2004) and is a variable that takes a value between 0 and 6. Amendments is the number of 
ex-post loan amendments in a loan contract.Control variables have been previously identified in section 5. Robust z-
statistics in parentheses:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
For ease of accessibility, we only show the main variables of interest in Table VI-13 and 
Table VI-14 above. Table VI-13 relates to the analysis conducted on longer term maturity 
loan observations, while Table VI-14 relates to analysis conducted on shorter term maturity 
loan observations.  For brevity, we will only discuss the main results from the analysis. From 
Table VI-13, we can see that the Level 1 (FVA1) variable observes a significant and negative 
relationship for the COV_BS, COV_IS, and COV_NF variable. This result is in line with 
our expectation that the Level 1 classification (FVA1) should result in a decrease in the 
number of Balance Sheet covenants (COV_BS), however, the results are not consistent with 
our hypothesis for the Income Statement (COV_IS) or the Non-financial covenants 
(COV_NF). We also find that the Level 1 classification observes a significant and negative 
relationship in the Covenant Intensity Index analysis, which is in line with our expectation 
that the Level 1 classification should result in a reduction in the Covenant Intensity Index. 
We do not find any evidence to support our expectation concerning the relationship between 
Level 1 and the number of ex-post loan amendments, however, we do find a significant and 
negative relationship between the Levels 2 and 3 classifications and the number of 
Amendments, which gives support to our prediction that the Levels 2and 3 classifications 
should have a negative impact on the number of loan contract amendments (4b). We do not 
find any evidence to support our prediction concerning the effect of FVA on the cost of debt 
(2a,b). The results can be viewed as giving some evidence that the Level 1 classification is 
seem as being beneficial, given that there is a general decrease in all three types of covenants 
and yet the Yield spread and fees, though not significant are negative, therefore suggesting 
that for a given level of debt cost, lenders are issuing a lower number of covenants. This 
explanation would be in line with the CCH. Another argument for the beneficial impact is 
that the level 2 and 3 variables exhibit negative and significant results for the amendments 
test, suggesting that these two levels might be seen as less informative by lenders.  
In Terms of the Shorter-term maturity loans, we find mixed results. We find that the Level 
3 classification results in a reduction in the number of Income Statement covenants and an 
increase in the number of Income Statement covenants for the Level 1 classification, and 
that the Level 1 classification leads to a reduction in the Yield Spread and loan fees (2a,b), 
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while the Level 2 classification leads to an increase in the Yield Spread. We do not find any 
other significant relationships in our analysis on the shorter maturity sample.  
Overall, the analysis shows some support that FVA is seen to be beneficial for longer-term 
debt, the Level 1 FVA classification appears to exhibit a lower number of Balance Sheet, 
Income Statement and Non-financial covenants, and a lower level of loan contract strictness, 
as measured by the Covenant Intensity Index. We also find that the Levels 2 and 3 
classifications result in a decrease in the number of loan amendments. The analysis on the 
shorter spectrum of the loan contract maturity is more mixed, with some evidence that the 
Level 3 classification leads to the reduction in the number of Income Statement covenants, 
and evidence in support of a decreased level loan costs for the Level 1 classification (H2b). 
5. Robustness tests 
Our theoretical paper assumes that under the FVA regime, the lender obtains the true 
realisation of the transfer (that is, faces lower information asymmetry). In essence, our 
theoretical paper assumes that the use of FVA improves transparency and reduces the 
information asymmetry being faced by the lender. However, it may be possible that the 
relationships that we have observed between FVA use and contract design may be influenced 
by an external (omitted) variable that actually captures any change in financial reporting 
transparency. If this is indeed the case, then we are incorrectly assigning significant 
relationships to FVA, which may be driven by another omitted variable. 
In order to control for this potential issue, we run a number of distinct robustness tests, 
wherein we include two recently used variables that have been introduced to account for 
financial statement transparency and/or the relationship between contract design and 
accounting information, we first rerun our analysis using these two measures as the 
explanatory variables, and then we include these variables as additional explanatory 
variables alongside the FVA classifications.  
Some caution should be used when comparing the results from our main analysis with the 
results from the robustness tests given that we are not able to fully replicate our sample for 
the two additional explanatory variables. 
A. Daske et al (2013) 
The first measure (s) we use is that introduced by Daske et al (2013). Daske et al (2013) 
examine the liquidity and cost of capital effects around voluntary and mandatory IFRS 
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adoption and introduce a classification of “Serious” and “Label” adopters using firm level 
changes in reporting incentives, actual reporting behaviour, and the external reporting 
environment. Daske et al (2013) refer to “serious” adopters as those firms that are “serious” 
about the changes in their reporting strategy.  
They use three proxies to partition the firms into serious and label adopters. The idea is to 
attempt to identify firms that experience substantial increases in their reporting incentives. 
These firms are deemed more likely to make major improvements to their reporting strategy. 
Two of the proxies focus on the determinants of firm’s incentives, while the remainder relies 
on the firm’s actual reporting behaviour.  
The Reporting Incentives (“serious 1”) is calculated as the first and primary factor (out of 
the two that are retained) when applying factor analysis to the following four firm attributes: 
firm size (natural log of the US$ market value), financial leverage (total liabilities to total 
assets), profitability (return on assets), and growth opportunities (book to market ratio). The 
factor increases in size, leverage, profitability and growth, similar to Daske et al (2013). 
The second proxy relies on the accrual based characteristics of financial reporting. The 
Reporting Behaviour (“serious 2”) variable is constructed as the ratio of the absolute value 
of accruals to the absolute value of cash flows (multiplied by -1, so that higher amounts 
signify more transparent reporting) The variable is then scaled by operating cash flows in 
order to serve as a performance adjustment. Accruals are calculated as the difference 
between net income before extraordinary items and the cash flow from operations.  
The third proxy relies on the ability to capture external changes affecting a firm’s reporting 
incentives. In line with Daske et al (2013), we compute the Reporting Environment (“serious 
3”) variable as the natural log of the number of analysts following the firm (plus one). For 
firms without any analyst coverage in I/B/E/S, we set the analyst following to zero.  
In order to reduce measurement errors and to allow for the incentives to change over time, 
we calculate 3 year rolling averages relative to the observed quarter for each reporting proxy. 
We then use the distribution of changes to classify firms with above median changes 
compared to their industry peers.35 Firms with rolling averages above the median industry 
moving averages are coded as “serious” adopters (coded as 1), and with below median 
                                                             
35 We use the entire COMPUSTAT/CRSP dataset for US firms in constructing the SERIOUS variables. 
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changes as label adopters (coded as 0). This classification methodology is slightly different 
compared to that used in Daske et al(2013) in order for us to allow firms to be classified as 
more or less transparent compared to their peers and to allow firms to move between being 
more or less transparent over the time period under question. 36 
Table VI-15: SERIOUS1 as an explanatory variable (control variables not shown) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES COV_BS_IND COV_IS_IND COV_NF_IND COV_BS COV_IS COV_NF Yield_Spread FEES Covenant 
Intensity 
Amendments 
           
SERIOUS1 0.105 0.013 0.025 0.024 0.033 -0.011 11.252 -0.871 0.004 0.027 
 (0.894) (0.106) (0.205) (0.899) (0.824) (-0.205) (1.451) (-0.402) (0.069) (1.008) 
Constant -0.343 -3.160*** -1.943*** 0.721*** 0.068 0.196 87.161*** 22.428*** 0.366* -0.177* 
 (-0.793) (-6.431) (-3.981) (7.411) (0.509) (1.000) (3.046) (2.961) (1.923) (-1.784) 
Observations 2,738 2,738 2,738 2,738 2,738 2,738 2,738 2,738 2,738 2,738 
R-squared 0.112 0.334 0.355 0.148 0.338 0.384 0.093 0.004 0.638 0.093 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm 
Clustering 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COV_BS_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has a Balance sheet covenant. COV_IS_IND is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has an Income statement covenant. COV_NF_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the loan contract has a non-financial covenant. COV_BS is the number of Balance sheet covenants in a loan contract. 
COV_IS is the number of Income statement covenants in a loan contract. COV_NF is the number of non-financial 
covenants in a loan contract. Yield_Spread is the additional yield offered on the loan contract compared to a corresponding 
Treasury security. FEES is the initial loan fees charged on originating the loan. Covenant Intensity Index is the benchmark 
created by Bradley and Roberts (2004) and is a variable that takes a value between 0 and 6. Amendments is the number of 
ex-post loan amendments in a loan contract. Control variables have been previously identified in section 5. Robust z-
statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table VI-15 above, shows the regressions with the SERIOUS1 variable included as the 
explanatory variable replacing the three FVA classifications. As can be seen from the table, 
non of the tests were found to be significant, and therefore, we can conclude that the 
SERIOUS1 variable in itself, is not a significant explanatory variable for the expected 
influence on the loan contract design. 
Table VI-16: SERIOUS2 as an explanatory variable (control variables not shown) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES COV_BS_IND COV_IS_IND COV_NF_IND COV_BS COV_IS COV_NF Yield_Spread FEES Covenant 
Intensity 
Amendments 
           
SERIOUS2 -0.042 0.019 -0.038 -0.023 0.029 -0.050 7.463 -1.184 -0.042 0.021 
 (-0.435) (0.183) (-0.360) (-1.057) (0.939) (-1.148) (0.984) (-0.607) (-1.016) (0.846) 
Constant -0.475 -3.088*** -1.925*** 0.510*** -0.072 0.133 147.738*** 25.553*** 0.191 -0.311*** 
 (-1.137) (-6.384) (-4.106) (5.345) (-0.512) (0.664) (4.649) (2.893) (0.973) (-2.821) 
Observations 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 
R-squared 0.118 0.343 0.365 0.153 0.344 0.391 0.087 0.004 0.645 0.094 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm 
Clustering 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COV_BS_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has a Balance sheet covenant. COV_IS_IND is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has an Income statement covenant. COV_NF_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the loan contract has a non-financial covenant. COV_BS is the number of Balance sheet covenants in a loan contract. 
COV_IS is the number of Income statement covenants in a loan contract. COV_NF is the number of non-financial 
covenants in a loan contract. Yield_Spread is the additional yield offered on the loan contract compared to a corresponding 
Treasury security. FEES is the initial loan fees charged on originating the loan. Covenant Intensity Index is the benchmark 
created by Bradley and Roberts (2004) and is a variable that takes a value between 0 and 6. Amendments is the number of 
                                                             
36 Daske et al(2013) use their methodology in order to examine the influence of IFRS adoption in 2005, so 
their methodology is centred around this time period. We adjust their methodology to allow our 
classifications to be more dynamic. 
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ex-post loan amendments in a loan contract. Control variables have been previously identified in section 5. Robust z-
statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table VI-16 above, shows the regressions with the SERIOUS2 variable included as the 
explanatory variable replacing the three FVA classifications. As can be seen from the table, 
non of the tests were found to be significant, and therefore, we can conclude that the 
SERIOUS2 variable in itself, is not a significant explanatory variable for the expected 
influence on the loan contract design. 
Table VI-17: SERIOUS3 as an explanatory variable (control variables not shown) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES COV_BS_IND COV_IS_IND COV_NF_IND COV_BS COV_IS COV_NF Yield_Spread FEES Covenant 
Intensity 
Amendments 
           
SERIOUS3 -0.674** 0.151 -0.158 -0.135* 0.124 -0.125 -12.066 -3.353 -0.070 0.087*** 
 (-2.211) (0.379) (-0.538) (-1.866) (1.159) (-0.934) (-0.536) (-0.727) (-0.497) (2.651) 
Constant 0.411 -3.037*** -1.513*** 0.710*** -0.202 0.267 145.247*** 39.306** 0.313 -0.367*** 
 (0.810) (-5.085) (-2.885) (5.995) (-1.205) (1.168) (3.674) (2.448) (1.347) (-3.360) 
Observations 3,306 3,306 3,306 3,306 3,306 3,306 3,306 3,306 3,306 3,306 
R-squared 0.120 0.337 0.358 0.153 0.344 0.390 0.097 0.005 0.640 0.095 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm 
Clustering 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COV_BS_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has a Balance sheet covenant. COV_IS_IND is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has an Income statement covenant. COV_NF_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the loan contract has a non-financial covenant. COV_BS is the number of Balance sheet covenants in a loan contract. 
COV_IS is the number of Income statement covenants in a loan contract. COV_NF is the number of non-financial 
covenants in a loan contract. Yield_Spread is the additional yield offered on the loan contract compared to a corresponding 
Treasury security. FEES is the initial loan fees charged on originating the loan. Covenant Intensity Index is the benchmark 
created by Bradley and Roberts (2004) and is a variable that takes a value between 0 and 6. Amendments is the number of 
ex-post loan amendments in a loan contract. Control variables have been previously identified in section 5. Robust z-
statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table VI-17 above, shows the regressions with the SERIOUS3 variable included as the 
explanatory variable replacing the three FVA classifications. As can be seen from the table, 
the COV_BS_IND and the COV_BS tests were found to be significant and negative, 
suggesting that the SERIOUS3 variable results in a reduction in the occurrence and number 
of Balance sheet covenants. The Amendments test was found to be significant and positive, 
suggesting that the SERIOUS3 variable results in an increase in the number of loan 
amendments. However, non of the other tests were found to be significant. Overall, the 
SERIOUS3 variable exhibits similar results to the FVA1 variable in terms of the Balance 
sheet covenants, and exhibits the expected FVA1 results for the loan amendments test.  
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 Table VI-18: SERIOUS1 as an additional explanatory variable (control variables not shown) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES COV_BS_IND COV_IS_IND COV_NF_IND COV_BS COV_IS COV_NF Yield_Spread FEES Covenant 
Intensity 
Amendments 
           
FVA1 -0.343** -0.007 -0.295 -0.045 -0.008 -0.019 -30.753*** -2.926 -0.039 -0.017 
 (-2.118) (-0.039) (-1.547) (-1.257) (-0.153) (-0.277) (-3.350) (-1.075) (-0.562) (-0.578) 
FVA2 -0.009 0.013 -0.022 -0.009 -0.024 -0.189** 45.543*** 5.962 -0.135 -0.036 
 (-0.041) (0.056) (-0.089) (-0.186) (-0.346) (-2.166) (2.819) (1.288) (-1.594) (-0.905) 
FVA3 0.079 -0.320 -0.279 -0.053 -0.172*** 0.033 -27.511 -0.692 -0.083 -0.066* 
 (0.346) (-1.473) (-1.269) (-1.052) (-3.025) (0.323) (-1.603) (-0.173) (-0.850) (-1.706) 
SERIOUS1 0.091 0.013 0.016 0.022 0.033 -0.012 10.351 -0.954 0.002 0.027 
 (0.771) (0.102) (0.128) (0.838) (0.820) (-0.229) (1.339) (-0.439) (0.035) (0.977) 
Constant -0.345 -3.146*** -1.935*** 0.730*** 0.089 0.190 93.760*** 22.826*** 0.376** -0.169* 
 (-0.800) (-6.391) (-3.965) (7.501) (0.663) (0.967) (3.295) (3.028) (1.977) (-1.702) 
Observations 2,738 2,738 2,738 2,738 2,738 2,738 2,738 2,738 2,738 2,738 
R-squared 0.114 0.335 0.356 0.149 0.340 0.385 0.098 0.005 0.638 0.094 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm 
Clustering 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COV_BS_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has a Balance sheet covenant. COV_IS_IND is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has an Income statement covenant. COV_NF_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the loan contract has a non-financial covenant. COV_BS is the number of Balance sheet covenants in a loan contract. 
COV_IS is the number of Income statement covenants in a loan contract. COV_NF is the number of non-financial 
covenants in a loan contract. Yield_Spread is the additional yield offered on the loan contract compared to a corresponding 
Treasury security. FEES is the initial loan fees charged on originating the loan. Covenant Intensity Index is the benchmark 
created by Bradley and Roberts (2004) and is a variable that takes a value between 0 and 6. Amendments is the number of 
ex-post loan amendments in a loan contract. Control variables have been previously identified in section 5. Robust z-
statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table VI-18 above, shows the regressions with the SERIOUS1 variable included as an 
additional explanatory variable. The regressions are identical to those conducted in the main 
analysis and the control variables behave in a similar manner. The addition of the SERIOUS1 
variable does adversely affect the significance of the Level 1 results for the COV_BS test, 
but the remainder of the results are in line with those obtained from the main analysis, and 
the Level 3 classification is still found to be consistent and negatively related to the number 
of income statement and to the number of ex-post loan amendments. On the contrary, the 
inclusion of the variable indicates that both the Level 1 classification leads to a reduction in 
the occurrence of Balance Sheet covenants and a reduction in the loan’s yield spread. 
Overall, the results are generally consistent with those found in the main analysis. 
Table VI-19: SERIOUS2 as an additional explanatory variable (control variables not shown) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES COV_BS_IND COV_IS_IND COV_NF_IND COV_BS COV_IS COV_NF Yield_Spread FEES Covenant 
Intensity 
Amendments 
           
FVA1 -0.378** 0.056 -0.201 -0.058* 0.012 -0.010 -24.829*** -1.887 -0.022 -0.011 
 (-2.499) (0.335) (-1.082) (-1.779) (0.241) (-0.141) (-2.613) (-0.692) (-0.329) (-0.395) 
FVA2 -0.011 0.024 0.004 -0.005 -0.010 -0.168** 37.990** 4.868 -0.112 -0.043 
 (-0.049) (0.102) (0.016) (-0.111) (-0.149) (-1.998) (2.426) (1.091) (-1.358) (-1.135) 
FVA3 0.050 -0.343 -0.297 -0.057 -0.163*** 0.022 -26.416 -1.023 -0.088 -0.073* 
 (0.212) (-1.573) (-1.322) (-1.143) (-2.847) (0.219) (-1.546) (-0.257) (-0.913) (-1.906) 
SERIOUS2 -0.047 0.012 -0.047 -0.025 0.026 -0.053 7.054 -1.157 -0.047 0.018 
 (-0.487) (0.119) (-0.455) (-1.186) (0.827) (-1.214) (0.929) (-0.594) (-1.127) (0.739) 
Constant -0.485 -3.080*** -1.917*** 0.511*** -0.067 0.129 149.558*** 25.697*** 0.191 -0.310*** 
 (-1.163) (-6.351) (-4.088) (5.377) (-0.480) (0.643) (4.749) (2.908) (0.974) (-2.813) 
Observations 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 
R-squared 0.120 0.344 0.366 0.155 0.346 0.392 0.091 0.005 0.645 0.095 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm 
Clustering 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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COV_BS_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has a Balance sheet covenant. COV_IS_IND is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has an Income statement covenant. COV_NF_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the loan contract has a non-financial covenant. COV_BS is the number of Balance sheet covenants in a loan contract. 
COV_IS is the number of Income statement covenants in a loan contract. COV_NF is the number of non-financial 
covenants in a loan contract. Yield_Spread is the additional yield offered on the loan contract compared to a corresponding 
Treasury security. FEES is the initial loan fees charged on originating the loan. Covenant Intensity Index is the benchmark 
created by Bradley and Roberts (2004) and is a variable that takes a value between 0 and 6. Amendments is the number of 
ex-post loan amendments in a loan contract. Control variables have been previously identified in section 5. Robust z-
statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table VI-19 above, shows the regressions with the SERIOUS2 variable included as an 
additional explanatory variable. The regressions are identical to those conducted in the main 
analysis except that we include the SERIOUS2 variable as another additional explanatory 
variable. The addition of the SERIOUS2 variable does not adversely affect the significance 
or direction of the results obtained from the main analysis for the Level 1 (FVA1) and the 
Level 3 (FVA3) classifications, and the Level 1 classification is still found to be significant 
and negative for the Balance sheet covenants (H1b), and the Yield spread (H2b), and to have 
no effect on the Income and the Non-financial covenants (H1c,d). We also find that the 
FVA3 classification has a significant and negative relationship with the amendments test. 
Overall, the results are generally consistent with those found in the main analysis and the 
control variables behave in a similar manner to those in the main analysis.  
Table VI-20: SERIOUS3 as an additional explanatory variable (control variables not shown) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES COV_BS_IND COV_IS_IND COV_NF_IND COV_BS COV_IS COV_NF Yield_Spread FEES Covenant 
Intensity 
Amendments 
           
FVA1 -0.378** 0.056 -0.201 -0.058* 0.012 -0.010 -24.829*** -1.887 -0.022 -0.011 
 (-2.499) (0.335) (-1.082) (-1.779) (0.241) (-0.141) (-2.613) (-0.692) (-0.329) (-0.395) 
FVA2 -0.011 0.024 0.004 -0.005 -0.010 -0.168** 37.990** 4.868 -0.112 -0.043 
 (-0.049) (0.102) (0.016) (-0.111) (-0.149) (-1.998) (2.426) (1.091) (-1.358) (-1.135) 
FVA3 0.050 -0.343 -0.297 -0.057 -0.163*** 0.022 -26.416 -1.023 -0.088 -0.073* 
 (0.212) (-1.573) (-1.322) (-1.143) (-2.847) (0.219) (-1.546) (-0.257) (-0.913) (-1.906) 
SERIOUS3 -0.047 0.012 -0.047 -0.025 0.026 -0.053 7.054 -1.157 -0.047 0.018 
 (-0.487) (0.119) (-0.455) (-1.186) (0.827) (-1.214) (0.929) (-0.594) (-1.127) (0.739) 
Constant -0.485 -3.080*** -1.917*** 0.511*** -0.067 0.129 149.558*** 25.697*** 0.191 -0.310*** 
 (-1.163) (-6.351) (-4.088) (5.377) (-0.480) (0.643) (4.749) (2.908) (0.974) (-2.813) 
Observations 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 2,908 
R-squared 0.120 0.344 0.366 0.155 0.346 0.392 0.091 0.005 0.645 0.095 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm 
Clustering 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COV_BS_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has a Balance sheet covenant. COV_IS_IND is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has an Income statement covenant. COV_NF_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the loan contract has a non-financial covenant. COV_BS is the number of Balance sheet covenants in a loan contract. 
COV_IS is the number of Income statement covenants in a loan contract. COV_NF is the number of non-financial 
covenants in a loan contract. Yield_Spread is the additional yield offered on the loan contract compared to a corresponding 
Treasury security. FEES is the initial loan fees charged on originating the loan. Covenant Intensity Index is the benchmark 
created by Bradley and Roberts (2004) and is a variable that takes a value between 0 and 6. Amendments is the number of 
ex-post loan amendments in a loan contract. Control variables have been previously identified in section 5. Robust z-
statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table VI-20 above, shows the regressions with the SERIOUS3 variable included as an 
additional explanatory variable. The regressions are identical to those conducted in the main 
analysis except that we include the SERIOUS3 variable as another additional explanatory 
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variable. The addition of the SERIOUS3 variable does not adversely affect the significance 
or direction of the results obtained from the main analysis for the Level 1 (FVA1) and the 
Level 3 (FVA3) classifications, and the Level 1 classification is still found to be significant 
and negative for the Balance sheet covenants occurrence (H1b), and the Yield spread (H2b), 
and to have no effect on the Income and the Non-financial covenants (H1c,d). We find that 
the FVA2 classification has a positive and significant relationship with the Yield Spread, 
and a negative and significant relationship with the COV_NF test. We also find that the FV3 
classification has a negative and significant relationship with the Amendments test and the 
COV_IS tests. Overall, the results are generally consistent with those found in the main 
analysis and the control variables behave in a similar manner to those in the main analysis. 
Overall, including either of the three “serious” variables as an additional explanatory 
variable or the replacement explanatory variable was not found to adversely affect the 
results, and the results are found to be generally consistent with those found in the main 
analysis for the Level 1 classification. 
B. Demerjian (2011)  
The second robustness variable we use is the Volatility Ratio (VR) introduced by Demerjian 
(2011). The Volatility Ratio is used as a proxy for the exposure to balance sheet based 
accounting rules. The Volatility Ratio is defined as: 
𝑉𝑅 =  
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
Book value volatility is the five year standard deviation of the change in book value. The 
change in book value is the change in retained earnings (REQ) with the annualized dividend 
(DVPSPQ x CSHOQ) added back. The change in book value captures all non-capital 
changes in shareholder’s equity, including changes that are not recorded through the income 
statement. Adjusted net income volatility is the five year standard deviation of net income 
(NIQ) minus special items (SPIQ) and non-operating income and expense (NOPIQ).  
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Table VI-21: Volatility Ratio (VR) as an explanatory variable (control variables not shown) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES COV_BS_IND COV_IS_IND COV_NF_IND COV_BS COV_IS COV_NF Yield_Spread FEES Covenant 
Intensity 
Amendments 
           
VR 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.070) (-0.060) (-1.738) (1.129) (-1.573) (-0.014) (0.444) (-0.434) (-0.110) (-0.148) 
Constant -0.288 -2.883*** -1.580*** 0.722*** 0.090 0.241 87.452*** 30.004*** 0.434** -0.162* 
 (-0.724) (-6.461) (-3.622) (8.192) (0.740) (1.341) (3.343) (3.078) (2.510) (-1.809) 
Observations 3,298 3,298 3,298 3,298 3,298 3,298 3,298 3,298 3,298 3,298 
R-squared 0.118 0.335 0.359 0.152 0.343 0.389 0.097 0.006 0.639 0.095 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm 
Clustering 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COV_BS_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has a Balance sheet covenant. COV_IS_IND is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has an Income statement covenant. COV_NF_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the loan contract has a non-financial covenant. COV_BS is the number of Balance sheet covenants in a loan contract. 
COV_IS is the number of Income statement covenants in a loan contract. COV_NF is the number of non-financial 
covenants in a loan contract. Yield_Spread is the additional yield offered on the loan contract compared to a corresponding 
Treasury security. FEES is the initial loan fees charged on originating the loan. Covenant Intensity Index is the benchmark 
created by Bradley and Roberts (2004) and is a variable that takes a value between 0 and 6. Amendments is the number of 
ex-post loan amendments in a loan contract. Control variables have been previously identified in section 5. Robust z-
statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table VI-21 above, shows the regressions with the Volatility Ratio (VR) variable included 
as the explanatory variable. The VR variable only appears to exhibit a significant and 
negative relationship for the COV_NF_IND test. The remainder of the tests were not found 
to be significant.  
Table VI-22: Volatility Ratio (VR) (control variables not shown) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES COV_BS_IND COV_IS_IND COV_RES_IND COV_BS COV_IS COV_RES Yield_Spread FEES Covenant 
Intensity 
Amendments 
           
FV1 -0.291** 0.005 -0.159 -0.047 0.004 -0.017 -21.306** -3.925 -0.029 -0.002 
 (-1.961) (0.033) (-0.972) (-1.484) (0.083) (-0.264) (-2.368) (-1.460) (-0.458) (-0.074) 
FV2 -0.194 0.047 -0.110 -0.038 0.010 -0.156** 27.323* 3.315 -0.108 -0.064* 
 (-0.906) (0.220) (-0.486) (-0.881) (0.161) (-1.993) (1.871) (0.777) (-1.433) (-1.839) 
FV3 0.051 -0.394* -0.337* -0.048 -0.136* -0.027 -22.529 -1.218 -0.121 -0.050 
 (0.241) (-1.817) (-1.673) (-1.112) (-1.960) (-0.301) (-1.473) (-0.335) (-1.419) (-1.357) 
VR 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.109) (-0.078) (-1.781) (1.140) (-1.577) (-0.019) (0.449) (-0.418) (-0.117) (-0.160) 
Constant -0.287 -2.883*** -1.577*** 0.728*** 0.102 0.242 91.325*** 30.413*** 0.446*** -0.158* 
 (-0.724) (-6.441) (-3.613) (8.273) (0.842) (1.350) (3.498) (3.115) (2.580) (-1.774) 
Observations 3,298 3,298 3,298 3,298 3,298 3,298 3,298 3,298 3,298 3,298 
R-squared 0.120 0.336 0.360 0.154 0.344 0.390 0.100 0.006 0.640 0.096 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm 
Clustering 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COV_BS_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has a Balance sheet covenant. COV_IS_IND is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the loan contract has an Income statement covenant. COV_NF_IND is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the loan contract has a non-financial covenant. COV_BS is the number of Balance sheet covenants in a loan contract. 
COV_IS is the number of Income statement covenants in a loan contract. COV_NF is the number of non-financial 
covenants in a loan contract. Yield_Spread is the additional yield offered on the loan contract compared to a corresponding 
Treasury security. FEES is the initial loan fees charged on originating the loan. Covenant Intensity Index is the benchmark 
created by Bradley and Roberts (2004) and is a variable that takes a value between 0 and 6. Amendments is the number of 
ex-post loan amendments in a loan contract. Control variables have been previously identified in section 5. Robust z-
statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table VI-22 above, shows the regressions with the Volatility Ratio (VR) variable included 
as an additional explanatory variable. The addition of the VR variable does not adversely 
affect the significance or direction of the results obtained from the main analysis for the 
Level 1 (FVA1) and the Level 3 (FVA3) classifications, and the Level 1 classification is still 
found to be significant and negative for the Balance sheet covenants occurrence (H1b), and 
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the Yield spread (H2b), and to have no effect on the Income and the Non-financial covenants 
(H1c,d). Overall, the results are generally consistent with those found in the main analysis 
and the control variables behave in a similar manner to those in the main analysis. 
Overall, from the two additional explanatory variables, we can observe that there is some 
influence of FVA1 on the occurrence and number of Balance sheet covenants and on the 
Yield spread. We can also observe that the FVA3 classification generally tends to exhibit a 
negative relationship with the number of loan amendments and with the number of income 
statement covenants.  
6. Conclusion 
The paper examines the relation between FVA and debt contract design. Specially, the main 
interest is to examine any possible impact of FVA on covenant inclusion, the loan’s cost of 
debt, the Covenant Intensity Index and the number of ex-post loan amendments. We use a 
sample of US private debt contracts over the 2008-2013 period and find that the use of FVA 
results in the decrease of Balance Sheet, and Income Statement covenants. We further find 
mixed evidence that the use of FVA results in a lower cost of debt, a lower covenant intensity 
index and in a lower number of ex-post loan amendments.  
However, our results are not homogenous. In particular, when we focus the FVA 
classification, we find that the Level 1 classification exhibits a lower occurrence and number 
of Balance sheet covenants, while the Level 3 classification tends to exhibit a lower 
occurrence and number of Income statement covenants. In terms of the cost of debt we find 
that the lower yield spread and loan fees are generally exhibited by the Level 1 classification, 
while we find that the Level 2 classification tends to exhibit a decrease in the number of ex-
post loan amendments. In terms of the level of the Covenant Intensity Index, we generally 
find that it is the Level 3 classification that tends to exhibit a decrease. The Covenant 
Intensity Index result may be largely due to the observed effect of the Level 3 classification 
on the Income Statement covenants and the higher percentage of Income Statement 
covenants in the Covenant Intensity Index and the observed negative relationship between 
FVA3 and Dividend sweep covenants. 
Overall, our results are consistent with evidence found by other papers. For example, 
Demerjian et al (2014) argue that FVA may result in a reduction in the contracting ability of 
the financial information, especially, the level 2 and 3 classifications, which they and Liao 
et al(2013) argue is more ‘noisy’ and may include more ‘biased judgements’ compared to 
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the Level 1 classifications. Our results suggest that the Level 1 classification results in a 
reduction in the number of Balance sheet covenants and an associated reduction in the Cost 
of debt, whereas the Level 3 classification results in a reduction in the number of Income 
Statement covenants, but with no associated reduction in the Cost of debt We also find that 
the Level 2 classification observes a reduction in the ex-post number of amendments, which 
in accordance with Roberts and Sufi (2009), may imply a reduced accrual of new, relevant 
information. Therefore, our results are generally consistent with those found earlier, that is, 
we find that the Level 1 classification is deemed to be more ‘value relevant’ to lenders 
compared to the Level 3 classification. 
When we partition our sample into two subsample according to the median initial maturity, 
we find that for longer term maturities, the Level 1 classification leads to a reduction in the 
number of Balance Sheet, Income Statement, and Non-financial covenants, and in the 
Covenant Intensity Index.  We also find that the Level 3 classification exhibits a reduction 
in the number of ex-post loan amendments. The shorter maturity subsample exhibits a 
reduction in the cost of debt for the Level 1 classification and an increase in the number of 
Income Statement covenants. The results are in line with our earlier analysis where we do 
not find maturity to be a key explanatory variable for the use of FVA and also appear give 
some support for Platin et al (2008) who suggest that the damage done by FVA is greatest 
when the claims are long lived, however, our results suggest that this may be less of an issue 
for the FVA level 1 classification.  
For our robustness tests, we use Daske et al’s (2013) “serious” versus “label” adopters as a 
proxy to test for differences in financial reporting behaviour and environment, and 
Demerjian’s (2011) Volatility Ratio measure. Both of these measures are meant to capture 
differences in the quality of financial reporting and therefore, are used as additional 
explanatory variables that could explain the results obtained in the main regression. Even 
with these variables included as additional variables in our regressions, we find that the 
results from the main regressions generally hold, that is, we find that the significance and 
direction of the results found for the Level 1 and the Level 3 classification are still found to 
exist with the additional variables; the level 1 classification leads to a decrease in the 
occurrence and number of Balance Sheet loan covenants, while the Level 3 classification 
leads to a decrease in the occurrence and number of Income Statement loan covenants. We 
also find some evidence that the Level 1 classification leads to a lower yield spread and that 
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the Level 2 and 3 classifications lead to a reduction in the number of ex-post loan 
amendments.  
This paper contributes to the capital structure and accounting literature, by providing insights 
into the impact of FVA on debt contract design, its influence on covenant inclusion and the 
covenant intensity index, on loan amendments and on the cost of debt. Prior studies have 
tried to link ‘conservative’ accounting to covenant design and to cost of debt, however, we 
show a link between the recently introduced FVA regime and its ability to affect debt 
contract design and the cost of debt. In particular, similar to Demerjian et al (2014), we are 
able to show that the Level 1 FVA classification appears to be more value relevant compared 
to the Level 3 classification and consistent with Demerjian et al (2014) and others, we posit 
that this may arise due to the lack of contractibility introduced by the bias and judgement 
inherent in the Level 2 and Level 3 classifications compared to the Level 1 classification. 
Our results suggest that lenders may prefer certain accounting regimes over others and that 
in the context of private loan contracts, lenders appear to prefer accounting regimes that are 
meant to improve the information set available to them by disclosing asset and liability 
values, and the resulting gains and losses in a timely manner. 
Our results also suggest that the influence of FVA on Loan contracts is not uniform, and that 
the different FVA classification have differing influences on the occurrence and number of 
Balance Sheet, Income Statement, and Non-Financial covenants, the cost of debt, the 
covenant intensity index, and the number of ex-post loan amendments. 
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Appendix 
Table VI-23 below gives definitions and calculation methodology used to calculate the 
control variables used in the analysis. We winsorise the Maturity, Leverage, Size, Amount, 
and the Z-score variables at the 1% level. 
Table VI-23: Definition of control variables used 
Variable Calculation and source 
WMAT Calculated as the natural logarithm of the initial months to maturity for each observation. Data 
obtained from LPC/Dealscan. 
WLEV 
Calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Data obtained from COMPUSTAT/CRSP. 
WSIZE 
Natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Data obtained from COMPUSTAT/CRSP. 
WAMOUNT Calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the total loan amount to total assets. Data 
obtained from LPC/Dealscan and COMPUSTAT/CRSP. 
SECURED Binary variable equal to 1 if the loan is secured against a firm asset. Data obtained from 
LPC/Dealscan. 
Switching Binary variable takes the value of 1 if the borrower has switched to Fair Value accounting in the prior 
quarter. 
LOSS Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm exhibits a loss in the prior period. Data obtained from 
COMPUSTAT/CRSP. 
Rating Binary variable takes the value of 1 if the borrower has a credit rating in the firm year, or 0 
otherwise. Data obtained from Standard and Poors/Thomson. 
WZScore 
Calculated using Altman’s (1968) formula: ZScore = 1.2 * (Working capital/ Total assets) + 
1.4*(Retained earnings/Total assets) + 3.3* (Earnings before interest and taxes / Total 
assets) + 0.6 * (Market value of equity / Total liabilities) + 0.999 * (Net sales/ Total assets). 
The relevant compustat/crsp data is as follows: (ZScore = (1.2 * ((actq - lctq )/atq)) + (1.4 * 
(req / atq)) + (3.3 * (oiadpy/atq)) + (0.6 * (mkvaltq / ltq)) + (0.999 * (revty / atq)) ) 
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VII. Conclusion 
In a world of symmetric information, firm insiders and outsiders would have the same 
information and the firm’s choice of accounting policy would not matter. However, once we 
move away from a symmetric information world to a world in which there is asymmetric 
information, as we see in practise, accounting policy can have an impact on how outsiders 
view the firm. This thesis examines certain situations in which a firm may change its 
accounting policy and thereby, change the information set available to outsiders. 
The first paper examines the influence of uncertainty avoidance on the cost of equity benefits 
associated with IFRS adoption around the world. We focus on firm-level heterogeneity in 
the consequences, recognising that firms can differ in their motivations and the influence of 
uncertainty avoidance (UAI) (Hofstede, 1980, 2001) on IFRS. Some firms may adopt new 
IFRS standards as a means to signal their quality, others may adopt without making any 
material changes to their reporting policies, while some may adopt IFRS as part of a broader 
strategy to improve their commitment to greater capital market transparency. The possibility 
of such differences implies significant heterogeneity in the economic consequences around 
IFRS adoption due to selection effects. 
Our main prediction for the influence of uncertainty avoidance on the cost of equity benefit 
derived from IFRS adoption is that the prevailing cultural attitudes towards uncertainty in 
higher UAI countries, would result in a higher marginal benefit to investors compared to 
lower UAI countries. We predict this hypothesis due to our expectation that the pre-existing 
cultural norms in higher UAI countries would pre-dispose these countries to adopt 
accounting standards that would provide the disclosure of a lower quality or quantity of 
information compared to that offered by IFRS adoption. Hence, these types of countries 
should benefit to a greater degree from IFRS adoption compared to lower UAI countries.  
We predict that Voluntary adopters would benefit more in higher UAI countries than their 
counterparts and compared to mandatory and voluntary/mandatory adopters due to the 
ability to signal their quality by going counter to the cultural norms of society.   
To show the existence of such effects, we create and use two sets of variables in the paper. 
The first set of variables takes into account whether the firm observation uses IFRS, and in 
later analysis, whether the observation contains a Mandatory, Voluntary/Mandatory, or a 
Voluntary adopter. The second set of variables takes into account the influence of 
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uncertainty avoidance on the firm’s adoption decision, and the resulting economic 
consequences (UAI). We examine the economic consequences of uncertainty avoidance on 
IFRS adoption for mandatory, voluntary/mandatory, and voluntary adoption firms in a large 
EU based panel dataset from 2000-2013. 
We find that for IFRS adopters as a whole, the UAI variable has a significant positive 
relationship on cost of equity. That is, higher UAI implies a higher cost of equity. These 
results are consistent with our hypothesis. We further find that for the cost of equity, the 
three SERIOUS variables as introduced by Daske et al (2013), are significant and negative, 
implying that improved financial reporting transparency results in a decrease in the cost of 
equity. In terms of the interaction effect, in line with our hypothesis, we find that the use of 
IFRS and a higher UAI score for the country interact to lead to a reduction in the cost of 
equity, that is, the interaction terms are significant and negative, however, we find that the 
benefit from the interaction term is not sufficient to overcome the effect of the UAI variable. 
Examining the IFRS group by mandatory, voluntary, and voluntary/mandatory adopters 
suggests the effect of IFRS adoption and UAI are not uniform, but rather that mandatory 
adopters in higher UAI countries appear to benefit more than firms in lower UAI countries 
or any other type of IFRS adopter. We find that voluntary/mandatory firms tend to suffer 
from an increase in their cost of equity. 
We check the robustness of the results and replace the UAI variable with several competing 
cross-country variables used in prior literature. We find that all the other competing cross-
country variables previously used generally appear to suggest that uncertainty avoidance (or 
a proxy of UAI), may be able to partly explain the cross-country differences in the economic 
benefits from IFRS adoption. Therefore, the robustness tests provide additional support to 
our conclusions from the main analysis.  
The study also contributes to the literature on the role of the influence of uncertainty 
avoidance on IFRS adoptions and the resulting capital market outcomes. It highlights the 
role of cross-country differences in uncertainty avoidance, and how these differences can be 
used to explain part of the heterogeneity in capital market outcomes across firms and 
countries. We present evidence that suggests that the level of uncertainty avoidance can 
influence the economic benefits that firms can accrue from the adoption of IFRS. Also, 
unlike other existing studies on IFRS, we do not focus on just cross sectional data, but we 
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also include time series data. This allows us to examine whether the differences between 
countries and firms are persistent or time specific. This is important as there may be incorrect 
inferences drawn, if we only focused on a specific time period. 
Finally, we caution the reader that the results should not be interpreted as implying that 
uncertainty avoidance is the primarily driver for the cross-country heterogeneity in cost of 
equity, but rather a factor that is able to explain part of the difference in the results. We do 
not claim that managers were able to benefit from using the level of uncertainty avoidance 
in their respective countries. But rather the paper claims that managers could have benefited 
from the level of uncertainty avoidance.  While we show that uncertainty avoidance plays 
an important role for the sign and magnitude of the market reactions from IFRS adoption, 
the tests are not designed to analyse the relative contribution of standards and incentives. 
The second paper examines the design and renegotiation of covenants in debt contracts under 
asymmetric information using Garleanu and Zwiebel’s (2009) model as a starting point. In 
particular, we examine the influence of two distinct accounting regimes on the design and 
renegotiation of covenants. The model has a setting wherein future firm investments are 
efficient in some states but also result in a transfer from the Lender to the firm. We model 
symmetric information concerning the efficiency of the investments, however, the firm is 
better informed about any potential transfers compared to the lender. Information acquisition 
differs under the two different accounting regimes. Under the FVA regime, the Lender 
obtains the true realisation of the transfer value prior to the investment being made. 
However, under the HCA regime, the lender has to acquire this information at a cost.  
Given the above setting, we show that the presence of asymmetric information between the 
firm and the lender, and between the two different accounting regimes leads to the allocation 
of a greater amount of decision rights (covenants) ex ante to the more uniformed party, which 
is the lender facing a HCA regime, then would be the case under symmetric information.  
The model also suggests that firms that use FVA should be rewarded ex ante by the lender 
via requiring a lower yield on the debt contracts. Finally, the model suggests that the trade-
off between the potential cost savings from delaying information and the potential benefits 
from acquiring information earlier, results in the lender being more likely to renegotiate 
under the FVA regime. 
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We extend the base model and allow for the HCA firm to revalue prior to renegotiation and 
to share the information with the lender. We show that under this scenario, unlike the HCA 
firm in the base model, the firm that revalues is able to observe a less ex-ante covenants, and 
a lower cost of debt. 
We also extend our base model and allow for the FVA regime to produce information with 
noise, which we assume is a proxy for the Level 2 and Level 3 classifications. We are able 
to show that under the base model, in our extension, the firm will observe a higher number 
of loan covenants and a higher cost of debt. 
Our paper compliments existing literature by incorporating the influence of accounting 
choice on contract design and renegotiation. In particular, the paper is the first of its type 
that examines the influence of FVA on debt covenants, initial yield, covenant strictness and 
renegotiations. 
The third paper examines the relation between FVA and debt contract design. Specially, the 
main interest is to examine any possible impact of FVA on covenant inclusion, the loan’s 
cost of debt, the Covenant Intensity Index and the number of ex-post loan amendments. We 
use a sample of US private debt contracts over the 2008-2013 period and find that the use of 
FVA results in the decrease of Balance Sheet, and Income Statement covenants. We further 
find mixed evidence that the use of FVA results in a lower cost of debt, a lower covenant 
intensity index and in a lower number of ex-post loan amendments.  
However, our results are not homogenous. In particular, when we focus the FVA 
classification, we find that the Level 1 classification exhibits a lower occurrence and number 
of Balance sheet covenants, while the Level 3 classification tends to exhibit a lower 
occurrence and number of Income statement covenants. In terms of the cost of debt we find 
that the lower yield spread and loan fees are generally exhibited by the Level 1 classification, 
while we find that the Level 2 classification tends to exhibit a decrease in the number of ex-
post loan amendments. In terms of the level of the Covenant Intensity Index, we generally 
find that it is the Level 3 classification that tends to exhibit a decrease. The Covenant 
Intensity Index result may be largely due to the observed effect of the Level 3 classification 
on the Income Statement covenants and the higher percentage of Income Statement 
covenants in the Covenant Intensity Index and the observed negative relationship between 
FVA3 and Dividend sweep covenants. 
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Overall, our results are consistent with evidence found by other papers. For example, 
Demerjian et al (2014) argue that FVA may result in a reduction in the contracting ability of 
the financial information, especially, the level 2 and 3 classifications, which they and Liao 
et al(2013) argue is more ‘noisy’ and may include more ‘biased judgements’ compared to 
the Level 1 classifications. Our results suggest that the Level 1 classification results in a 
reduction in the number of Balance sheet covenants and an associated reduction in the Cost 
of debt, whereas the Level 3 classification results in a reduction in the number of Income 
Statement covenants, but with no associated reduction in the Cost of debt We also find that 
the Level 2 classification observes a reduction in the ex-post number of amendments, which 
in accordance with Roberts and Sufi (2009), may imply a reduced accrual of new, relevant 
information. Therefore, our results are generally consistent with those found earlier, that is, 
we find that the Level 1 classification is deemed to be more ‘value relevant’ to lenders 
compared to the Level 3 classification. 
When we partition our sample into two subsample according to the median initial maturity, 
we find that for longer term maturities, the Level 1 classification leads to a reduction in the 
number of Balance Sheet, Income Statement, and Non-financial covenants, and in the 
Covenant Intensity Index.  We also find that the Level 3 classification exhibits a reduction 
in the number of ex-post loan amendments. The shorter maturity subsample exhibits a 
reduction in the cost of debt for the Level 1 classification and an increase in the number of 
Income Statement covenants. The results are in line with our earlier analysis where we do 
not find maturity to be a key explanatory variable for the use of FVA and also appear give 
some support for Platin et al (2008) who suggest that the damage done by FVA is greatest 
when the claims are long lived, however, our results suggest that this may be less of an issue 
for the FVA level 1 classification.  
For our robustness tests, we use Daske et al’s (2013) “serious” versus “label” adopters as a 
proxy to test for differences in financial reporting behaviour and environment, and 
Demerjian’s (2011) Volatility Ratio measure. Both of these measures are meant to capture 
differences in the quality of financial reporting and therefore, are used as additional 
explanatory variables that could explain the results obtained in the main regression. Even 
with these variables included as additional variables in our regressions, we find that the 
results from the main regressions generally hold, that is, we find that the significance and 
direction of the results found for the Level 1 and the Level 3 classification are still found to 
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exist with the additional variables; the level 1 classification leads to a decrease in the 
occurrence and number of Balance Sheet loan covenants, while the Level 3 classification 
leads to a decrease in the occurrence and number of Income Statement loan covenants. We 
also find some evidence that the Level 1 classification leads to a lower yield spread and that 
the Level 2 and 3 classifications lead to a reduction in the number of ex-post loan 
amendments.  
This paper contributes to the capital structure and accounting literature, by providing insights 
into the impact of FVA on debt contract design, its influence on covenant inclusion and the 
covenant intensity index, on loan amendments and on the cost of debt. Prior studies have 
tried to link ‘conservative’ accounting to covenant design and to cost of debt, however, we 
show a link between the recently introduced FVA regime and its ability to affect debt 
contract design and the cost of debt. In particular, similar to Demerjian et al (2014), we are 
able to show that the Level 1 FVA classification appears to be more value relevant compared 
to the Level 3 classification and consistent with Demerjian et al (2014) and others, we posit 
that this may arise due to the lack of contractibility introduced by the bias and judgement 
inherent in the Level 2 and Level 3 classifications compared to the Level 1 classification. 
Our results suggest that lenders may prefer certain accounting regimes over others and that 
in the context of private loan contracts, lenders appear to prefer accounting regimes that are 
meant to improve the information set available to them by disclosing asset and liability 
values, and the resulting gains and losses in a timely manner. 
Our results also suggest that the influence of FVA on Loan contracts is not uniform, and that 
the different FVA classification have differing influences on the occurrence and number of 
Balance Sheet, Income Statement, and Non-Financial covenants, the cost of debt, the 
covenant intensity index, and the number of ex-post loan amendments. 
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